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DISSERTATION

VALUE IN THE THOUGHT OF PAUL TILLICH

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. The Problem of the Dissertation

The problem with which this dissertation is concerned is to discover, expound, and evaluate critically the understanding of value in the thought of Paul Tillich. One acquainted with this man's thought will immediately realize that nowhere in his major works does this traditional concern of philosophy receive exhaustive exposition. In fact, the term "value" is not, as such, one of the primary concepts in Tillich's systematic thought.[1] This silence is the source of both the justification for and the complexity of the selected topic.

For reasons which will be discussed in the next chapter, Tillich rejects the solutions offered by his teachers to the problem of the dichotomy of reality and value. His oft-affirmed commitment to ontology as the *sine qua non* of thought and reality is the hallmark which distinguishes this twentieth-century thinker and assures him a unique place in our intellectual arena. It is from the ontological perspective that Tillich offers a critique of certain late nineteenth and early twentieth-century minds, to which he is in the main very much indebted, and from which he seeks to re-examine some of the main concerns which claimed the attention of these men.

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[1] The singularly significant treatment of this problem is Tillich's article, "Is a Science of Human Values Possible?" in *New Knowledge in Human Values*, Abraham H. Maslow, ed. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), pp. 189-196.

Though stated in various ways, the problem of value is one such issue. There is therefore a need to explicate what Tillich is content to suggest or leave implicit. The difficulty in treating such a topic is that from one perspective, the entire philosophy-theology expounded could be regarded as relevant to the stated problem of value. In one sense, then, almost all of Tillich's writings could be regarded as pertinent to this problem, if not directly at least indirectly. Consequently, there is imposed upon this undertaking the necessity of making very clear what is here attempted.

Basically the thesis is an attempt to expose the manner in which value is "grounded" in "being," or stated in a different way, to demonstrate to what degree Tillich's "theory of value" is consistent with his ontologically-determined thought. The findings of this investigation should indicate whether Tillich should finally be regarded more as a "conservative essentialist" within the confines of his inherited idealism, or whether he should be understood as a "radical," or an existentialist--all claims to the contrary notwithstanding.

2. Limitations

Because the issue of value is at once both so fundamental and far-reaching, it is important to assert at the outset that this investigation is concerned simply to focus on an analysis of the more formal moments of Tillich's "ontology of value." Admittedly this focus is more philosophical than theological, given Tillich's distinctions and the approaches relevant to each. Consequently, the emphasis of this study is more on the philosophical than on the theological terms and concepts. This further prescribes an emphasis on the material to be used as the basis of the study. The "question-side" of Tillich's method of correlation is more fundamental for the purposes of analysis than is the "answer-side." In light of this situation, only his works or parts of certain works which deal most directly with this dimension of his thought will be used.[1]

There will be no attempt to impose alien categories or distinctions or criteria for the understanding of Tillich's concept of value. Tillich provides little or no basis for dialogue with those whose standpoint is alien to his basic philosophical outlook. This dissertation is but an attempt to provide in systematic form a theory of value which Tillich did not make explicit. Once this task is accomplished, there will be a concluding attempt to summarize and evaluate the Tillichian thesis on value.

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[1] This can be interpreted as an endorsement of G. H. Tavard's claim that Tillich's "analysis of Life and its tragedy is much more convincing than the description of the healing power of the divine spirit." The Commonweal, LXXIX (February 6, 1964), 567.

3. The Procedure Followed in the Dissertation

The dissertation has only two chapters following the Introduction. Chapter Two will expound the concept of value in Tillich's thought. The first part of this chapter will provide an analysis of the historical and biographical orientation of Tillich to the problem of value by indicating what alternatives he is quick to reject and by anticipating some of the major emphasis which will provide something of a vignette to Tillich's ontologically-grounded theory of value. Parts two and three of this chapter will treat respectively the ontology and epistemology which are foundational to the entire discussion. Because Tillich nowhere spells out in systematic manner how the structure of being is related to values in the dimension of spirit, it is necessary to map out again this well-examined territory. The brief treatment of epistemology not only provides a link with contemporary philosophical concern but is also essential to a discussion on the manner in which values are known. Here, it might be suggested, is a point in which the consistency of Tillich's understanding of value is most critically strained. Because of the ontological significance and grandeur accorded him in the Tillichian systematic structure, man will be the subject dealt with in part four of this chapter. Again, this is the stepping stone to the discussion of the functions of the spirit which will be extensively examined in part five. Here will be discussed the actual norms or values: Love, Truth, Authentic Expressiveness, Humanity, Justice, and the Holy and their relation to the functions of the spirit.

Chapter Three will conclude the dissertation with a summary and evaluation of Tillich's understanding of value, the latter from an "internal" perspective which will permit an analysis of the degree of consistency with which the nature of value is understood through the medium of ontology. The formal criterion for the concluding evaluation is provided and exemplified by Tillich himself when, in an attempt to criticize Karl Barth, he states that

> if Barth must be criticized, criticism is possible only when it deals with that which escapes Barth when judged by his own standards.[1]

To this formal criterion must be added four material criteria which, fortunately, Tillich himself supplies. (1) It must be determined whether Tillich's theory of values overcomes the deficiencies and inadequacies he finds in the alternate theories which he rejects. (2) The evaluation must determine the degree to which the theory of values is consistent with the system as a whole. (3) Based on Tillich's criterion for criticizing Karl Barth, there must be a determination of what escapes Tillich when judged by his own standards. (4) Given Tillich's avowed commitment to provide a system in which the problem of value is answered for the modern man, there must be an assessment of the degree to which Tillich stands in the twentieth century.

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[1] Paul Tillich, "What is Wrong with the 'Dialectical' Theology?" in The Journal of Religion, XV (April, 1935), 135-136.

4. Previous Research on this Topic

There has been no major analysis of the problem of value in the thought of Paul Tillich. A 1962 article by Louis C. Midgeley, "Paul Tillich's New Science of Values"[1] provides an excellent introduction to the problem by attempting to raise some of the epistemological questions involved. James Luther Adams' "Paul Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science and Religion" provides an analysis of the foundation of the problem of value in Tillich's early thought.[2] There have been several comparisons of phases of Tillich's ethics with other interpretations, but none has dealt with the larger problem of value as such. Any analysis done prior to the late 1963 publication of Tillich's Systematic Theology, Volume III, would have to be re-examined in light of this work. Early correspondence with Professor Tillich, in which this problem was discussed, elicited from him this response on October 19, 1964:

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[1] Louis C. Midgeley, "Paul Tillich's New Science of Values," in The Western Political Quarterly, XV (June, 1962), 235-253.

[2] James Luther Adams, "Paul Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science and Religion" (unpublished Ph. D. disser-

> . . . I must warn you that it is a very hard job you have undertaken. I am not aware of anybody who has tried it or is trying it today, and would certainly be very happy if it could be done by you!

In regard to works about Tillich it is interesting to note that Karl Barth states in January, 1963 that literature on Tillich, "strikingly enough, is not very extensive."[1] Kenneth Hamilton, with concern, notes that "nearly all the critical writing on Tillich to date has been in essay form; and if ever a theology called out for extended analysis, this one does."[2] Even such a critic as George

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tation, University of Chicago, 1946). At the time of this writing, announcement has been made of the publication of this volume by Harper and Row, scheduled for December 15, 1965. It is a brilliant and definitive work on the early Tillich.

[1] Karl Barth, "An Introductory Report," The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, by Alexander J. McKelway (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1963), p. 12.

[2] Kenneth Hamilton, The System and the Gospel: A Critique of Paul Tillich (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1963), p. 9. If this critique is generally correct, it is even more so in regard to the theory of value.

Tavard exemplifies this concern.[1] It is therefore obvious that there is a justification for works on Tillich which can fill the need as expressed in these references as well as provide a precise focusing on a particular problem which in turn helps to illumine the structure and tendencies in which his thought takes form.

5. Definitions

A word of explanation concerning the carefully and deliberately selected wording of the title of this study will serve to shed light on the meaning of the terms involved. An originally selected title was, "The Relationship of Value Theory to Metaphysics in the Philosophy of Paul Tillich." However, to use "Value Theory" as such would have for Tillich connotations of the Wertphilosophie which he sharply criticizes and unhesitatingly rejects as inadequate and misleading. Because there is considerable vacillation on Tillich's part in regard to his preference for a substitute for the term, "Metaphysics," it finally seemed unwise to incorporate the implicit Tillichian ambiguity into the title. It further became obvious that one should be hesitant to call Tillich's thought "philosophy" as such. Some might contend that it is theological or religious philosophy while others might insist that it is

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[1] George H. Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962).

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philosophical theology. It did not seem prudent to attempt to solve this issue by defending a particular interpretation. The fact that the writer feels strongly that in the final analysis the term, "theology," or its adjectival derivative, "theological," should be applied to Tillich only with great caution and careful explanation is of no ultimate consequence to the topic chosen. Consequently, "Value in the Thought of Paul Tillich" is a title that seeks to avoid prejudgment.

It is undoubtedly the case that a definition of value would involve one in issues attendant on attempts to define "good." And yet some working definition is needed which neither distorts nor prejudices Tillich's own understanding of the term, which, though fundamental to his thought, is never made explicit. The fact that the term is used both as a noun and a verb imposes upon it a certain ambiguity which is undoubtedly part of the problem Tillich wishes to address by avoiding as much as possible an unqualified use of it. It is generally agreed that as an abstract noun "value" designates that a thing or an experience is desired or desirable and as such can be equated with "worth" or "goodness." Tillich would insist that the term "worth" is dependent on value as he defines and uses it. Therefore he would make some sort of distinction which makes "worth" more a subjective than an objective term. Used concretely, "value" or "values" refers to things or, for Tillich, "products" of the functions of the "spirit" which have value. His concern is, however, to save value from relativity while yet admitting the necessity of individual values.

For some, especially German thinkers, values "refer to specific value qualities (Werte) analogous to colors."[1] Tillich does not concern himself with value interpreted in this way. As a verb, the term value refers to the act of expressing a worth-judgment. The separation of value from metaphysics has created a use of the term in current thought which suggests value as "valuing." This singular subjective "grounding" of value is very much resisted by Tillich. The concerns of value theory, as a major aspect of philosophy today, are primarily differentiations between intrinsic and extrinsic value; objectivity and subjectivity of values; the nature and number of its properties; its psychological status; and the cognition of values. In the main, Tillich does not enter into dialogue with the value-theorists. He does not treat systematically the issues raised during the last fifty years of discussion oriented to the empirical strain of philosophy from Locke on. Only occasionally does one find a phrase or a sentence which deals with certain specific approaches, and yet it must be insisted that a sweeping dismissal of a position or positions is not to be equated with a systematic discussion. It is a source of disappointment to realize that a system based on a method of correlation so consistently avoids genuine dialogue.

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[1] William Frankena, "Value," in Dictionary of Philosophy, Dagobert D. Runes, ed. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1942), p. 330.

Frankena points out one further distinction which is perhaps the most helpful. He states that

> value is sometimes contrasted with "fact" or "existence". Here the contrast intended is that of the "ought" versus the "is", and the term "value" is used to cover not only the various kinds of goodness, but also beauty and rightness. And the main problem is that of the relation of value and existence.[1]

Although this is a general designation, and although in it value is not as such defined, the description is probably the most adequate one for providing at least a preliminary orientation to the concern which embodies Tillich's understanding of value. In a sense to be explained in the dissertation there is an attempt on his part to use the term "meaning" for the term value, especially as the issue becomes identified with or related to the question of the value or meaningfulness of life. This leads Tillich to suggest that life is better understood in terms of meaning rather than value, because, as mentioned above, value is often limited to the subjectivity of valuation. For Tillich, meaning has an intrinsic objectivity which "value" as such has lost. At any rate the distinctions suggested by Frankena's summary quoted immediately above serve to suggest the direction in which the problem of value is focused. How Tillich solves this on the basis of "being" is the burden of this dissertation.

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[1] _Ibid_.

Some further explanation is required regarding the word "thought." As indicated above, this is an attempt at neutrality. The clearest intent of the term is to point to the philosophical aspect of Tillich's contributions in contrast to the theological. Even if this distinction is materially untenable, it is a valid formal distinction. Keeping in mind the references made above in the section on Limitations, one needs to remember that the dissertation attempts to make explicit what Tillich leaves somewhat hidden. It has the high purpose of presenting value as Tillich might himself have attempted to do it. Because the thesis purposes to discover whether and how value is in a sense an a priori, one must avoid grounding it exclusively in either the "question" or the "answer" side of the method of correlation. Therefore, "thought" as used in the title contains both the philosophical and theological moments in Tillich while designating neither in an exclusive way.

CHAPTER II

TILLICH'S THEORY OF VALUE

1. Tillich's Grasp of the Problem

i. The Relevancy of the Problem

A survey of philosophical thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries indicates the way in which the western mind has turned to a scientific positivism which in turn has had determinative consequences on many other areas of human life and thought. Perhaps in no area, however, has the consequence of this development been more passionately regarded with existential concern than in the domain of value. The general rejection of traditional metaphysics imposed on philosophy the necessity of finding another "foundation" for value.[1] Defenders of the traditional metaphysical heritage in philosophy have been denounced as impossible, irrelevant, and alogical. Though noble efforts have been made by "realists" or "naturalists" to maintain a commitment to empiricism and to the reality of values, their efforts have been subjected to the criticism of those who argue for a moment of absolutism in values and valuations as well as of those who have burdened the endeavor with such issues as the "naturalistic fallacy."

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[1] There are many ways to summarize the alternatives open to one who would systematize various answers. Perhaps none is totally adequate. However, Tillich gives an interesting summary and analysis of approaches which have gained recognition, though he fails to discuss those resulting from the empirical traditions of philosophical thought, especially that of logical positivism. His approach is clearly stated in his article, "Ethics in a Changing World," first published in 1941 in Religion and the Modern World (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941), then later in his book, The Protestant Era, and again in the more recent work, Morality and Beyond. Regrettably, the article was not revised to deal with more current alternatives which have been formulated by nearly a quarter of a century of philosophical dialogue.

It was inevitable that with the rise of logical positivism and the concern for the nature of language and meaning there be a focusing on ethical or value statements with the result that the cognitive and non-cognitive status of value statements became the main concern of value theory.[1] The identification of values with preferences and the claims by the advocates of the emotive theory of value have removed values and valuations not only from the metaphysical but the cognitive dimensions as well. Beyond the issues of validation, vindication, justification, fallacies, and simple qualities, lies the greater demand for adequacy. For many, if not for most, the issues regarding value remained unresolved and in constant need of re-examination. That any thinker attempts to address the problem of value with seriousness, regardless of his particular philosophical commitments, earns for him the right to be heard, even if his conclusions are rejected or modified.

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[1] One such attempt to deal with this problem is this author's Master's Thesis, "Good Reasons in Ethics" (unpublished Master's dissertation, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, 1957).

That Tillich is concerned with the problem of value has already been indicated in the Introduction. In the later writings, and especially in the three volumes of Systematic Theology are to be found the structures which make possible an ontological grounding of value. But these contributions cannot be fully appreciated or assessed without even a cursory survey of the historical orientation and heritage which were peculiarly Tillich's.

ii. The Historical Background

Numerous biographical references provide a wealth of material from which we can grasp something of the basic concern which Tillich inherited from his early teachers, shaped and modified by his own personal experiences. His relationship to idealism (Schelling), Neo-Kantianism, Wertphilosophie, phenomenology, and Lebensphilosophie was modified very much by World War I, evaluated as "the catastrophe of idealistic thinking"[1] in which a seemingly infinite chasm was created between theology and philosophy, or, to put it another way, between value and reality. Basically, during these years of near-global fighting, there opened up to Tillich an aspect of reality which he refers to as the "experience of the abyss of our existence."[1] The whole arena of history was sinking into meaninglessness which philosophical formalism, because of its inability to deal with the concrete and/or the unique individual moments, could not address. Neither could positions which stand within history constituted by a time which devours its own children. The comfortable complacency which inspired easy interpretations of life or history and its meaning was shattered. The abyss thus experienced put into question the meaningfulness of history, the synthesis of the absolute and the relative, the relationship of reality and value. On this basis it was concluded that the fundamental question in philosophy and theology revolved around the issue of discovering the meaningfulness of historical existence. In short, modern men are described as standing before the abyss of meaninglessness, "engaged in a vain search for an absolute reality in which they can take root."[2]

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[1] Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History, tr. N. A. Rasetski and Elsa L. Talmey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 35.

Part of the problem for Tillich was the lack of understanding on the part of his contemporaries as to what history really was, what constituted it, what was its structure. The uncritical understanding of nature was paralleled in the understanding of history. In fact, a comparison of the deficiencies is stated succinctly:

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[1] Tillich, Interpretation of History, p. 35.

[2] Ibid., p. 119.

> Was im Anfang von dem Begriff der Natur gesagt war, dass man ihm unreflektiert voraussetzte, gilt noch vielmehr vom Begriff der Geschichte; die Selbstverständlichkeit und Unreflektiertheit, mit der man ihn handhabte, ist erstaunlich; in der gesammten benutzten Literatur ist mir kaum eine Definition von Geschichte entgegengetreten, die geeignet wäre, ein deutliches Licht auf diesen Begriff zu werfen. Mann kann wohl sagen, es gab noch keinen wissenschaftlichen Begriff von Geschichte.[1]

The difficulties attendant upon this uncritical grasping of history are compounded further by the Tillichian insistence that "in every meaning, however, lies the silent presupposition of the meaningfulness of the whole, the unity of all possible meanings. . . . Meaning is always a system of meanings."[2] In other words, an unconditional meaning is the basis of any human experience of meaning. To acquire this, man needs a Weltanschauung, a term which must be interpreted, since it has a two-sided meaning.

> Entweder bezeichnet das Wort die jedem theoretischen und praktischen Urteil unausgesprochen zugrunde liegende Anschauung der Welt. In diesem Sinne ist "Weltanschauung" die notwendige und immer wirksame Voraussetzung der geistigen Akte. Oder Weltanschauung bezeichnet ein durchgearbeitetes Weltbild, ein "geistiges Haus", in dem man sich in allen Räumen

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[1] Paul Tillich, Der Begriff des Übernatürlichen, sein dialektischer Charakter und das Princip der Identität dargestellt an der supranaturalistischen Theologie vor Schleiermacher (Königsberg Nm.: H. Madrasch, 1915), p. 19.

[2] Tillich, Interpretation of History, pp. 221-222.

> einschliesslich Boden und Keller genau auskennt und das einen vor den Unbilden geistiger Wandlungen und Revolutionen schützt. In diesem Sinne ist der moderne Mensch Weltanschauungslos.[1]

This needed "geistiges Haus" has been destroyed in various ways by being divided against itself. It was lost in the medieval double-standard-of-truth theory; it is destroyed by side-by-side metaphysics of orthodoxy (supernaturalism); it is without foundation for those who advocate the Ritschlian renunciation of metaphysics.

Tillich was forced to conclude that the medieval synthesis degenerated into a destructive heteronomy which had been revived by Protestant orthodoxy. He fought his way against this to an autonomy, an achievement which occasioned his recognition of the fundamental problem with which he would have to work, namely, "the relation of the absolute, which is assumed in the idea of God, and of the relative, which belongs to human religion."[2] The realm of relativity, the area of history or of culture, in other words, the human realm, is never just a realm of relativity. Following his intellectual hero, Troeltsch, in a way to be discussed below, Tillich saw something sacred in all of the achievements of man, in all of the "products" of the functions of the spirit. The very nature of being is its power to become. In life in the dimension of the spirit this power is a demand. Basically the autonomous culture of Europe in the early part of the twentieth century was regarded as a victory of the spirit.

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[1] Paul Tillich, Religiöse Verwirklichung (zweite Auflage; Berlin: Furche-Verlag G. m. b. H., 1930), p. 273.

[2] Tillich, Interpretation of History, p. 25.

> The significance of the profane, of autonomous culture, of free society, however, is that it pursues logical, moral, esthetic, and social laws, that it grasps the forms of existence and realizes them in nature and society. Thus in accordance with the demand of the absolute meaning, science and art grow out of myth; law and ethics out of the cult. And because the growth of this profane culture is a demand of the unconditioned, it has divine strength and divine right. . . . But its weakness also lies in this contrast [autonomy of the profane and the heteronomy of the holy]; for through the contrast with the holy it loses its connection with the abyss of meaning, which gave the secular world its own validity.[1]

Given this situation, Tillich attempts to discover a solution to the question of the meaning and value of human existence. Since the anti-metaphysical emphases of the day had not borne fruit, the obvious answer lay in some form of metaphysical grounding of reality. Not only did there emerge the summons for a new understanding of nature, but also a new understanding of history. There had to be a metaphysical structuring of both. The "depth" had to be recognized. A metaphysics of nature would result in ecstatic naturalism or "belief-ful realism." A metaphysics of culture, regarded as the content of history, would reveal a theonomous culture. Value and reality must be seen together; the absolute and the relative must be united.

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[1] *Ibid*., pp. 228-229.

For Tillich, meaning and value are finally found in a world, a cosmos, in which there is no "aboveness," "side-by-sideness," in which there is no ultimate dualism. This is the basic Ausgangspunkt with which Tillich attempts to reconcile his theoria (based on idealism) and his praxis (shaken by a historically-produced "existential" experience of history). Tillich would spend most of his years in Germany and all of his years in America in this task. The problems he faced proved every bit as great as the problems he inherited. But because it was his inheritance of certain issues and certain alternatives which proved to be the mold in which all subsequent interpretations would be shaped, it is necessary to make even a cursory survey of Tillich's inheritance. This will in itself shed light on the meaning of the concepts which already have emerged as pivotal.

(1) Tillich's Relationship to Ernst Troeltsch. -- It might be said that Troeltsch was himself an incarnation of the issues of the theological-philosophical world at the beginning of the twentieth century. Beginning his career with a Ritschl-like regard for Christianity as the absolute religion, and a Kantian philosophy regarded especially adequate for a Wertphilosophie, he moved more toward an emphasis upon the uniqueness of the historical, toward the historicity of both religion and ethical-cultural values.

In other words, his inheritance of an understanding of the absolute became more and more historical, bringing into sharp focus the question of the relation between the absolute and the relative; the descriptive and the normative; individuality and validity. Given the varieties of perspectives and the historical _mode d'existence_ of any culture, he raised _the_ question as to "where one can find a basis for a standard of values and of religion? What is the ground of validity?"[1]

Adams notes as determinative for Troeltsch the paradox of the age; "on the one hand, endemic forms of dogmatism relying upon false absolutes; on the other, cultural relativism which had emerged as a consequence of the historical consciousness that came to birth in the eighteenth century."[2] Troeltsch saw in this crisis something of what Wilhelm Dilthey had described as "the anarchy of values." This concern is the source of _the_ problem and tension which characterize Troeltsch's thought, "the tension between the absolute and the relative, and the tension between the claims of a categorical ideal and the demands, the possibilities, and the ambiguities of ongoing history."[3] Given the absurdity of all forms of absolutism and the meaning-destroying relativism of culture, Troeltsch dedicated his intellectual energies to a fight against "meaninglessness." Stated in yet another way, "the problem of the relationship of value to historical processes, as posed by Rickert, is a problem also for Troeltsch."[1] David Little analyzes Troeltsch's stance as being oriented to a doctrine according to which man

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[1] James Luther Adams, "Ernst Troeltsch As Analyst of Religion," in _Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion_, I (October, 1961), 99.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 98.

[3] _Ibid_.

> is a social actor who stands between the two spheres and is pulled, so to speak, in two directions. At the heart of his existence, a man is constrained both by the logic of his system of values (his system of ultimate coherence and order) and by the logic of his physical and sociopsychological environment.[2]

Analyzing Troeltsch's book, Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte, Roger Johnson concludes that Troeltsch's problem was the central issue of the day and further that it was generally ignored, but not completely so.

> Perhaps the one significant theological exception to the otherwise common rejection of Troeltsch's problems is the thought of Paul Tillich. Like Troeltsch . . . Tillich retains the legacy of German Idealism to the extent that he is still able to attempt to correlate the particular faith confession of Christianity with the universal structure of reality. In spite of this one exception, however, it would seem fair to say that Troeltsch's attempt--and failure--

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[1] Max L. Stackhouse, "Troeltsch's Categories of Historical Analysis," in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, I (April, 1962), 225.

[2] David Little, "Religion and Social Analysis in the Thought of Ernst Troeltsch," in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, I (October, 1961), 116.

> to resolve this problem remained normative for our time.[1]

That Tillich does address the problems which concerned Troeltsch cannot be questioned. With the latter the former recognized the limits of Lebensphilosophie, in that it cannot posit the telos of evolution; and apriorism, which is unable to comprehend the individual moment in history. Both saw that "reality and value, being and oughtness, are more and more torn asunder."[2] Tillich's early reaction to the problems of Troeltsch is most revealing. While recognizing the significance of Troeltsch's attempt to extricate history from the methodological approach of a scientific study of nature, he then claims that

> of course it will be scarcely possible to free the concept [historicism] permanently from its corrupted connotations without recognizing that philosophy can never remain content with the final dualism of two ways of considering reality, but that it must attempt to rise above both points of views.[3]

Again, while accepting Troeltsch's analysis of the tearing asunder of reality and value, of being and oughtness, he quickly adds that

> only an autonomous logic of history can arrive at the

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[1] Roger A. Johnson, "Troeltsch on Christianity and Relativism," in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, I (April, 1962), 223.

[2] Paul Tillich, "E. Troeltsch: Historismus und Seine Probleme," in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, I (October, 1961), 111.

[3] Ibid., p. 110.

> solution, a logic that at bottom is an epistemology of history and that in the manner of Leibniz and Malebranche presupposes the identity of the finite spirits with the infinite Spirit. Only on this basis also is the fundamental problem of historical understanding, the perception of an alien psychic life, to be solved.[1]

In a most helpful summary, Tillich indicates what strengths he finds in Troeltsch's thought regarding this set of problems:

> (1) "the idea of the contemporary cultural synthesis as a criterion of the interpretation of the meaning of history;"
>
> (2) "the idea of the individually-creative;"
>
> (3) "the conception of the interpretative principle as a risk;"
>
> (4) "the fundamental transformation of the neo-Kantian theory of values by the idea of their creative, unique realization;"[2]

all of which Tillich regards as "breakthroughs." Several of these points will be discussed below. But in spite of this evaluation of the strengths of Troeltsch's analysis and contributions, there is pointed out one basic deficiency which marks the difference between these two men. Troeltsch is praised for his confessed sympathy for the Leibnizian-Malebranchean doctrine of the _identity_ of the infinite and the finite minds or spirits. The rebuke comes at the point wherein Troeltsch did not recognize this as more than an epistemological theory--as a metaphysical truth. As Troeltsch uses this identity doctrine it emerges at best as but an "extra," an accorded position that destroys its thrust. For, claims Tillich, the metaphysical doctrine of the identity of the infinite and the finite mind

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 111.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 113.

> is either the foundation or it is nothing. And where it is lacking, the whole structure hangs in the air. The concept "individual creativity" can destroy the creative power, if it is understood as the demand to build up a new relative aim from an infinite number of cultural creations and if it does not carry within it an ultimate religious justification in spite of its relativity.[1]

Nothing short of a metaphysics of history will solve the problem of values, of meaning, of the absolute-relative.

> Metaphysics of history is a view of history in symbols. It finds in representative, symbol-creating events a meaning of all history which is free from the difficulties of relativism and leads to ethical consequences which are rooted in an ultimate meaning of life.[2]

Tillich's final understanding and interpretation of history as the actualization of being provides the foundation for a "metaphysics" of history.

Another point at which Tillich employs his "Yes-No" method of evaluating is in the area of religion, which in Troeltsch's later writings became more and more swallowed up in historical relativity. It is argued that "an die

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*

Möglichkeit einer ontologischen Begründung der Religion und ihres Absolutheitsanspruches dachte niemand,"[1] not even Troeltsch. "So schloss sich denn Troeltsch demjenigen Flügel des Kantianismus an, der in die Richtung auf geisteswissenschaftliche Methode drängte, der Windelband-Rickert'schen Wertphilosophie."[2] Following the lead and under the influence of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, Troeltsch attempted to find "ein Religiöses a priori," an endeavor which should be applauded for its insistence on according reality to the religious over against attempts to identify religion and culture. But herein is also the danger.

> Wird die Religion zu einer Funktion neben anderen gemacht, so ist der ihr innewohnende Anspruch auf Unbedingtheit unerfüllt geblieben und es lässt sich keine zugängliche inhaltiche Bestimmung für sie finden. Und wird die Religion primär als Geistesfunktion gewertet, so kann zwar ein formales Geltungsbewusstsein gesichert werden, aber der Anspruch auf Transzendenz im überformalen Sinne bleibt unerfüllt. Das bedeutet aber in beiden Beziehungen: Das Unbedingte ist dem Bedingten geopfert.[3]

When God is relegated exclusively to the function of serving as the ground of life in the dimension of spirit, he can never be seen also as that which transcends life.

From this analysis of the problems of Troeltsch and

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[1] Paul Tillich, "Ernst Troeltsch: Versuch einer geistesgeschichtlichen Würdigung," in Kantstudien, XXIX (1924), 352.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 352-353.

Tillich's relation to these problems ought now to be seen quite clearly the unfaltering metaphysical orientation with which Tillich shall build his system. Remaining more than faithful to Schelling I and Schelling II in his insistence on the principle of identity, Tillich attempts to put back together a world which the issues of value-existence, absolute-relative, and like issues had dichotomized and/or dualized, and to do this with an ontology that can take into account the experience of the "abyss."

There is yet one further aspect of Troeltsch's thought which, for lack of better opportunity, should be mentioned here. This concerns his development and use of the concept of *Gestalt*, an idea which Tillich also uses in discussing the problems outlined above. As Little succinctly summarizes Troeltsch at this point, the problem of historical understanding is the obvious actuality of the two basic "structures" of reality which are identified as the ideational "superstructure" and the "real-causal substructure." "For Troeltsch, history is wrought precisely out of the 'manifold interweaving and interpenetration (*Verflechtung* and *Durchwirkung*) of the 'superstructure' and the 'substructure.'"[1] Tillich evaluates Troeltsch's analysis of this problem as being based on the distinction made by Rickert between an individualizing and a generalizing method, between the "individual" and the "general." Troeltsch's refusal to regard the "individual events" of history finally as simply a particular thing, his insistence that historical objects are "totalities," represents an advance beyond Rickert.

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[1] Little, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, I (1961), 115.

> It provides the possibility of comprehending a group of realities that belong to neither side of that opposition, but which carry in themselves individual as well as general elements. It is the class of Gestalten which are characterized in this way. Totalities are configurations, whether they be biological, psychological or sociological. Between naturalism and historicism in the sense of Troeltsch's interpretation, there should be introduced a class of objects which one could characterize as types and which like the other two classes (the individual and the general) appear in all spheres. Troeltsch has had a feeling for the existence of this class. He demands of the philosophy of history attention to biology, and a great part of his historical-critical remarks are attempts, by comparison and contrast, to come to terms with types. But he has been too much bound by the Rickert alternative (between the individual and the general) to permit him to recognize the decisive significance of types and Gestalten in history.[1]

The significance of the concept of Gestalt is seen by Tillich in that it provides a category for the understanding of history beyond the category of individual totality. Gestalten are for Tillich the means whereby the dynamic of being can be understood apart from the static and consequently distorting category of individual totality. The "eruptive character" of historical dynamics demands this approach and consequently this concept of Gestalt. The application of this idea of Gestalt to cosmic life thereby relieves a material philosophy of history of the problems which lie beyond its ability to solve. Too, historical events are dependent upon present "situational Gestalten." Consequently, Tillich wants to view all the problems of historical interpretation, such as disparity between nature and mind, the problem of the unconscious, the necessity of accepting a number of cultural spheres, and the concept of a universal cosmic life (the arena for achieving historical existence), from the perspective of Gestalten which frees all these problems from the confines of the individual-general alternative. Now the point of all of this is that "meaning" is for Tillich understood as a Gestalt, one in which

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[1] Tillich, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, I (1961), 112.

> the dynamic depths of being are expressed and in which existence rises above itself into that creative realm which combines value, being, and import, all together pulsating with the powerfulness and holiness of the divine. Or in fewer words, meaning is the combining of value and reality in creative individuality.[1]

In short, Tillich wants to prevent an atomization of history. "Individuality" must never remain an ultimate category if the philosophy of being based on the principle of identity is to be sustained. Through the concept of Gestalt or Type he is able to recognize uniqueness and generalization together, or expressed in other words, the coinherence of the relative and the absolute, or reality and value.

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[1] Adams, "Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science and Religion," p. 59.

The use of the word Gestalten or Types immediately raises the question as to Gestalten or Types of what? In the answer to this question is his metaphysics of history, which is also the motif whereby the realms of value and existence are to be interpreted. His advance beyond Rickert and Troeltsch is really one in which Schelling and the principle of identity are "updated." Here too, we encounter an early motif which will be influential in the structuring of the concept of "symbol." In this way Tillich tries to correct the basic fallacy and failure of Troeltsch in the latter's dealing with the problem of the relative and the absolute (with all of its concomitant issues), whereby "in dem Ringen um diesen Widerspruch das Übergewicht auf Seiten des Relativen lag."[1] This is so

> because he does not dare to rise to the level where he would have to make appeal to the Protestant doctrine of justification, namely on the level of a metaphysics and theology of history.[2]

These criticisms outlined above do not mean to suggest that Troeltsch was an embodiment only of the problem. Undoubtedly, he also pointed out for Tillich something of the direction in which the solution is to be found. Ultimately for Troeltsch, "both science and religion, also logic and aesthetics depend upon reference to an ultimate and final value."[1] As Troeltsch himself admits, "the ontological ought is the key to being."[2] As Adams further points out in this analysis of Troeltsch, there seems to be some kind of a suggestion that obligation and validity confront one in the midst of the very processes of becoming, of history, of creative evolution. Consequently,

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[1] Tillich, Kantstudien, XXIX (1924), 351.

[2] Tillich, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, I (1961), 113.

> Troeltsch's theory of values has often been compared to that of Whitehead. Of Whitehead it has been said that he Bergsonized Plato. Of Troeltsch it may be said that he Bergsonized Kant and historicized Hegel. The absolute is not available for domestication in history.[3]

Evidently Troeltsch did not consider the possibility of "relating the question of standards to an elaborated ontology. He goes beyond Kant in the direction of a mystical philosophy and . . . a philosophy of history rather than of a philosophy oriented to the categories of being."[4] In this he is certainly to be contrasted with that which is Paul Tillich's achievement. This is the moment of sharpest comparison and contrast between the two thinkers. Tillich purposes to provide an ontology that solves the problems. Two important concepts are yet to be analyzed before the problem of value per se in Tillich's thought is discussed. In these become obvious certain assumptions that are all-determinative in the subsequent treatment of the problem of value.

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[1] Adams, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, I, (1961), 102.

[2] Troeltsch, "Moderne Geschichtsphilosophie," in Ges. Schr., II, 707, as quoted by Adams, ibid., p. 102.

[3] Ibid., p. 109.

[4] Ibid., p. 102.

(2) *"The Boundary-Situation" and "The Unconditioned."* -- The inheritance of certain problems from Troeltsch in particular and from "the times" in general must be examined, evaluated, and addressed from the perspective of two very important concepts in the early Tillich, namely, the boundary situation and the unconditioned. On the basis of these concepts Tillich examines a mass of difficulties attendant upon the recognition of the impossibility of "domesticating" the absolute and the impossibility of granting ultimacy to self-destructive relativism. The crisis was, in existential fashion, the dichotomy of value and existence. In "essential" fashion, the issue was one of formalism and materialism, and the relation, if any, between the two.

These two concepts attempt to recognize the reality of individual embodiments of the absolute while yet allowing for that necessary "something" beyond the individual, beyond the historical. In summary,

> es sind zwei Wege, die scheinbar in entgegengestzter Richtung verlaufen und doch auf das gleiche Ziel hinführen: Der eine ist der Weg radikalster Fassung des protestantischen Prinzips also Verkündigung der "menschlichen Grenzsituation", der andere ist der

> Weg entschlossener Bejahung der Gegenwart des Unbedingtsjenseitigen, das Reden von einer "Gestalt der Gnade."[1]

These concepts are offered as "demand and expectation," "demand in face of the Eternal, in face of the infinite and inexhaustible ground and abyss of being, and expectation, in the sense of anticipating the possible realization of the true meaning of life."[2] That the border situation is possible and perhaps even inevitable in man is grounded in the inevitability of man's freedom. In a most pointed summary it is claimed that

> the border-situation of man is possible because he is not identical with his vital existence. It is possible because man as man stands above his vital existence, because he has in a sense broken away from his vital existence. To be a man involves this transcending of vital existence, the freedom from himself, the freedom to say "Yes" or "No" to his vital existence. This freedom, which is an essential part of him and from which he cannot escape, carries with it the fact that he is radically threatened. Man is in a genuine sense the threatened creature because he is not bound to his vital existence, because he can say "Yes" and "No" to it. This is manifest in the fact that man can raise the question of the true and that he can demand the fulfilment of the good. Anyone who raises a question about *true* reality is in some way separated from reality; whoever makes a demand upon reality presupposes that it is not at hand. Man *must* raise the question, however, and *must* make the demand; he cannot escape this fate, that is, the fate of being man.[3]

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[1] Tillich, *Religiöse Verwirklichung*, pp. 14-15.

[2] Adams, "Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science, and Religion," p. 35.

[3] Paul Tillich, *The Protestant Era* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 197.

Because there is ultimate significance, and ultimate difference, in the way we decide, the inescapable freedom of human life is a threat. A life in freedom is one in which there is acceptance of the unconditional demand to realize the true and actualize the good.

> If this demand is not fulfilled -- and it is not -- our existence is driven into discord, into the hidden agony that infects all life, and even death cannot free us from it. Wherever this situation is experienced in its unconditional and inescapable character, the human border-situation is encountered. The point at which not-being in the ultimate sense threatens us is the boundary line of all human possibility, the human border-situation.[1]

The issues here are complex. As will be discussed in the sections dealing with ontology and man, freedom is ever in polarity with destiny. It is the latter that serves as the locus of the demand. Too, one should also realize that for Tillich, freedom is first of all an ontological category. By so interpreting freedom, Tillich is able to recognize as ethical all exercise of freedom in the dimension of the spirit.

In this boundary or border situation one somehow stands between threat and support, for the boundary-situation is, in fewer terms, the awareness of the temporal before the infinite realm. The "infinite" demand to fulfill life, to realize the true and to actualize the good, is recognized as beyond the ability of historical existence. That threat and support are related is based on the concept of being and the fact that this (being) is regarded as a power that is the heart of all creativity. Thus even "the threat" to human existence, in order to be real and actual, must in some manner participate in this basic power of being. Should anything violate completely the form or structure of being, it would not exist at all.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 198. In a significant biographical reference Tillich claims that "auf diesem Ort [Grenzgebiet] wurde ich geworfen, seitdem ein entschlossenes autonomes Denken mit einer starken und konservativen religiösen Tradition zusammenstiess; auf ihm bin ich geblieben, er hat von Anfang an mein Denken und Handeln bestimmt; er hat Ausdruck gewonnen in all meinen Arbeiten und darüber hinaus in meinem akademischen Schicksal, ..." *Religiöse Verwirklichung*, p. 11.

This moment of support introduces the concept of the unconditional whereby all human existence is saved from despair, relativity, meaningless; whereby existence is saved from valuelessness. Tillich is not prepared to surrender the meaningfulness of existence to this inevitable moment in man's boundary-situation. The whole historical-cultural process is more than a flowing from the past toward the future. It is more because there is something that "supports the times but is not subject to them."[1] It is thus from the boundary that Tillich is able to hear a yes and a no whereby the former accords to the stream of events a positive meaningfulness while the latter denies to any event or any stream of events ultimate or absolute value or meaningfulness. In theological terminology, Tillich hereby relates dialectically the concepts of creation and justification. With the concept of the boundary-situation there is the related idea of the unconditioned.

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[1] Paul Tillich, The Religious Situation, tr. H. Richard Niebuhr (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), p. 35.

For Tillich the unconditioned is a prius, a direction of consciousness, evidenced or hidden in all moments of consciousness. It is the sine qua non of the reality of meaning.

> The prius of every individual apprehension of meaning is the unconditioned meaning itself, the prius of every meaning-form is the direction toward the unconditioned form, and the prius of every meaning-content is the unconditioned import.[1]

Examination helps to confirm the observation made by Adams concerning the ambiguity pertaining to the content and the function of the concept of the unconditioned.[2] It must now be further stated that the ambiguity remains in subsequent writings. However, it is still possible to chart the basic course which this important concept follows throughout Tillich's thinking. Early in his attention to this idea he claims that

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[1] Adams, "Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science, and Religion," p. 40. Tillich regards the ontological argument as an illustration of this analysis.

[2] Ibid., p. 179. "The idea of the Unconditioned must be understood in relation to Tillich's conceptions of being, truth, and value. In connection with these things it serves as a ground and 'qualification' and also as a limiting concept. The concept is used also as a philosophical-religious synonym for the Holy where presumably it possesses no particular valuational implication. But Tillich has not given a definitive statement concerning these denotations and connotations of the concept. Without clarity in these matters the reader is uncertain not only with respect to the several ingredients of the concept but also with respect to the criteria by which one judges its validity. Moreover, we have no description of how the Unconditioned 'erupts' into the consciousness. We are simply told that it does so 'some-

> das Unbedingte ist nicht nur a posteriori durch eine Schematisierung, sondern a priori durch Wesensbeziehung das fundierende Element alles Wertbewusstseins, aller Geisteswirklichkeit. . . . Das Unbedingte des Gehaltes und das Unbedingte der Form gehören wesenshaft zusammen.[1]

Of particular importance is the reference to the unconditioned as an a priori, and its relation to consciousness. Only on this basis does there seem to be ground to make the later equation of this with ultimate concern. It is obvious that even the "boundary-situation," when under-

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how.' Again, the deficiency is partly due to Tillich's renunciation of the empirical method in theological matters." In subsequent use of the terms it seems that the ambiguity still remains although the questions pertaining to the awareness of the Unconditioned are partly answered in Tillich's later doctrines of man and knowledge. This will be shown later in the dissertation. In Tillich's "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," The Theology of Paul Tillich, eds. Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), there is mention of this concept. Here he attempts to denounce the substantive form of the term and offer instead adjectival forms, such as "unconditional," "ultimate" or "infinite concern." (Note especially p. 340). Kenneth Hamilton claims that "it may be doubted whether changing from noun to adjective really accomplishes much so long as these adjectives continue to derive their force from the substantive being-itself which is also the 'absolute'." System and the Gospel, p. 61.

[1] Paul Tillich, "Die Kategorie des 'Heiligen' bei Rudolf Otto," Theologische Blätter, II (January, 1923), cl. 11.

stood with the correlative concept of the unconditioned, is possible only on the basis of the principle of identity. Tillich does not raise the possibility of a real or actual loss of the possibility of a boundary experience. While there will be references to this in subsequent discussion, it is yet valid to point out that hidden in this analysis is an assumption that value is never ultimately lost. The unconditioned is a necessary moment in consciousness. Value becomes the presupposition of consciousness, since consciousness presupposes the moral function of self-integration. This will be discussed in the section dealing with man.

However, an indication of the complexity of Tillich's concept is suggested by Adams' summary analysis of the unconditioned.

> The concept of the Unconditioned, as the ultimate that is presupposed by all meaning, being and value (contradicting and supporting them), is a composite concept. In Tillich's usage it draws upon and modifies the ontological and axiological concepts of Greek and modern thought, from Anaximander and Parmenides to Spinoza and Kant, though in its modified form it aims to give expression to the Jewish-Christian idea of the majesty and unspeakable richness of the divine.[1]

Recognizing that there are three ways in which the concept functions in Tillich's thought, namely, as a negative, constitutive, and value concept, Adams perceptively points out that only on the basis of the latter can be understood and evaluated (in terms of or in relation to universal norms) all cultural creations and even human nature itself. From the point of view of his cultural creations man is seen as standing at the boundary whereby and wherein he recognizes as implicit within the norms pertaining to both realms of _theoria_ and _praxis_ the unconditional ~~dema~~nds implicit within the functions of the spirit.

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[1] Adams, "Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science, and Religion," p. 35.

> Thus in confronting the limited character of our existence, in confronting the ambiguous events of the temporal order, in confronting the normative demands of truth, goodness, and beauty, we find a qualification which we "intuit" in reality itself, the qualification of the conditioned by the unconditioned.[1]

Thus the unconditioned is understood as the creative power which is seen in but which is never exhausted by the historically conditioned events, thoughts, and deeds of man, As a qualifier or qualification of all realms of life in the dimension of the spirit, the unconditioned cannot be relegated to a particular function or moment of creaturely life. It is a "direction" toward which all things move or aim.

At this point there is brought into focus the relation of religion to the boundary situation. In Tillich's own words it is summarized as follows:

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 48. Writing in a later article, Adams says that the unconditional "is that quality in being and truth, in goodness and beauty, that elicits man's ultimate concern; thus it is the absolute quality of all being and meaning and value, the power and vitality of the real as it fulfills itself in meaningful creativity." "Tillich's Concept of the Protestant Era," in Paul Tillich, _The Protestant Era_, pp. 300-301.

> Religion ist Richtung auf das Unbedingte. Durch das Seiende, durch die Werte, durch das Personleben hindurch wird offenbar der Sinn unbedingter Wirklichkeit, vor dem alles Einzelne und die Totalität alles Enzelnen, vor dem jeder Wert und das System der Werte, vor dem Persönlichkeit und Gemeinschaft zerbrechen in ihrem Eigen-Sein und Eigen-Wert. Wo dieses machtvolle, unbedingte Nein vom Unbedingten her über alles Bedingte bejaht wird, da ist Religion. Aber dieses Nein ist nur die Kehrseite des Ja: der unbedingten Gewissheit, der Unbedingten Hingabe, der unbedingten Verantwortung gegenüber dem Unbedingten als Realität in allem Seienden, als Notwendigkeit in allen Werten, als Sinn in allem Personleben. Wo die Beziehung zu Welt und Leben in dieser letzten Tiefe wurzelt, da ist Religion. Weil aber kein Bewusstsein möglich ist, ohne in irgendeiner Form und an iregendeinem Punkte auf Unbedingt-Wirklichem zu ruhen, so ist Religion eine notwendige, ja die alles tragende Funktion des Geistes, diejenige, in der der Geist auf das gerichtet ist, was tiefer ist als er selbst, weil es ihm selbst Wurzel und Halt, Sinn und Bestand gibt.[1]

This analysis further shows how the Protestant Principle is used primarily as "the guardian against the attempts of the finite and conditioned to usurp the place of the unconditional in thinking and acting."[2]

From all of this can be gleaned the particular stance and posture with which Tillich faced the problems which are the concern of his day. In these basic ideas of the boundary situation and the unconditioned, combined with his over-arching idea of justification by faith as the content of the Protestant Principle, are to be found the basic presuppositions which embody Tillich's commitment to the philosophy of identity. To be on the boundary is to be related in some way to the borders of the realms in relation to which one judges himself to be in a boundary situation. In this "symbol" one senses something of Tillich's basic concern to hang on to the unconditioned (or to be grasped by the unconditioned) in the realm of and consequently through the conditioned. "On the boundary" is a "value position," which, in connection with the necessary awareness of the unconditioned, makes possible an interpretation of value which grounds each realization of value as an achievement of sorts for Being-Itself.

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[1] Paul Tillich, "Ueber die Idee einer Theologie der Kultur," Religionsphilosophie der Kultur, zwei Entwürfe von Gustav Radbruch und Paul Tillich, zweite Auflage, (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1921), pp. 35-36.

[2] Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 163.

With these introductory remarks designed to show the form in which the problem of value is understood by Tillich and to show further his basic stance and posture as that of being on the boundary in which the unconditional is necessarily ever present in awareness, it is now possible to focus specifically on the problem of value and value theory as Tillich develops it.

Again, Tillich's basic problem could be stated in several ways. But basically, he is faced with the task of relating the Unconditional and the conditional, or Value and values. Granted that historical values cannot be absolute, does it have to follow that values are only relative? This alternative is outrightly rejected. He is faced with the task of showing how relative values have yet a moment of the absolute. Tillich, as the discussion which follows will show, has to develop a theory of value which will depend on some kind of synthesis between the absolute and the relative, between value and existence. This, it will be seen, is accomplished in terms of an ontology which defines life as the actualization of being. By interpreting being as the a priori of power and value, Tillich has the necessary ingredient for a theory of value which will nevertheless have to borrow heavily from the idealism under which he was trained and of which he is critical.

iii. Tillich's Approach to Value

Tillich is openly critical of the neo-Kantian attempts to preserve for value a prominent place in philosophy by their "philosophy of value." Such thinkers (Lotze, for example) paid a high price for their "success," namely, the separation of "the world that we encounter from the world of values in a radical way."[1] The separation of being and value results in the fact that "value has no being and being has no value."[2] And he was also critical of the theological movement, led by such as Ritschl, which reduced classical theological assertions to mere value judgments. The heart of Tillich's opposition is in the assertion that he is not prepared to accept the defeat of metaphysics. "We wanted being."[1]

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[1] Tillich, "Is a Science of Human Values Possible?" in New Knowledge in Human Values, Maslow, ed., p. 190.

[2] Ibid.

From this vantage point, Tillich attempts to criticize certain philosophies of value theory on several grounds. (1) The basic weakness consequent upon a separation of value and being is the inability of the theory to relate values to life.

> The value theory has a high standing in present philosophical thought and has largely influenced non-philosophical and even popular thought. Its great merit has been to establish the validity of norms without taking refuge in either heteronomous theology or that kind of metaphysics the breakdown of which has produced the value theory (in people like Lotze, Ritschl, the Neo-Kantians, and so on.) They wanted to save validity (Geltung) without pragmatic relativism or metaphysical absolutism. In their 'hierarchies of values' they tried to establish norms for a society without sacred hierarchies. But they were and still are unable to answer the question: What is the basis for the claim of such values to control life? What is their relevance for the processes of life in the dimension of spirit for which they are supposed to be valid? Why should life, the bearer of spirit, care for them at all? What is the relation of obligation to being? This question has driven some philosophers of value back to the ontological problem.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 191.

[2] Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III: Life and the Spirit; History and the Kingdom of God (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 29. In a penetrating analysis of the situation, Tillich also makes this point by claiming that "the establishment of values and their relationships presupposes a valuating subject, and the question arises: how can values that are relative to a valuating individual or group (e.g., pleasure values) be separated from values that are valid by their very nature regardless of personal or social attitudes? If there are such 'absolute values' (absolute in the sense of being independent of a valuating subject), what is the source of

(2) Value theory, as commonly understood today, cannot satisfactorily explain the necessary distinction between relative and absolute values.

> Looking at these endeavors of the philosophers of values, I come to the conclusion that the whole theory is wrecked by the necessity of distinguishing between relative values, which can be reduced to valuations and absolute values, which require another foundation because they command valuations.[1]

(3) Within values, there are often "conflicts" of various degrees. "No value theory without ontological foundation can solve the conflict between love and justice as it appears in ethics as well as in theology."[2] (4) Related to the above claim and in keeping with his rejection of "levels"[3] in general, Tillich argues that the value of the

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their absoluteness, how can they be discovered, how are they related to reality, and what is their ontological standing? These questions lead unavoidably to a situation that the value theory by its very nature tries to avoid--namely, a doctrine of being, and ontology. For values have reality only if they are rooted in reality. Their validity is an expression of their ontological foundation. Being precedes value, but value fulfills being. Therefore, the value theory, in its search for absolute values, is thrown back upon the ontological question of the source of values in being." Paul Tillich, Morality and Beyond (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 25-26.

[1] Tillich, "Is a Science of Human Values Possible?" in New Knowledge in Human Values, Maslow, ed., p. 192. But is the issue this simple? What does Tillich mean by "absolute?" To what extent is the pragmatic approach the result of a different concept of absolute?

[2] Ibid., p. 195. This point is debatable. However, Tillich's insistence that values must be grounded in being precludes for him any ultimate conflict in values.

[3] This is discussed below.

holy may or may not be included in a hierarchy of values, and if it is,

> it is often on the top of this pyramid, above the moral, legal, social, political, and economic values. For our problem, this means first of all that values lie above and below each other and that there can be no immanence of one within another. The value of the holy, for example. [sic.] cannot be immanent in the value of the good, and conversely. The relationship is external and may lead to the elimination of one or the other -- most frequently, in this case, the value of the holy.[1]

It is these basic issues which convince Tillich that the only solution to the dilemmas imposed by these analyses of value is to re-claim some metaphysical or ontological[2] foundation. One familiar with Tillich's thought will not register surprise at this proposal since, as Christoph Rhein correctly points out,

> Im Hintergrund der gesamten philosophischen Arbeit Tillichs steht ein Wissen von der Bedeutung der Metaphysik als Grundlage aller Philosophie und des

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[1] Tillich, Morality and Beyond, p. 25.

[2] Though Tillich uses both terms, he is insistent on pointing out his preference for "ontological" in contrast to "metaphysical" because the latter has fallen into ambiguity. ". . . The preposition meta now has the irremediable connotation of pointing to a duplication of this world by a transcendent realm of beings. Therefore, it is perhaps less misleading to speak of ontology instead of metaphysics." Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I: Reason and Revelation; Being and God (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 20. Randall is perceptive in raising a caution at this point. "I find very congenial Tillich's ultimate concern with the mystery and the power of being, for I too am intensely interested in metaphysics--and I will not, with the unexpected caution of Tillich, water down the time-honored term to a mere 'ontology.'" John Herman Randall, Jr., "The Ontology of Paul Tillich," in The Theology of Paul Tillich, Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, eds. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), pp. 135-136.

> Denkens überhaupt. Es ist nicht die Metaphysik als rationale Wissenschaft....Aber damit fällt nicht die Metaphysik überhaupt. Denn auch die streng kritische Haltung, selbst die allgemeine Ablehnung der Metaphysik setzt eine Metaphysik voraus.[1]

As will be evident in the following discussion of "Supernaturalism," Tillich is not advocating a return to a world view that puts eternal forms or values "above" or "beyond" the world as we experience it. This is a form of the dualism which he shuns. He is indebted both to the phenomenology of Husserl and the critical approach of Kant, to say nothing of his being influenced by Schelling. His answer to the question: "Is a Science of Human Values Possible?" is based on the claim that the question is first of all identical to another question, namely, "Is an ontological approach to values possible?"[2] The answer is affirmative.

> If science is understood as it is more frequently in recent discussions, in the sense of the German word Wissenschaft, a science of values is possible in the sense in which ontology is a science. If however, science is understood as a cognitive approach according to the pattern of physics, only a science of actual valuation is possible, not a science of values.[3]

The moments of this approach are developed in a regrettably brief analysis in the article cited above. Where does one look within the encountered reality of his world to discover the source of the "ought-to-be?" It is *not* found in existence (the erroneous conclusion or assumption of Pragmatism and Naturalism). Rather, "values must be derived from essential structures of being which appear within existence, though in a state of distortion."[1] The process by which this is done is termed the "ideating method" which he illustrates in the following way. We pass judgment on such common realities as a tree, that is, we somehow judge the value of a tree from the point of view of its potentialities as a tree for itself. In other words, we make a comparison of a tree with an image or an *εἶδος* which we have of the tree.

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[1] Christoph Rhein, Paul Tillich / Philosoph und Theologe: Eine Einführung in sein Denken (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1957), p. 45.

[2] Tillich, "Is a Science of Human Values Possible?" in New Knowledge in Human Values, Maslow, ed., p. 192.

[3] Ibid., pp. 192-193.

> The way in which this *εἶδος* or essence of treehood --which is more than a concept--is attained and tested is identical with the way in which an *objective* value in this realm can be known, namely, the value of a tree for itself.[2]

Admitting his indebtedness to the phenomenological school, Tillich endeavors to relate this "ideating method" to the empirical scientific method. Scientific inquiry can prescribe the biological conditions of a perfect tree and in fact may even change the intuitive picture of the essential nature of such a tree, but the empirical analysis cannot actually create the image of the perfect tree. The thrust of the argument is the establishment of the relation between value and essence, the *sine qua non* of Tillich's entire value theory.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 193.

[2] *Ibid*.

One might at this point ask Tillich to offer us a further analysis of values in the objective sense of the term. We have already concluded that we are to find values in essences and further that essence is an ontological concept. Following the example of Heidegger, it is man who is the door to ontology,[1] and it is also man who is the door to value. Consequently, the great bulk of Tillich's concern with values per se involves man, with the result that the content or material of values ~~or~~ norms are primarily ethical in nature, if by ethical we mean the norms of the functions of man as bearer of spirit.

> Man is the valuating subject. But from our presupposition it follows that man also must become the place where special values receive their ontological foundation. Ethical values are commands derived from the essential nature of man. Human nature is their ontological locus. Therefore, I would say: our knowledge of values is identical with our knowledge of man, of man not in his existential, but in his essential, nature.[2]

The source of the "ought-to-be" then is in the essential nature of man. Lest there be any doubt as to the meaning of this, it is stated again that "value is man's essential being, put as an imperative against him."[1]

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[1] Tillich, I, 169.

[2] Tillich, "Is a Science of Human Values Possible?" in *New Knowledge in Human Values*, Maslow, ed., pp. 193-194.

Ethics, understood as the science of norms, as well as the problems consequent upon futile attempts by philosophers of value, comes into focus when ontology becomes the foundation of value theory.

> Ethics is the science of man's moral existence, asking for the roots of the moral imperative, the criteria of its validity, the sources of its contents, the forces of its realization. The answer to each of these questions is directly or indirectly dependent on a doctrine of being. The roots of the moral imperative, the criteria of its validity, the sources of its contents, the forces of its realization, all this can be elaborated only in terms of an analysis of man's being and universal being. There is no answer in ethics without an explicit or implicit assertion about the nature of being.[2]

Even if one has grasped something of what is Tillich's concern in locating in "being" the source of values, it is still necessary to point out what has been implied here by way of negatives. By arguing for a yet-to-be-explained "essential nature" as the locus of value, Tillich has excluded the "external" as a source of value. Value is to be found in things according to their essential nature. Most obvious is this in the case of man's being.

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[1] Ibid., p. 195.

[2] Paul Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 72. One might validly ask for some proof for this analysis. It rather involves the presuppositions of Tillich's thought, namely, the identity of the divine and human spirit. Only on this basis can this analysis be sustained. Consequently, for many, it is untenable.

Several points emerge in Tillich's locating value in essential nature. First of all, one rightfully can demand of Tillich a clear definition of value. Can one find a definition that is persistent and consistent? Nowhere does Tillich provide such a definition. There are "indications" as to what value is or how it is to be interpreted, and these indications are based on the assumption of the identity of the spirit of man and the spirit of God (to use more traditional terminology). Consequently, Tillich can argue for basic norms and values that permeate all varieties of cultures, religions, and ethical systems. Why? How? Because these norms and values "are rooted in man's essential nature and ultimately in the structure of being itself."[1] It would seem to follow that Tillich is committed to a concept of value which can also designate Being-Itself. But since it has been pointed out above that value fulfills being, it follows that any definition of value must incorporate this basic claim. Therefore, it may not be too erroneous to suggest that value is fulfilled being, with "fulfilled" denoting the triadic dialectical process whereby being transcends itself through self-integration and self-creation. Further attention will be given this point in parts six and seven of this chapter.

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[1] Tillich, Morality and Beyond, p. 34.

The second consequence which follows from the correlation of value and essential nature is the rejection of nominalistic attempts to reduce ethical norms and values to accepted social patterns or the prescriptions of political power structures. Over against this tradition Tillich elevates the natural law theory which is to be interpreted in terms of man's essential nature. But on what grounds does Tillich advocate this natural law theory? It is for him necessary to explain the experience of "the conflict between what man essentially is and what he existentially is . . . ."[1] Again, Tillich is not hesitant to employ the method of Kant's transcendental idealism.

The third moment of significance in this analysis is Tillich's insistence that the differences in values are the result of the social situations in terms of which the concrete formulation and interpretation of moral commands in ethical systems are largely conditioned. Again, one detects Tillich's preference for solving such difficult issues by resorting to the kind of Kantian idealism whereby emerges a bifurcation between the formal and the material. Tillich could be criticized in the very terms which he uses to reject formalism per se, were it not for his basic idealistic preference to see reality as a living whole whereby the conditional is a manifestation, though ambiguous, of the Unconditional. So also, the material is a manifestation or "symbol" of the formal. How Tillich, on the one hand, can reject the synthesis of the absolute and the relative as advocated in absolute idealism while yet retaining a modified version of the idealistic synthesis, and yet, on the other hand, claim to have gone "beyond" idealism, is a serious problem. It is precisely this kind of ambiguity, so characteristic of Tillich's thought, that gives some justification to the criticisms, mentioned earlier in the chapter, that Tillich rejects idealism on assumptions that are yet thoroughly idealistic.

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[1] Ibid.

Granted the above "exclusion" of the sociological and political externals as valid foundations for values, the question immediately arises as to the relationship between religion and values. "The ontological foundation of values guarantees the autonomous [italics mine] process in which they are discovered."[1] This claim implies that the relationship between religion and values, as commonly understood or as it was stated by certain Kantian-grounded philosophers-theologians, must be reinterpreted. "If morality is intrinsically religious, as religion is intrinsically ethical, neither is dependent on the other, and neither can be substituted for the other."[2] The relationship between them is in the fact that the religious dimension of the moral imperative is its unconditional character.

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[1] Tillich, "Is a Science of Human Values Possible?" in New Knowledge in Human Values, Maslow, ed., p. 195.

[2] Tillich, Morality and Beyond, p. 15.

To clarify this important claim, there is a distinction made between the "fundamental" and "traditional" concepts of religion. The former identifies religion as "the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern, by an infinite interest, by something one takes unconditionally seriously."[1] The "traditional concept" of religion identifies it as a "particular expression, in symbols of thought and action, of such ultimate concern within a social group as, for example, a church."[2] The moral imperative, in which Tillich finds something "unconditional," is derived from religion in the fundamental sense. Unfortunately, however, the "fundamental sense" of the term is less universal than fundamental. There is greater clarification of the reasons for this distinction, especially in Volume III of Systematic Theology. Religion, as a function of the human spirit, is ambiguous, as are the other functions. It is in religion that life reaches for the "unconditional" and it is in religion that man receives the answers, but the answers are not identical with religion. The dialectical moments of this concept are not difficult to grasp. "The self-transcendence of life never unambiguously reaches that toward which it transcends, although life can receive its self-manifestation in the ambiguous form of religion."[1]

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 30.

[2] *Ibid*.

There are obvious overtones of the early controversy with Karl Barth in the above claims, and since their differences are common knowledge, it might be helpful to pinpoint the crucial moment between them as it relates to values, although we shall discuss the larger aspects of the differences when in the next section we examine more critically the positions in value theory which Tillich opposes. Basically, Tillich wants to avoid ethical relativism and ethical dogmatism. The core of the argument is in his appeal to natural law (defined as the law of one's essential being), the law of moral reason or, in the terms of Kant, practical reason.

> Its background is the awareness man has of the gap between what he essentially is, and therefore ought to be, and what he actually is, a consciousness of estrangement from and contradiction of his essential being.[2]

Tillich recognizes that some supranaturalists stress estrangement so as to affirm that man has completely lost what he is by creation, that is, what he essentially is.

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[1] Tillich, III, 107.

[2] Tillich, Morality and Beyond, p. 33. There are several issues raised here, such as Tillich's assumption that life as an actualization of being precludes separation but permits estrangement, interpreted as essential unity and existential "separation." However, Tillich's refutation is based on the very assumption which Barth must reject. This and the matter of conscience will be discussed below.

Thus, the only way such knowledge of his nature can be given is by revelation. He criticizes this view by claiming

> there is self-deception in every denial of the natural moral law. For those who deny it must admit that a divinely revealed moral law cannot contradict the divinely created human nature. It can only be a restatement of the law that is embodied in man's essential nature. . . . Man's essential nature cannot be lost as long as man is man. It can be distorted in the process of actualization, but it cannot disappear. The very statement that man is estranged from his created nature presupposes an experience of the abyss between what he essentially is and what he existentially is. Even a weak or misled conscience is still a conscience, namely, the silent voice of man's own essential nature, judging his actual being.[1]

Here is the Tillichian-Barthian controversy in a nutshell.

But the question must then be asked of Tillich as to how values are in fact known, once "revelation" is excluded. The answer is forthcoming.

> The knowledge of values is identical with the knowledge of one's essential being. And this occurs in two complementary ways, the intuitive and the experiential. Intuitively, man sees the contrast between what he is essentially and what he is actually.[2]

Obviously this gives a rather negative overtone to the force which such knowledge has on us. The conscience basically judges us. It is obvious too, that the intuitive element is subject to the tendency to error. It is too subjective. The correction which is offered is the insistence that this "subjective side" must be subjected to the criticism of experience, "not only the individual experience but the experiences of mankind as they are embodied in its ethical traditions."[1] But it must still be recognized that there is "no external criterion for the validity of norms that can be applied at will."[2] His case rests with the claim that

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[1] Ibid., pp. 33-34.

[2] Tillich, "Is a Science of Human Values Possible?" in New Knowledge in Human Values, Maslow, ed., pp. 195-196.

> there is a continuous tension between the intuitive and the experiential element in the cognition of values. No calculating and measuring method will overcome this situation. One cannot escape the existential risk in the knowing of values. There is no safe place outside the risk that characterizes life in all its dimensions.[3]

This is then the crisis in the philosophy of value to which Tillich gives his energy. The points of utmost importance in the above analysis are (1) Tillich's analysis of the problem; (2) his thesis that there is no value without an ontology; (3) his commitment to a kind of realism which avoids the problems of supranaturalism (as he understands it) and naturalism (as he defines it); (4) the status of religion in the analysis of values. It is now our task to see how and why and what Tillich precisely rejects in the alternatives open to one attempting to formulate a theory of value.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 196.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] *Ibid*.

iv. Alternatives Rejected by Tillich

(1) Supernaturalism. -- Tillich's rejection of the "supernaturalistic position" is a well-known moment in his philosophy and theology. It is immediately obvious that his philosophical commitment to an ontological monism precludes "supernaturalism" interpreted in any terms suggesting a dualistic Weltanschauung. Because the philosophy of value of certain thinkers resorts to a dualism of "things" and "values," or the descriptive and the normative, he found continued grounds to take issue with their main tenets. While granting that the thrust of philosophy of value is the preservation of that which is valued, that which gives meaning to existence, it fails because it accords values a standing of their own, totally divorced from the "order of being" as naturalism analyzes it. "The good, the beautiful, the true are beyond being."[1]

The philosophy, ontology, and methodology of supernaturalism alike come under critical scrutiny. Supernaturalism "takes the Christian message to be a sum of revealed truths which have fallen into the human situation like strange bodies from a strange world."[1] Supernaturalistic ethics, according to Tillich, affirms that "ethical norms are given by God. This is the basis of their validity."[2] This claim is rejected on the grounds of his analysis of heteronomy. Concluding that supernaturalism in theology and value is destructive, he argues for a theonomy, a concept which will be examined below.

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[1] Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 73. Tillich is correct in pointing out that values thusly "grounded" became the inevitable object of attack from a science which regarded values as expressions of existence and as such could not judge existence from a "place" beyond existence. Again, he saw in this dilemma an implicit question, namely, "does not the value theory itself demand that it be replaced by ontology?" p. 75.

However, were one to see the issues simply in terms of their theological expressions, he would overlook the philosophical seriousness with which the position of supernaturalism is examined by Tillich.[3] In one of his earliest works he subjects the concept of supernaturalism to a critical and dialectical analysis based on the "principle of identity."[4] The whole argument has several aspects, an examination of the most important of which will assist in illuminating the basic concern and position from which supernaturalism is criticized.

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[1] Tillich, I, 64.

[2] Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 75.

[3] In a recently published work, Tillich, in response to a question pertaining to the issue of supernaturalism, claims that "you approach something here that is fundamental to all my thinking--the antisupernaturalistic attitude." Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue, by D. Mackenzie Brown (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 158.

[4] Reference is here made to his famous work, Der Begriff des Übernatürlichen, sein dialektischer Charakter und das Princip der Identität (Königsberg Nm.: H. Madrasch, 1915). In this work he makes a distinction which should be mentioned here. "Dass die Bejahung des Identitätsprinzips die Annahme einer Identitätsphilosophie nicht ein--sondern vielmehr ausschliesst, glaube ich in meiner Arbeit über 'Mystik und Schuldbewusstsein in Schellings philosophischer Entwicklung' gezeigt zu haben." (iii) In this basic distinction Tillich attempts to make room for the "abyss" by keeping a philosophy "open," an achievement which he feels

In theological language, Tillich is persuaded that God is the grand loser in the supernaturalistic approaches. (1) God bears no "necessary" relation to the world when he is "beside" or "above" it.

> Gott steht der Materie gegenüber, wie der Erbauer einer Maschine dem Rohstoff: ein natürliches innerlich notwendiges Verhältnis ist nicht vorhanden: est gibt keine natürliche Notwendigkeit des Daseins oder des Soseins der Welt; denn die göttliche Natur steht schlechterdings über der Natur.[1]

(2) Stated in yet another way, supernaturalism makes God a "being, not being-itself."[2] (3) A God derived on the basis of the supernaturalistic approach either finally remains in the relative or destroys the relative.

> Das Absolute ist entweder Anfang oder es kann nie erreicht werden; eine Konstruktion des Gottesbegriffs, die vom Relativen ausgeht, kommt nicht über das Relative hinaus, es sei denn, dass sie das Relative vernichtet; ebendies aber liegt im Wesen des Supra, dass es sich gründet auf das, über das es

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eluded the philosophies of identity. But here one can sense the basic approach which keeps Tillich very much in the tradition of the philosophy of identity, even one which remains "open."

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 36. This same argument is stated in the article, "Die Überwindung des Religionsbegriffs in der Religionsphilosophie," in *Kantstudien*, XXVII (1922), 446-469.

[2] Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), p. 184.

> hinausführen soll, das Natürliche, und darum immer sowohl im Natürlichen bleibt, wie das Natürliche vernichtet.[1]

Two basic influences determine Tillich's further criticism of supernaturalism. Inheriting the identity principle from Schelling, he insists that knowledge of God, as indeed knowledge of value, is possible because of the identity of our finite spirit with the infinite spirit, or of the reality of essence and existence ever together in life. From Kant is the understanding of causality as a category that applies only to finite things, to the finite realm. As such, this category cannot be applied to the noumenal realm or to God. From these positions there is the basic Tillichian charge that such methodology ends up "conditioning" the "unconditioned."[2] Again, it is argued that "der Gedanke eines geschichtlichen Eingehens Gottes in dem allgemeinen Weltprozess ist für supranaturalistisches Denken a priori unfassbar."[3] The final consequence of significance is embodied in the claim that there is a devaluation of creation. It is argued that the depth of holiness is deprived both nature and history. Because supernaturalism implies a kind of dualism, it is obvious that Tillich's repeated attacks on it are weighty evidence for the claim that he yet remains indebted to much of the idealism of which he was openly critical.

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[1] Tillich, Der Begriff des Übernatürlichen, p. 54.

[2] See especially The Protestant Era, p. 82.

[3] Tillich, Der Begriff des Übernatürlichen, p. 22.

It is around these points that the early tensions between Barth and Tillich emerged.[1] Basically, the early positions and the controversies consequent upon these positions have not changed. Two basic points are made against Barth's position as it emerged in the famous Römerbrief. (1) The grand "Nein" of Römerbrief implies a "position" which in contradictory fashion escapes the unequivocal "Nein!"

> Auch dieses Urteil der Krisis ist nur auf dem Boden einer Position möglich, die selbst nicht nur unter diesem Urteil steht, Nirgends ist die positive Wurzel des negativen Paradox offenbarer als hier; denn die Verkündigung der Krisis ist Geschichte, und ihr Inhalt ist geschichtlicher Inhalt. Wo diese Botschaft verkündigt wird, ist eine Stätte der Of-

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[1] In an early article, Tillich expresses his concern regarding the inevitable consequences of Barth's position which dichotomizes theology and culture, science and theology, thus leaving science and culture without genuine significance. He further insists again that it is not permissible singularly to interpret nature negatively. "Denker der Zeit: Karl Barth," in Vossiche Zeitung, XXXII (Januar, 1926), p. 1. The conflict between the two positions of Barth and Tillich has received wide recognition. Hennig claims that "gegen Karl Barth grenzt sich Tillich besonders dann ab, wenn er die Gefahr eines neuen Supranaturalismus glaubt fürchten zu müssen." "Paul Tillich: Leben und Werk," in Der Spannungsbogen: Festgabe für Paul Tillich zum 75. Geburtstag, herausgegeben von Karl Hennig (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1961), p. 181. The continuity or the point of identity so important to Tillich is the point, the validity of which, "separates Barth and Tillich drastically in their understanding of the task of theology." John Pemberton, "Ontology and Christology: The Apologetic Theology of Paul Tillich," in A Miscellany of American Christianity: Essays in Honor of H. Shelton Smith, Stuart C. Henry, ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1963), p. 264.

> fenbarung mitten in der Geschichte . . . . Barth und Gogarten lehnen diesen Gedanken ab. Sie übersehen die positive Wurzel ihrer Theologie der Krisis, sind nun aber gezwungen, doch eine Position in der Geschichte zu suchen, auf die sich die Verkündigung der Krisis gründet.[1]

In other words, Barth's "dialektische Aufhebung der Dialektik" basically remains dialectic.[2] (2) Tillich opposes Barth's placing of creation, spirit and history under the "Zorn Gottes." All three have in them a "yes" and a "no."

> Aber sie [Theologie der Krisis] hat eine Voraussetzung, die selbst nicht mehr Krisis ist, sondern Schöpfung und Gnade. Nur durch die Krisis hindurch, nur paradox dar von ihr geredet werden; so aber muss von ihr geredet werden, allenthalben, in Natur und Geist, in Kultur und Religion. Und in dreifacher Weise kann von ihr geredet werden: als von dem ewigen Ursprung, dem Grunde und Abgrunde, der unanschaulich und ungegeben durch alles Wirkliche in Ja und Nein dem Glauben offenbar wird.[3]

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[1] Paul Tillich, "Kritisches und Positives Paradox" in Paul Tillich, Der Protestantismus als Kritik und Gestaltung, in Gesammelte Werke: Band VII (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1962), p. 223.

[2] Tillich is careful to point out at what points the Barthian "position" is correct, however. "Die Theologie der Krisis hat Recht, uneingeschänktes Recht in ihrem Kampf gegen jede unparadoxe, unmittelbare, gegenständliche Fassung des Unbedingten. Sie ist kein Übergang, sondern etwas Bleibendes, ein Wesenselement der Theologie. Ibid., p. 224. In the famous article, "What is Wrong with 'Dialectical' Theology?" in The Journal of Religion, XV (April, 1935), 145, Tillich identifies Barth as the founder and head of the so-called dialectical theology and then claims that "he does not think dialectically, but supernaturally." Here in the article he states that the criterion of a truly dialectical theology is that the "yes" and "no" remain inseparably together. In early Barthian thought they become irreconcilably separated, though such can no longer be said of Barth. (See page 127).

[3] Tillich, "Kritisches und Positives Paradox," in Gesammelte Werke: VII (1962), 224.

It is thus that Tillich argues against the supernaturalism which Barth originally embraced,[1] concluding his contention by pointing out that

> in Schöpfung, Erlösung und Vollendung stellt sich der Sinn des Paradox dem Glauben dar. Die Theologie des kritischen Paradox, die sich nicht nur dialektisch, sondern real unter das Paradox stellt, wird eben damit zur Theologie des positiven Paradox.[2]

Anticipating further analyses and arguments, it should be pointed out that Tillich insists that the "essence" of reality--of things and man--escapes the "Nein Gottes." Here Tillich's concept of grace as it obtains in history and creation becomes determinative. Here, however, is the break with Barthian neo-orthodoxy,[3] on the basis of a clearly articulated principle of identity. Tillich is consistent in his insistence on the point made here. Central to his entire philosophy and theology is the essence-existence distinction. They *cannot* be dualistically separated, with essence acquiring a "supranaturalistic" connotation. Writing on the topic of philosophy and fate

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[1] For a most helpful analysis of Barth's development, see S. Paul Schilling, Contemporary Continental Theologians (Nashville and New York: Abingdon Press, 1966), pp. 19-40.

[2] Tillich, "Kritisches und Positives Paradox," in Gesammelte Werke: VII (1962), 225.

[3] Barth does not permit Tillich's points to go unchallenged. In summary fashion his refutation of Tillich involves the following points: (1) Tillich does not argue from "within" theology but rather from "without" theology. "Tillich kann meinen Protest gegen die Voraussetzung, mit der er seinen Artikel geschrieben, ablehnen--aber nur unter der Bedingung, dass er zugibt, dass seine Voraussetzung die charakteristisch nicht-theologische Voraussetzung ist, gegen die zu protestieren mir denn auch nicht einfällt, weil sie selbstverständlich möglich ist." Karl Barth, "Von der Paradoxie des 'Positiven Paradoxes'," in Gesammelte Werke: VII (1962), 228. (2) He challenges Tillich's assumption that he (Barth) argues from a "position" or that he is even concerned with the abrogation of dialectic. Barth contends that his dialectic is based on the "reale Aufhebung," since "die durch unsre ultima ration bedeutete 'Aufhebung' nicht nur nicht dialektisch, sondern überhaupt nie und nimmer als Geistesakt vollziehbar ist?" (p. 230) (3) Barth questions further whether Tillich's positive paradox has any paradox at all. "Wer von jenem Verhältnis wirklich im Blick auf

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das 'positive Paradox' redete, dem würden die vielen 'es ist' und 'es gibt' und 'sie stehen' unmöglich so leicht aus der Feder fliessen und am allerwenigsten mit der gelegentlich gegebenen verräterischen Erläuterung, dass 'Tiefen-Sinn' *da* zum wirklichen 'Tiefsinn' werde, 'wo er *zum Bewusstsein* gekommen ist'! Er würde wissen, dass es sich beim Glauben um einen Tiefsinn, den 'es gibt', auf alle Fälle *nicht* handeln kann!" (p. 233) (4) Perhaps the most perceptive criticism is the following: "das von Tillich so grosszügig geübte *Generalisieren*, dieses Beziehungen-Behaupten zwischen Gott und allem und jedem zwischen Himmel und Erde, diese breite allgemeine Glaubens- und Offenbarungswalze, die ich, ich kann mir nicht helfen, beim Lesen von Tillich alles und nichts ausrichtend über Häuser, Menschen und Tiere gehen sehe, als ob es sich wiederum von selbst verstünde, dass überall Gericht und Gnade waltet, alles, einfach alles einbezogen 'ist' in den Streit und Frieden des 'positiven Paradoxes', das, so gehandhabt, bei aller 'Unanschaulichkeit' doch wirklich ein *Paradox* mehr ist, das mit dem Gotte *Luthers* und *Kierkegaards keine*, dafür aber mit dem Gotte *Schleiermachers* und *Hegels* eine ganz auffallende Ähnlichkeit hat. Ist es Tillich ernst mit der *Paradoxie* des positiven Paradoxes, so kann es ihm nicht ernst sein weder mit der *Direktheit* der von ihm behaupteten Beziehungen von Gott und Welt, noch mit der logischen *Leichtigkeit*, mit der er über die positive und negative Seite dieser Beziehungen verfügen zu können meint, noch mit der Freigebigkeit, mit der er solche Beziehungen an die verschiedenen hohen und niedern Würdenträger dieses Äons glaubt austeilen zu dürfen. *So redet man nicht* vom 'positiven Paradox', wenn man weiss, dass man es als Theologe mit dem *göttlichen* Paradox zu tun hat . . . ." (p. 234) Though the points in the disagreement have more obvious theological than philosophical implications, the relevance to the problem is very clear. Tillich opposes any kind of dualism and argues for a monism. This is the basis of his rejection of a philosophy of value that puts "value" beyond "things."

(*Schicksal*), Tillich illustrates this by asserting that

> the union of kairos and logos is the philosophical task set for us in philosophy and in all fields that are accessible to the philosophical attitude. The logos is to be taken up into the kairos, universal values into the fulness of time, truth into the fate of existence. The separation of idea and existence has to be brought to an end. It is the very nature of essence to come into existence, to enter into time and fate. This happens to essence not because of something extraneous to it; it is rather the expression of its own intrinsic character, of its freedom.[1]

It is thus abundantly clear that Tillich is opposed to any philosophical dualism or theological supernaturalism as live options in the crisis in value. But what Tillich offers in its place is not beyond ambiguity nor has it escaped criticism. Tillich himself is not certain of what is the name of that for which he is arguing. As will be pointed out in the discussion on ontology, Tillich wants to suggest a "belief-ful realism" or an "ecstatic naturalism," which is paralleled by a kind of "ecstatic mentalism." It is very clear, however that for him

> not a transcendent world but the transcending character of our world must be taught. I do not know whether this is neo-supernaturalism or neo-naturalism, and I do not think that the question of name is very important.[2]

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[1] Tillich, *Protestant Era*, p. 14.

[2] Paul Tillich, Review of *The Growth of Religion* by H. N. Wieman and W. M. Horton, in *The Journal of Religion*, XX (January, 1940), 71. George Hendry, in a review of *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II, asks a most penetrating question regarding Tillich's attempt to avoid supernaturalism by developing a concept of ecstatic naturalism. "Does this not mean that Tillich has merely moved transcendence from

(2) "Reductionistic" Theories of Value. -- Both psychology and sociology have attempted to answer the question of the source of the "ought" or the "unconditional" in value experiences. Some have argued that the feeling of something unconditionally serious is a product of threatening and demanding parents or even commandments supposedly given by a god. Shifting from psychological to sociological analyses, one recognizes in such as Nietzsche an attempt to identify the "inner unconditional demand" as a product of the "internalization" of the rules of the ruling groups through generalizations until at last it becomes the voice of conscience.

Tillich claims that these analyses are inadequate because they assume what is to be proven, namely, the identity of two qualitatively different structures, the structure of the unconditional which he identifies as the structure of "intentionality" (noetic structure) and the structure of conditions in which this becomes manifest. An example is given of the "discovery" of a mathematical truth --discovered through psychological and sociological conditions but basically apart from or "beyond" them. On this

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the supernatural to the intranatural, and in addition, made it contingent in the process?" Theology Today, XV (April, 1958), 79. David Freeman goes even farther by arguing that "a God that is beyond naturalism and supernaturalism is not simply an unknown idol of Tillich's creative genius; it is a theological square-circle. It is theological nonsense." Tillich (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1962), p. 42.

basis it is argued that one must not "reduce" what is "discovered" to the "means" by which it is discovered.

> This is not possible with regard to the unconditional character of the moral imperative. One can, of course, discard every particular content for the sake of another, but one cannot discard the moral imperative itself without the self-destruction of one's essential nature and one's eternal relationship. For these reasons, the attempts to undercut the unconditional character of the moral imperative by psychological and sociological arguments must fail.[1]

This analysis anticipates Tillich's philosophy of culture, symbols, etc., all of which will be referred to below. But already the "ontological approach" is obvious.

(3) Pragmatism. -- The rejection of the pragmatic theory of value is unequivocal. Again, pragmatism demands an ontology. Though stated in several ways, the thrust of the argument against pragmatism is its failure to see man "on the boundary" between the finite and the infinite.[2] It is when pragmatism has to provide criteria for "adequate behavior" that the need for some non-pragmatic foundation becomes obvious. In fact, Tillich argues, "the

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[1] Tillich, Morality and Beyond, p. 27.

[2] James Luther Adams is correct in pointing this out as one of Tillich's arguments against pragmatism. "In Tillich's view the existential man stands between the infinite and the finite and can never be understood as merely a part of natural objectivity." "Tillich's Concept of the Protestant Era" in Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 308. Adams makes a further contribution by pointing out that "Tillich criticizes pragmatism because it has 'surrendered itself as 'instrumentalism' to the objective process of nature and society, producing means for ends which are finite and, consequently, not a matter of infinite, passionate concern'" (p. 308).

pragmatic escape from ontology . . . is barred by the question of the criteria of pragmatic adequacy."[1] This objection is developed further in Volume III of Systematic Theology where it is pointed out that

> whenever the pragmatic method is applied consistently to ethical, political, or aesthetic judgments, it selects criteria which themselves must be measured by higher, and finally highest, criteria, and when this point is reached, the pragmatic method is replaced, without explicit recognition, by an ontological principle which cannot be tested pragmatically because it is the criterion for all testing.[2]

While strongly criticizing pragmatism's failure to accept an ontological perspective from which to focus on the value of values, Tillich is yet in accord with its basic attempt to find norms within life itself. "The norms of life do not originate outside of life."[3] But the failure of pragmatism to understand "life" in terms of essence and existence makes it an impossible alternative in the search for a solution to the problem of value. Recognizing the correctness of at least part of pragmatism's approach, Tillich suggests that it be restated and qualified since

> it is true that the criteria for life in the dimension of spirit are implicit in life itself--otherwise they would not be relevant for life; but life is ambiguous because it unites essential and existential elements. The essential or potential

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[1] Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 75.

[2] Tillich, III, 29.

[3] Ibid.

> in man and his world is the source from which the norms for life in the dimension of spirit are derived. The essential nature of being, the logos-determined structure of reality, as Stoicism and Christianity would call it, is the "heaven of values" to which the value theory points.[1]

As scant as they are, these references comprise the bulk of Tillich's treatment of alternatives in value theory. What is missing in his references is as significant as what has been discussed. As mentioned in the Introduction of the dissertation, Tillich is not really in dialogue with men who are discussing such issues today. With this said, however, it nevertheless cannot be denied that from this discussion, one can get a clear understanding of the direction in which Tillich is pushing for a theory of value.

Related to an examination of the setting of the problem of value is the concept of spirit. A brief analysis of the significance of this concept for Tillich's philosophy will prepare us for the subsequent relating of ontology to culture.

v. The Role of Spirit in the Theory of Values

It can perhaps be argued with persuasive conclusiveness that one of Tillich's greatest contributions to contemporary thought, both theological and philosophical, has been his revival and analysis of the concept of "spirit." In spite of the fact that such a term is little used in contemporary philosophy and in spite of the fact that it is often used with little clarity in ecclesiastical terminology, one cannot be unimpressed by what is here done with the concept. His ability to discuss it in terms of contemporary thought makes the analysis relevant and significant. One *cannot* understand the status of value without grasping the reality of spirit. The full implications of this will be illustrated later.

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[1] *Ibid.* This is in basic keeping with the earlier criticisms of "naturalism" which Tillich formulated in his analysis of the weaknesses of humanism. "It derives the Christian message from man's natural state. It develops its answer out of human existence, unaware that human existence itself *is* the question. . . . It identified man's existential with his essential state, overlooking the break between them which is reflected in the universal human condition of self-estrangement and self-contradiction. . . . But revelation is 'spoken' to man, not by man to himself." I, 65.

(1) *Definition of Spirit*. -- It is interesting to note that one of his earliest works, *Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenständen und Methoden*, and one of his latest major works, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. III, analyze the concept or dimension of spirit in comprehensive fashion, though obviously from different approaches. In the former treatise the analysis is within the context of his basic understanding of *Denken* and *Sein*. His thesis is that *Denken*, *Sein*, and *Geist* are inextricably related. In fact, this might be stated as the triadic foundation of his whole thought. In summarizing his analysis, Tillich claims that

> der *Begriff des Geistes* ist nicht so ursprünglich wie die Begriffe Denken und Sein; er ist von ihnen abhängig: Geist is Selbstbestimmung des Denkens im Sein; es ist nicht möglich, das Wesen des Geistes zu erfassen ohne metalogische Erfassung der beiden Grundelemente des

> Wissens. Das Wesen des Geistes, seine innere Spannung, sein dynamischer Charakter, beruht auf dem unendlichen Widerspruch von Denken und Sein. In der logistischen Betrachtung des Geistes pflegt das Seinselement vernachlässigt zu werden, in der psychologischen das Denkelement und in beiden die Spannung der Elemente. Aber Geist ist keine Denkform und Geist is keine Seinsform, sondern er ist trotz der Abhängigkeit von beiden eine eigene Form: Geist ist Form des seienden Denkens.[1]

The import of this definition is accented in another analysis of "spirit" in Volume III of Systematic Theology. Given the assumption that value is the fulfillment or "completion" of being, Tillich attempts to analyze spirit in the same way as he does in relation to Sein and Denken. Again, spirit or Geist is used by Tillich as the locus of the actualization of being (power) and value (meaning).

> . . . Spirit as a dimension of life unites the power of being with the meaning of being. Spirit can be defined as the actualization of power and meaning in unity. Within the limits of our experience this happens only in man--in man as a whole and in all dimensions of life which are present in him. Man, in experiencing himself as man, is conscious of being determined in his nature by spirit as a dimension of his life.[2]

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[1] Paul Tillich, Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenständen und Methoden, in Gesammelte Werke, I (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1959), 9-10.

[2] Tillich, III, 111. This is expounded in Tillich's claim that "every life that goes beyond the immediacy of the purely biological, psychical, and sociological is meaningful life. Each of our logical and esthetic, legal and social actions contains a reference to meaning. In every meaning, however, lies the silent presupposition of the meaningfulness of the whole, the unity of all possible meanings, i.e., faith in the meaning of life itself. . . . In our every act of meaning, theoretical as well as practical, a definite concrete meaning is before us, and at the same time, as the object of a silent belief, there is the absolute meaning or the meaningfulnessof the whole." Interpretation of History, p. 221. James Luther Adams par-

It is on the basis of such definitions that we can catch a glimpse of the peculiar function of spirit.

(2) Function of Spirit. -- Once man is given a unique place as the locus of the actualization of the power and meaning of being in unity, we find also the unique locus of values and/or norms. Writing concerning history (a dimension which is actualized by man) and norms, Tillich offers a most illuminating picture of their relationship, an analysis so important to his entire philosophy. The following points are central.

(1) One of the characteristics of history is the production of the new. Here Tillich argues for the uniqueness of each concrete event. It could be argued that even in nature there is uniqueness in each achievement of the evolutionary process, in new constellations of matter, and the like. However, human history is claimed to be unique in that it is "essentially related to meanings or values."[1]

(2) Tillich is willing to accept the analysis of history as the actualization of values or "the realm in

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aphrases this aspect of Tillich's thought by asserting that "beyond thought and being there is an even more significant propelling element, the living import or meaning. Every spiritual act is 'somehow' related to this meaning, is 'somehow' confronted by the claim of the Unconditioned. In response to this claim, the spirit-bearing Gestalt effects the meaning-giving, or rather the meaningfulfilling act." "Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science and Religion," p. 147.

[1] Tillich, III, 303.

which values are actualized."[1] As indicated earlier, Tillich also accepts the analysis of Troeltsch who seeks to transform the neo-Kantian theory of values by the idea of history as the realm of value-realization. But one should at this point anticipate a problem which will confront Tillich. If history is the over-arching dimension which reflects the entire triadic, dialectical process of being, then it must follow that each even, even the form-destroying ones, receive their power from being. In other words, Tillich is here bringing together the realms of existence and value in such a way as to make difficult if not impossible the task of separating them. The "ought" is in danger of being consumed by the "is" or vice versa. This issue will warrant further attention in Chapter Three.

(3) Human history can be understood as the actualization of value but the ambiguity of the term value makes necessary a clarification. There has to be some criterion for distinguishing arbitrary or subjective values from objective values which are embodiments of the Unconditional. It is personalities and communities which are bearers of objective valuations, valuations which are validated independently of the valuating subject. Consequently, one can describe "the creation of the new in human history as the creation of new actualization of value in centered personalities."[2] It is

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

suggested, however, that the word meaning be substituted for the word value. Life in meanings is "life determined by the functions of the spirit and the norms and principles controlling them."[1]

(4) The dimension of the spirit, with freedom as its essential ingredient, is the dimension of creativity. Life in this dimension is analyzed in terms of functions. But because freedom can only be interpreted in polarity with destiny, freedom and subjection to valid norms are equated. Consequently, all functions (interpreted as "powers") have to actualize some values, norms or principles. But given the monism which shapes Tillich's Weltanschauung, all acts of freedom must be seen as actualization of Being-Itself which fulfills or completes itself in human history, though this completion and fulfillment must be interpreted as dynamic, ongoing, ever transcending each actualization. This is Tillich's attempt to relate the absolute and the relative without absolutizing the relative (the error of absolute idealism) and without relativizing the absolute (the error of Troeltsch). However, Tillich has not denied the basic idealistic synthesis between the Unconditional and the conditional.

What must be remembered is that Tillich sees in man as spirit creation of new actualizations of value. It is the creative aspects of human life, that is, the "becomingness" of life which is the arena of the spirit's operation. This basic creativity of man, this production of the new in a unique way, is under certain values or norms which Tillich claims to be objective. It is quite obvious that "becoming a person" is the sine qua non of all other value actualizations. There is therefore a great bulk of the material dealing with values that is related to the ethical.

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[1] Ibid.

One would fail to interpret Tillich correctly, however, should he use value and ethical equivocally. The ethical encompasses one of the functions of the spirit, all of which, though related, are under what is termed objective norms or values. What is suggested, but not developed, is the claim that actualization of life in meaning in the cultural functions of man is dependent upon the moral and hence the ethical realm. This priority of "the moral" to any and all other functions of life in the dimension of spirit is undoubtedly one element in his refusal to accord a separate place in the theological arena to ethics. Values are the norms or goals of the self-creation of life in the dimension of spirit. But there is no self-creation until there is self-integration. Neither is there self-transcendence until there is a constituted self. An examination of the relationship of spirit to morality will illumine this analysis.

(3) Morality and Spirit. -- Tillich builds much of his philosophy of value and norms on the foundation of becoming a person, a process which cannot be avoided. Here one might venture to claim is the "experiential" moment of the analysis. Tillich finds several elements in this experience. (1) Herein is to be found the source of one's awareness of the "ought-to-be" in our experience. That is, he claims that in the I-Thou relations, "oughtness" is basically experienced. Here and hereby the moral constitution of the self begins.

> The first question that arises at this point is: How does man become aware of the ought-to-be in his encounter with being? How does it happen that he experiences the moral commands as commands of unconditional validity? In contemporary ethical discussions the answer has been given with increasing unanimity on the basis of Protestant and Kantian insights: in the encounter of a person who is already and not yet a person with another in the same condition, both are constituted as real persons. "Oughtness" is basically experienced in the ego-thou relation.[1]

The same point is made in another way in which it is claimed that man has the whole universe as the potential content of his centered self. But there is one limit to this endless libido.

> One can subject and exploit another in his organic basis, including his psychological self, but not the other self in the dimension of the spirit. One can destroy it as a self, but one cannot assimilate it as a content of one's own centeredness. . . . Therefore, the other self is the unconditional limit to the desire to assimilate one's whole world, and the experience of this limit is the experience of the

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[1] Ibid., p. 40.

> ought-to-be, the moral imperative. The moral constitution of the self in the dimension of the spirit begins with this experience. Personal life emerges in the encounter of person with person and in no other way.[1]

Apart from all the implications for a philosophy of value, the point thus made is important for much of the analysis of related philosophical concerns. For Tillich, we have in this experience _the one_ clear breakthrough of the _unbedingt_, the unconditional.

(2) The second find in this approach is the conclusion that the "moral experience" is the means of becoming aware of belonging to a transcending dimension, a dimension which lies "beyond" that of self-freedom. The unconditional moral imperative "is the command to become what one potentially is, a _person_ within a community of persons."[2] The question can then be asked as to whether or not this is after all but a conditional imperative, based on the condition that one choose to affirm his own essential nature, "the being of a person in a community of persons."[3]

> The answer to this argument is the experience that has been expressed in the doctrine of the infinite

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[1] _Ibid_.

[2] Tillich, _Morality and Beyond_, p. 19. An analysis of this claim brings into focus a certain ambiguity in Tillich's thought. One _is_ already what he _ought_ _to_ _be_ before he can experience the imperative. Here the ontological and the axiological are again blurred and blended.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 20.

> value of every human soul in the view of the Eternal. It is not an external prohibition against self-destruction--bodily, psychologically, or morally--that we experience in states of despair, but the silent voice of our own being which denies us the right to self-destruction. It is the awareness of our belonging to a dimension that transcends our own finite freedom and our ability to affirm or to negate ourselves.[1]

Within this context, the unconditional moral imperative thus becomes crystal clear, namely, "the demand to become actually what one is essentially and therefore potentially. . . . His true being shall become his actual being--this is the moral imperative."[2] Here is the moment of unconditional breakthrough of the essential being of man.

(3) Thirdly, Tillich defines a moral act as obedience to the inner law (the essential nature) of our real or true being. An antimoral act is described in relation to this same analysis as an act which

> is not the transgression of one or several precisely circumscribed commands, but an act that contradicts the self-realization of the person as a person and drives toward disintegration. It disrupts the centeredness of the person by giving predominance to partial trends, passions, desires, fears, and anxieties. The central control is weakened, often almost removed. And when this happens, and other partial trends also aspire to predominance, the self is split, and the conflicting trends make it their battlefield. The "will," in the sense of a self that acts from the centered totality of its being, is enslaved. Freedom is replaced by compulsion. Deliberation and

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[1] *Ibid*., pp. 24-25.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 20.

> decision, the hallmarks of freedom, become mere facades for overhwelming drives that predetermine the decision. The voice of man's essential being is silenced, step by step; and his disintegrating self, his depersonalization, shows the nature of the antimoral act and, by contrast, the nature of the moral act.[1]

Again, it needs to be pointed out that the "essential nature" of man is the source of the objective value or norm under which the function of the spirit is actualized in the moral constitution of a person. Here, for Tillich, is a haven protected from the fallacies and inadequacies of supernaturalism and naturalism.

(4) The Relationship of Geist to Wert. -- In the early work, Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenständen und Methoden,[2] several important theses are proposed, theses which are most relevant to an attempt to discern the relationship of Geist to Wert.

(1) Norms are standards, laws or criteria of creativity. Such a claim is elaborated fully in his exposition of Geisteswissenschaft. In what way this obtains is clearly

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[1] Ibid., pp. 20-21.

[2] Concerning this work, Tillich says in the Vorwort of its 1959 publication in Volume I of Gesammelte Werke that though it remained without far-reaching influence, the endeavor was for him "eine Erstorientierung in der verwirrenden Mannigfaltigkeit des wissenschaftlichen Betriebes und der Weg, eine Ortsbestimmung der theologischen Arbeit zu finden. Dabei ergaben sich Einsichten, die ein fester Bestandteil meines Denkens geblieben sind, z. B. das Verhältnis der technischen zu den "reinen" Wissenschaften oder das Verhältnis der Norm --zu den Wesenswissenschaften." Paul Tillich, Das System der Wissenschaften, in Gesammelte Werke, I (1959), 9-10.

indicated in the following way:

> Mit dem produktiven Charakter der Geisteswissenschaften ist unmittelbar ihr normativer Charakter gegeben. Normen sind Gesetze geistigen Schaffens. Durch Erkenntnis solcher Normen wird die Geisteswissenschaft gesetzgebend. Die Wissenschaftslehre gibt Gesetze der Wissenschaftlichen Arbeit, die Kunstlehre Gesetze des ästhetischen Anschauens, die Gemeinschafts-- und Rechtslehre Gesetze des rechtlichen und sozialen Handlens, und Metaphysik, Ethik und Theologie normiern das theoretische und praktische, das autonome und theonome Verhalten zum Unbedingten. Geisteswissenschaften sind Normwissenschaften.[1]

Here is the Ausgangspunkt of Tillich's attempt to locate value and norms within life and not outside of life. Here is an attempt to look at what is peculiar to man, namely, his spirit and creativity, and analytically to discover the "ought-to-be" of each aspect of his "spirit-creativity." Leibrecht gives a succinct and penetrating summary of this orientation when he compares Descartes and Tillich by stating that the former's

> search for epistemological assurance is transformed to new depths by stressing the quest for the truth of being, for the meaning of human existence. The experience of the paradoxical presence of the ultimate in the moment of utter estrangement and doubt leads Tillich to an insight which is fundamental to all his thought, his philosophy, his theology and analysis of culture: namely, that there is no truth without doubt and no doubt without truth; that, consequently, there is no realm of life, even life in its estrangement, which exists without being related to the unconditional, the ultimate.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 220.

[2] Walter Leibrecht, "The Life and Mind of Paul Tillich" in Walter Leibrecht, ed., Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959) p. 4.

Leibrecht is as correct as he is perceptive in pointing this out. His insight into Tillich's thought introduces us into the second important point which can be extracted from his concept of Geist and Geisteswissenschaft. (2) Norms are "located" in the creative process, a "place" which is assumed by Tillich to exclude the to-be-avoided weaknesses of idealism, formalism and positivism.

> Die Normen werden in dem schöpferischen Prozess des Geistes geboren; nur durch ihn haben sie Realität. Sie ruhen weder in einer idealen Sphäre, wie die reinen Formen der Denkwissenschaften, noch haben sie unmittelbare Wirklichkeit, wie die Strukturen der Seinswissenschaften, sondern sie haben die eigentümliche Realität, die der schöpferische Prozess des Geistes ihnen gibt. Sie gehen in ihn ein und steigen neu geformt aus ihm hervor und gehen wieder in ihn ein. Sie entstammen dem geistigen Schaffen, und das geistige Schaffen richtet sich nach ihnen. Sie sind individuell, wenn sie vom schöpferischen Prozess gesetzt werden, und sie vertreten das Allgemeine, wenn das Schaffen sich auf sie richtet. Das Allgemeine selbst aber existiert nicht. Alles geistige Formen richtet sich auf die Unbedingtheit der reinen Form, aber das Unbedingte ist nicht selbst eine Form. Es ist der Eros des Geistes, der sich ihm zuwendet, die Sehnsucht aller bedingten Formen nach dem Unbedingten, und nicht der Gehorsam gegen ein Gesetz, gegen ein System konkreter Normen, die mehr oder weniger erkannt, mehr oder weniger verwirklicht werden. Der normative Charakter kommt also nicht zu den geistigen Schöpfungen hinzu, sondern er ist ihnen wesentlich; er bezeichnet ihre Art, ihr Dasein als Geist, als Selbstbstimmung des Denkens im Sein. Jeder geistige Akt ist eine Normsetzung, und insofern die Geisteswissenschaft produktiv an ihm beteiligt ist, ist sie normativ. Der normative Charakter der Geisteswissenschaft besteht darin, dass sie die Normen, die sie erkennt, mitschafft.[1]

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[1] Tillich, Das System der Wissenschaften, in Gesammelte Werke, I (1959), 220-221.

(3) There is an ultimate and undeniable relationship between Geisteswissenschaften and Wertwissenschaften. But there is a moment of subjectivity in value (valuation in today's philosophy) which Tillich wishes to avoid. He feels compelled to go beyond "subjectivity" and/or "objectivity" in this problem, finding his answer in the concept of "unbedingt." If we are concerned with the value of value, with the unconditional value in all valuations, then we can equate Wertwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften, though the latter is the term preferred because it avoids the problems of subjectivity implicit in "valuations" or "valuating."

> Die Geisteswissenschaften werden gegenwärtig vielfach also Wertwissenschaften bezeichnet. In den Begriff des Wertes wird die Beziehung auf das Subjekt gelegt, dem das Geistige mit Geltungsanspruch gegenübertritt. Aber diese Beziehung ist vom Subjekt her gedacht. Es ist für den Geist sekundär, Wert zu sein, primär ist er Geltung, Wahrheit, Norm. Es ist aber nicht angebracht, den Geist nach einem sekundären Merkmal zu definieren, zumal dieses Merkmal im Begriff des Wertes nicht ausreichend bestimmt ist. Es gibt zahlreiche Werte, biologische, psychische, ökonomische usw. Geistige Werte aber sind unbedingte Werte. Ohne den Zusatz "unbedingt" ist die Bestimmung des Geistes als Wert irreführend. Das Problem der Werte gehört in die Ethik; aber Wert ist kein übergreifender Begriff, der die Geistesgebiete denken könnte; er umfasst zu wenig und zu viel, und er hat ein Moment der Subjektivität in sich, über das der Begriff der Geistes- oder Normwissenschaft erhebt.[1]

(4) It is interesting and necessary to observe again Tillich's determination to chart a course of thought which avoids a "reductionist idealism" and a "reductionist nat-

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[1] Ibid., p. 221.

uralism"--the two tidal waves of thought which had generally swept under their control the bulk of critical thinkers under whom Tillich sat as a promising student. As indicated above, meaning is a Gestalt in which value and reality are united. Meaning-fulfilling is a concept which Tillich uses to give to Geist its uniqueness. For him, Geist is the actualization of this "intention" toward meaning. As such, it is the actualization of value. Values do not "exist" in some "super realm." Rather, they are actualized in each act of the spirit which is necessarily a reaching for the unconditioned value. Tillich states this in the following manner:

> Wir haben das Verhältnis von Dingen und Sinnformen bestimmt als Sinnerfüllung. Der Begriff besagt, dass die Dinge in der Richtung auf die unbedingte Form stehen und dass diese Richtung ihre Erfüllung findet in den geistigen Schöpfungen. Nicht ideale Normen, die jenseits des Seins stehen, aber auch nicht eine dem Geist gegenüberstehende sinngeformte Wirklichkeit ist Trägerin des Sinnes. Der Sinn ist überhaupt nicht gegeben, weder real noch ideal, sondern er ist intendiert, und er kommt im Geiste zur Erfüllung.[1]

Because value is intrinsic to life, and because Tillich can sometimes ask, as Leibrecht points out, for the value of life in terms of meaning of life, the above reference is important in helping us to see both the concern of Tillich, his analysis of the problem with which this dissertation deals, and finally the direction of his answer.

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[1] Ibid., p. 233.

But lest it be overlooked, emphasis must underscore the claim made in this analysis, namely, that what is, as a "product" of spirit, is an actualization of meaning or value.[1] Tillich does not have to look for values above, beside or beyond things--people, philosophies, art, political-social-economic realities, etc. To be, or rather, to have become actual, is based on having "achieved" value. Life in terms of meaning or actualization of value is the thrust of the entire theory of values. How this concerns and relates to the ontology and epistemology is yet to be examined. One other thing must yet be mentioned in but an introductory way, namely, the relation of value to religion.

(5) Religion and Values. -- This very cursory survey of Tillich's understanding of the crisis in value and the introductory summary of his analysis of the problems and their solution could not be completed without a brief consideration of the question as to the relation of religion to values or norms. Tillich's break with the Ritschlian attempt to reduce religion to ethics is a matter of history, but the reasons for his doing it are ever important in his philosophy. At the risk of over-simplification, it might be stated that for Tillich, value, in a sense, is an embodiment or actualization of the Unconditional. Con-

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[1] See the above discussion concerning Tillich's willingness to use either term.

sequently, if religion is defined as ultimate, unconditional seriousness, or ultimate concern, and if ultimate concern is regarded as the sine qua non of personhood, all functions of the spirit actualized in man are thus related to "religion."[1] Religion is understood as "direction toward the unconditioned." Values will be understood as the goals of this direction related uniquely to each function. As there can be no special religious realm, so can there be no special "value" realm.

Perhaps at no place is the problem of the relation of values and religion any more obvious than in the ethical realm of life, though it must be remembered that each function, and not simply the moral function, is under objective norms or values. Discussing the ethical-religious problem of how each is related to the other, Tillich writes that

> it is urgent to raise this question again in view of the present character both of the church's preaching and of philosophical ethics. The latter either shapes

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[1] James Luther Adams is correct in his analysis of the function of religion in the life of man. "Tillich is concerned not only with the religion of the churches but even more with the religious bases and implications of the whole cultural process. In his view, which is based on a realistic philosophy of meaning, religion has to do with man's ultimate concern, his concern with the meaning of life and with all the forces that threaten or support that meaning, in personal and social life, in the arts and sciences, in politics, in industry, education and the church." "Tillich's Concept of the Protestant Era" in Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 273. If one will recall Tillich's use of value and meaning as interchangeable terms, Adams' summary is helpful and perceptive.

> the general retreat of analytical philosophy into logical and semantic problems or continues the discussion of value theory (which in itself is a retreat from ontological inquiry), or else it undermines the possibility of ethical norms by pure pragmatism or pure existentialism, although this assumption of purity is a delusion.[1]

Standing within his Christian tradition, and more specifically within the Lutheran emphases of faith and grace, Tillich claims that the problem today is the loss of the concept of grace, the message of reconciliation and reunion with God as the ground of our being as well as its aim. This message, he claims, has been distorted into doctrinal and ethical laws.

> It is understandable that people, in view of this graceless moralism, turn to secular ethics. But when they find nothing more than the logical analysis of ethical theory, they turn easily to a cynical relativism or to a totalitarian absolutism in ethics, each often a consequence of the other. The question implicit in this situation is: Can we point to something that transcends both graceless moralism and normless relativism in ethical theory and moral action?[2]

The Christian response is the message that the Christ is a power of being "in which we can participate, and out of which true thought and right action can follow, however fragmentarily."[3] Thus one is enabled to do the "will of God."

But lest one conclude that Tillich has fallen into the supernaturalism which he purposes to avoid, it is necessary to recognize that concerning the will of God Tillich asserts that it

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[1] Tillich, Morality and Beyond, p. 13.

[2] Ibid., p. 14.

[3] Ibid.

> can and must be understood differently. It is not an external will imposed upon us, an arbitrary law laid down by a heavenly tyrant, who is strange to our essential nature and therefore whom we resist justifiably from the point of view of our nature. The "Will of God" for us is precisely our essential being with all its potentialities, our created nature declared as "very good" by God, as, in terms of the Creation myth, He "saw everything that he made." For us the "Will of God" is manifest in our essential being; and only because of this can we accept the moral imperative as valid. It is not a strange law that demands our obedience, but the "silent voice" of our own nature as man, and as man with an individual character.[1]

The degree to which this claim can be accepted within historical Christianity is a question which unfortunately lies beyond the problem of this dissertation. Nevertheless, it becomes increasingly clear that Tillich's position is an attempt to find a haven for norms and values. To be avoided are the pitfalls of supernaturalism and naturalism without recourse to any Kantian solution which makes religion one a priori along with other a prioris. An examination of Tillich's historical inheritances in light of the concepts of the boundary situation and the unconditioned was followed by a brief survey of the alternatives he rejected. The description has concluded with an analysis of the role of spirit in the problem of value. Before us is the task of showing how an ontology such as Tillich propounds can be the basis for both an epistemology and a metaphysics of culture wherein the norms and values of life are actualized or realized.

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[1] Ibid., p. 24. This reference to the heavenly tyrant is meant to suggest the kind of supernaturalistic approach which makes God a kind of totalitarian ruler who throws laws upon man with a take-it-or-leave-it attitude.

2. Ontology

If Tillich's claim that value cannot be understood apart from ontology is valid, then it is necessary for us to examine this ontology which is to provide the key to the door leading to his value theory. While at once admitting that much of Tillich's writing deals with this aspect of his thought either directly or indirectly, it will yet be adequate if but the essential moments of this aspect of his thought can be succinctly outlined. However, before the outline is presented, it will be as helpful as it is necessary to present some introduction to this aspect of Tillich's thought.

i. Introduction to Tillich's Ontology

In order to characterize a man's thought as basically a representation of a philosophical school, it is necessary to indicate what one understands to be the main tenets of that particular tradition. It is the intention of this dissertation, as already indicated in the Introduction and the first section of this chapter, to discover to what degree Tillich stands primarily in the stream of

German idealism. It is further purposed to indicate whether his idealistic leanings are supported, if not finally confirmed, by this unformulated theory of value, especially as this "hidden" dimension of Tillich's thought is seen in light of his more recent publications, particularly Volume III of Systematic Theology. If Tillich's claim regarding value is valid, supporting evidence will be found in an examination of Tillich's idea of Being. The relationship of value to being will be made clear.

Stephen Crary, in his dissertation, "Idealistic Elements in Tillich's Thought,"[1] outlines five theses which characterize idealism and, at least in part, Tillich: (1) the interpretation of the Ultimate Ground as a living reality; (2) the general idealistic distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds; (3) the identity principle; (4) nature and spirit as manifestations of the ultimate; (5) dialectic--the "yes" and "no" in dialectical tension but also in dialectical unity.[2]

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[1] Stephen Crary, "Idealistic Elements in Tillich's Thought," (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Yale University, 1955). In this work, Crary attempts to show that Tillich's thought is best described as "a synthesis of an existentialized version of German idealism with certain articles of Christian Faith." (p. 5) He further points out that Tillich's first three published works all deal directly or indirectly with Schelling's thought, which would suggest that Tillich regarded himself in this stream, "although for him it was a stream which had been modified by the existential insights of Schelling II." (p. 55).

[2] For further clarification on each of these theses, one should read the following: (1) Christoph Rhein, Paul Tillich, pp. 39-41; (2) Tillich, "Art and Ultimate Reality,"

With this claim concerning Tillich's relation to idealism, one must reconcile his criticisms of idealism and evaluate his attempts to "go beyond" it, even beyond the "Schelling II." The thrust of his meta-idealism is the claim that the experience of the "abyss" could not be accounted for in a system which regards their categories as "portraying" reality as a whole, instead of its being conceived as an "expression of a definite and limited relation to reality."[1] Thinking must be understood as sharing the "fate of existence," a factor too easily overlooked. It was necessary, in light of his experiences, to shake free from the formalism of idealism by adding to "form" the polarity of dynamics--open endedness.[2] This advance, if it can be so designated, is really but a "dialecticizing" of that which remains essentially the world of idealism. He was concerned to effect some kind of reconciliation of the principle of identity with the awareness of estrangement.

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a Lecture given at the Museum of Modern Art in New York City, February 17, 1959, p. 2; (3) Tillich, Interpretation of History, pp. 60-61; (4) Rhein, Paul Tillich, pp. 35-46; (5) Tillich, "What is Wrong with 'Dialectical' Theology?" Tillich admits that he found "more 'theonomous philosophy' in Schelling than in any of the other idealists." Interpretation of History, p. 35.

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 61.

[2] James Luther Adams summarizes Tillich's position by pointing out that for him "both mind and world are through the dimension of depth related to the inexhaustible ground and abyss. Thus the dimension of depth as well as the contradiction of essence implies that both mind and its objects are to be understood in terms of a living principle which informs, but does not exhaust itself in, the phenomena. . . ." "Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science and Religion," p. 132.

This examination of the theory of value will help to indicate to what degree Tillich's attempt is weighted on the side of Schelling whom Tillich criticizes as having finally permitted the triumph of idealism over existentialism.[1]

The principle of identity, so important for the formal aspect of Tillich's philosophy, has also its material aspect. In keeping with the distinction made in the Introduction concerning the conditioned and the Unconditioned, it is relevant to the issue to recognize the early claim that

> eine Religionsphilosophie, die dem Wesen des Unbedingten gerecht werden will, muss das Unbedingte in allem Bedingten erfassen, als das, was sich selbst und das Bedingte begründet. Das Bedingte ist das Medium, in dem und durch das hindurch das Unbedingte erfasst wird.[2]

This is the declared manner in which the identity is sustained. How this is possible is interpreted as a "systematic paradox" which at the same time encompasses a kind of mysticism defined as "der religiöse Ausdruck für die unmittelbare Identität von Gott und Mensch."[1]

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[1] In spite of Tillich's attempts to escape from the idealist label, Crary insists, and quite correctly, that the very method used in the attempt "rests on presuppositions which are thoroughly idealistic." "Idealistic Elements," p. 47. Tillich himself asserts that "estrangement always implies a fundamental belongingness, and therefore an inner drive toward reunion." Ultimate Concern, by D. Mackenzie Brown, p. 47. Estrangement does not destroy the essential unity.

[2] Tillich, "Die Überwindung des Religionsbegriffs," in Kantstudien, XXVII (1922), 457.

To the degree that a commitment to a philosophy of identity precludes any ultimately significant dualism, it follows that in Tillich's ontology one is confronted with a kind of monism.[2] This final disposition to a monistic philosophy warrants several immediate conclusions. (1) The essential-existential dichotomy (discussed below) is not a dualism. This fact alone, as will be shown, excludes Tillich not only from a dualism (formal or material) but also from any label which would classify him purely as an essentialist or an existentialist. He certainly cannot be labeled as simply an "existentialist."[3] (2) This monistic commitment opens Tillich's philosophy to the charge of pantheism, though Tillich seeks to avoid the label by a kind of panentheism.[1] However, one feels bewildered by the verbal gymnastics with which Tillich seeks to avoid pantheism. He wants an interpretation of reality in which there is both identity and separation, as indicated in his claim that

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[1] Tillich, Mystik und Schuldbewusstsein, in Gesammelte Werke, I (1959), 20.

[2] J. Heywood Thomas, in an article titled, "Some Comments on Tillich's Doctrine of Creation," argues that the creatio ex nihilo doctrine used by Tillich produces a dualism. "What Tillich has done is to make the 'nothing' out of which we come a something with fatal power. Hence, as I suggested, we are once more faced with Dualism." The Scottish Journal of Theology, XIV (June, 1961), 113-118. Thomas misses the point entirely. For the nothing out of which anything comes "to be" something would have to depend on a prior reality, namely, being or the power of being.

[3] J. Glenn Gray says that "though he borrows much along the way, Tillich's final position is far removed from that of Heidegger or any of the Existentialists. He is far closer akin to the synoptic spirit of Hegel." "Review of Love, Power, and Justice," The Journal of Philosophy, LI (September, 1954), 644. Hamilton is also cautious in regarding Tillich within the Existentialists' camp. "Tillich is very widely supposed to be a Christian Existentialist, but such a title can be bestowed on him only when it is hedged about with so many reservations that it becomes virtually meaningless. For he has never believed that an existentialist outlook can be a self-sustaining vision of life." The

> everything that has being is an expression, however preliminary and transitory it may be, of being-itself, of ultimate reality. . . . There is a gap between that which expresses and that which is expressed. But there is also a point of identity between them. It is the riddle and depth of all expression that it both reveals and hides at the same time.[2]

But it is obvious that even if one can add to pantheism a depth of abyss and creative surge, then he is still confronted with basically a pantheism. Do we not here en-

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System and the Gospel, p. 38. In an article, "On the Boundary Line," Tillich admits that he should not be regarded as an existentialist as would be Kierkegaard or Heidegger. The existentialist "lives from his opposite, the essentialist. . . . For this reason my present inquiries are predominantly essentialist." The Christian Century, LXXVII (December, 1960), 1437.

[1] Tillich claims that "God is in every moving atom, in it as its creative ground. He is not identical with it; that would be pantheism. But he is its creative ground. And he is in it, not substantially only but also spiritually, and therefore knowingly. That is what divine knowledge means." Ultimate Concern, by D. Mackenzie Brown, p. 173. In an earlier work it is asserted that "the unsatisfactory thing in all pantheistic and monistic attempts to identify God with the world, religion with culture, is that God and religion forfeit the abyss and thereby make the basis of meaning shallow, that they lose inexhaustibility and thereby rob creation of its terror and depth." Interpretation of History, p. 223.

[2] Tillich, "Art and Ultimate Reality," Lecture at the Museum of Modern Art in New York City, February 17, 1959, p. 3.

counter a pantheistic world view with the added descriptive designation that by an intrinsic freedom it is self-transcending?[1]

In introductory summary, it is obvious that Tillich's philosophical commitment is to an idealism that is unique in its ability to incorporate a moment of existential analysis but not to the degree that the "essentialism" of idealism is abrogated.[2] It must further be stressed that the

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[1] In his book, System and the Gospel, Hamilton speaks to this issue. "Strictly speaking, Tillich's system is not pantheistic in that it does not identify the Universe and God. All the same, because God is identified with the reality of the universe, it must be classified as a monistic system standing in very close relation to pantheism, differing from the latter in the detail of its ontological analysis but sharing with it a common vision." (p. 85) Guy Hammond sees in Tillich's lack of "serious otherness" in God a position equivalent to the Hegelian view "that God comes to self-consciousness and self-transcendence through man." He further argues that this interpretation is suggested in Tillich's denial of the charges of pantheism by his viewing creation as outside the divine life on the basis of the actualization of human freedom as well as self-transcendence, "which is at the same time the divine self-transcendence. Tillich seeks to provide here a reinterpretation of God's transcendence of the world, and the world's transcendence of God in terms of the human experience of self-transcendence." "Tillich on the Personal God," The Journal of Religion, XLIV (October, 1964), 292.

[2] That this is the "balance" between essentialism and idealism is clearly revealed in Tillich's insistence that "only in confrontation with the essential structures of being can existentialism speak. An existentialist theology as such is as impossible as a purely existentialist ontology." "The Relation of Metaphysics and Theology." The Review of Metaphysics, X (September, 1956), 63. It should be pointed out here, in support of the claim of Tillich's basic commitment to essentialism in spite of and beyond his earlier hesitancy concerning it, that later in his thinking he offers a kind of "new look" at idealism as well as a new embracing of this tradition. This came about when he "realized that

"abyss" which idealism overlooked is for Tillich an element of the system. It is "within" the systematic scheme. In light of this, one can gain greater appreciation for the significance of the way in which Tillich "structures" being, an outline of which now follows.

ii. Ontology Defined

The first difficulty in defining being lies in the claim that basically being cannot be defined. In answer to the question as to what we can say regarding the nature of being, Tillich states that we can affirm

> nothing in terms of definition, but something in terms of metaphorical indication. And we suggested the concept of power for this purpose: Being is the power of being![1]

This "power-of-being" concept is to preclude the possibility of regarding being as something formal and dead. Rather, it is affirmed that

> the power of being, is not dead identity but the dynamic process in which it separates itself from itself and returns to itself. The more conquered separation there is the more power there is. The proc-

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idealism means anticipation of the highest possibilities of being; that it means remembrance of the lost, and anticipation of the regained, paradise. Seen in this light, it certainly is a medium for the experience of ultimate reality. It expresses the divine character of man and his world in his essential, undistorted, created perfection." "Art and Ultimate Reality," Lecture at the Museum of Modern Art in New York City, February 17, 1959, p. 18.

[1] Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 37.

ess in which the separated is united is love.[1]

Although being cannot be defined as such, it can be described. Ontology becomes then a description of this indefinable. What exactly ontology as description means can best be seen in the following analysis.

> Ontology is the elaboration of the 'logos' of the 'on', in English of the 'rational word' which grasps 'being as such'. It is hard for the modern mind to understand the Latin *esse-ipsum*, being-itself, or the Greek *ὂν ᾗ ὄν*, being-in-so-far-as-it-is-being. We all are nominalists by birth. And as nominalists we are inclined to dissolve our world into things. But this inclination is an historical accident and not an essential necessity. . . . But ontology asks the simple and infinitely difficult question: What does it mean *to be*? What are the structures, common to everything that is, to everything that participates in being?[2]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 48. Walter Leibrecht, in his article, "The Life and Mind of Paul Tillich," states this succinctly. "'Being' for Tillich is no static substance. In its prime manifestation in man it is the experience of the ultimate, present in the moment of despair, present as the power of being at the moment when our life is threatened by meaninglessness, by non-being. Being is a dynamic concept: the *power* of being." Walter Leibrecht, ed., *Religion and Culture* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. 5. See also the concluding discussion of this section dealing with ontology.

[2] Tillich, *Love, Power, and Justice*, pp. 18-19. In a most important article, "Being and Love," Tillich makes some additional points which are helpful in grasping his interpretation. Ontology is "the rational explanation of the structure of Being itself." The question of ontology is: "What does it mean that something *is* and is not *not*? Which characteristics show everything that participates in Being?" He continues to show the significance of the relationship of being and love by pointing out that "if we speak of the ontology of Love we indicate that Love belongs to the structure of Being itself, that every special being with its special nature participates in the nature of Love since it participates in Being itself." *Moral Principles of Action*, Ruth Nanda Anshen, ed. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 661.

By defining ontology as an analysis of structures, and by asserting that everything which "is" has structure, one must also expect to find in this analysis the structure of value. Because, as has been suggested above, being, in a sense, is value, we can see at once how Tillich's theory of value has an ontological foundation.[1] However, there are many dimensions to Tillich's ontology. Many issues are raised by his analysis, the first being the differentiation of ontology from a "transcendent" metaphysics. In Kantian fashion, Tillich's ontology is transcendental, discovered analytically.[1]

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[1] It might be wise at this point to summarize what can well be regarded as the most critical analysis of Tillich's ontology, an analysis made by Randall and surprisingly sympathetic: The following points Randall makes. (1) Tillich stands, with variations, in the Augustinian tradition, exchanging the Augustinian intellectual emphasis on the Truth or Logos implied in knowledge for the "power of being" "implied in all men's varied participations in the world in which they are grasped by an ultimate concern." Randall, "Ontology of Paul Tillich," Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 136. (2) Tillich's philosophy "is a realistic interpretation of a world in which man can find a meaning for his life." (p. 137) (3) Tillich's analysis of philosophy (ontology) and theology--their divergence and convergence at the moments of (a) the theoretical and practical aspects of both disciplines; (b) the loci of the manifestations of universal structures; (c) the treatment of categories of being (descriptive vs. soteriological)--is subjected to two penetrating criticisms. (i) Tillich equates Aristotelian "being as such" with the religiously significant "reality as a whole," the latter identifiable with God while yet the former possessing no religious significance. "'The structure of being' can hardly mean two such different things. The first is the proper object of an Aristotelian ontological inquiry; the second is the goal of Platonic and Neo-Platonic aspiration, the 'Being' that is the Idea of the Good and the One." (pp. 139-140) Since Tillich means the latter, Randall correctly claims that Tillich "is hence exposed to all the philosophical attacks directed against a block universe from Pierce and James on." (p. 140) Consequently, this ambiguity places in jeopardy much of Tillich's method of correlation. "Speaking as a metaphysician, however, it seems to me important to recognize that 'reality as a whole' has the ontological status of a myth or symbol rather than that of a descriptive hypothesis. It is, in Tillich's distinction, an existential rather than a theoretical concept." (p. 140) Tillich's response to this is but a restatement of one of his central theses, namely, that the theoretical can become existential. See his "Reply to Interpreta-

iii. "Analytical Ontology"

Stressing again and again that he is concerned with the structure of reality wherever and whatever that reality may be, Tillich attempts to show that the primary structure is within experience itself. "As long as there is experience in any definite sense of the word, there is a structure of experience which can be recognized within the process of experiencing and which can be elaborated critically."[2]

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tion and Criticism" in The Theology of Paul Tillich, pp. 329-349. (ii) Tillich's implication is that to be a good philosopher one must become a Christian theologian. "The root difficulty in all these distinctions seems to lie in the too sharp dualism Tillich accepts between the theoretical and the existential or 'practical'." (p. 141) What Randall actually points out is that Tillich's ontology is based on shaky equivocations and/or arbitrary definitions--enough so, at least, so as to give grounds for warranted criticism.

[1] In Tillich's own terms it is claimed that "metaphysics should be defined as the analysis of those elements in the encountered reality which belong to its general structure and make experience universally possible. Metaphysics then is the rational inquiry into the structure of being, its polarities and categories as they appear in man's encounter with reality." "Relation of Metaphysics and Theology," The Review of Metaphysics, X (September, 1956), 57. In the same article it is suggested that "if the word 'metaphysics' can be saved from its supranaturalistic connotations, it should be used." (p. 58).

[2] Tillich, I, 167.

In the strict sense of "a priori" ontological concepts are a priori.

> They determine the nature of experience. They are present whenever something is experienced. A priori does not mean that ontological concepts are known prior to experience. . . . They are the products of a critical analysis of experience.[1]

Again, he affirms that "those concepts are a priori which are presupposed in every actual experience, since they constitute the very structure of experience itself."[2] Once this is accepted, it is not difficult to realize Tillich's indebtedness to Böhme, Baader, Schelling and others in their contention that "the innermost center of Nature lies in the heart of man,"[3] since it is man who is the experiencer *par excellence*.

iv. Levels of Ontological Concepts

In order to provide the context for the moment in which this philosophy focuses on value, it is necessary to summarize Tillich's "levels" of ontological concepts.

(1) *The Ontological Structure*. -- The question which is the *sine qua non* of philosophy is the question of being-itself and arises, as Tillich describes it, in "something

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 166.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] Paul Tillich, *Theology of Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 95.

like a 'metaphysical shock'--the shock of possible nonbeing."[1] Not only is "being" based on Being, but, as is shown by the question, "'Why is there something; why not nothing?'"[2] thought is also based on being. From this beginning one discovers, by analyzing the question itself, the subject-object structure of being, the first level of ontological concepts.

> The ontological question presupposes an asking subject and an object about which the question is asked: it presupposes the subject-object structure of being, which in turn presupposes the self-world structure as the basic articulation of being. The self having a world to which it belongs--this highly dialectical structure--logically and experientially precedes all other structures. Its analysis should be the first step in every ontological task.[3]

The basic ontological structure "is the implicit condition of the ontological question."[4]

(2) The Elements. -- The elements are listed as (a) individuality - universality; (b) dynamics - form; (c) freedom - destiny. These "share the polar character of the basic structure. . .", and are further significant in that

> the first element expresses the self-relatedness of being, its power of being something for itself, while the second element expresses the belongingness of be-

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[1] Tillich, I, 163.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., pp. 164-165.

[4] Ibid., p. 164.

ing, its character of being a part of a universe of being.[1]

Without going into the details of Tillich's much-discussed concept of the demonic, it can be summarily stated here that in these polarities of elements is reflected a kind of polarity in Being-itself. It is this latter term which is called not only the ground but also the abyss of being. This added dimension of abyss is the basis of the claim that the absolute can never be contained fully within history. Here also is the foundation for an "open" idealism. Here too is the locus for the potentially demonic. To the concept of "form" is added the concept of "depth." In and out of the latter comes the creative surge of the Ground of Being which presses beyond all existent realities, beyond all "forms." In a summary and helpful passage, Tillich claims that

> in the demonic, on the other hand, the divine, the unity of bottom and abyss, of form and consumption of form, is still contained; therefore the demonic can come to existence only in the tension of both elements. The tension is really in everything which is produced by the creative power. The impulse for formation inherent in everything and filling it and the horror of decay of form is founded on the form-quality of existence. To come into existence means to come to form. To lose form means to lose existence. At the same time, however, there dwells in everything the inner inexhaustibility of being, the will to realize in itself as an individual the active infinity of being, the impulse toward breaking through its own, limited form, the longing to realize the abyss in itself.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 165.

[2] Tillich, Interpretation of History, pp. 84-85.

"Things" become demonic when their forms are regarded as ultimate, when the form is equated with the abyss. How this analysis operates in the cultural realm will be demonstrated below. Here is the ontological foundation for the concepts of autonomy, heteronomy and theonomy.

(3) Concepts of Power. -- At this level we come to the most determinative concepts in the analysis, the moment in the analysis which is decisive for an understanding of value. Here Tillich introduces the words essence and existence.

> The third level of ontological concepts expresses the power of being to exist and the difference between essential and existential being. Both in experience and in analysis being manifests the duality of essential and existential being.[1]

The question as to how essence and existence are related and how both are grounded in being-itself touch upon the foundation for the whole dynamic surge of being. Tillich affirms that

> the answer is prepared by the polarity of freedom and destiny on the second level of ontological analysis. However, freedom as such is not the basis of existence, but rather freedom in unity with finitude. Finite freedom is the turning point from being to existence. Therefore, it is the analysis of finitude in its polarity with infinity as well as in its relation to freedom and destiny, to being and nonbeing, to essence and existence, which is the task of ontology in the third level.[2]

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[1] Tillich, I, 165.

[2] *Ibid*.

It is Tillich's understanding that this comes to actualization in man. The relation of this analysis to the concept of spirit, creativity, norms, and values will be discussed below.

A question which relates to the analysis of being in this third level of ontological concepts is the question of potentiality and actuality. Is there potentiality in Being-Itself? Can Tillich admit to a potentiality and yet remain monistic? What is the relationship of potentiality to actuality? First of all, the difference between these two concepts is to be understood in terms which express the power of being to exist and in terms which reflect the "difference between essential and existential being. Both in experience and in analysis being manifests the duality of essential and existential being,"[1] expressed in Aristotelian terms in the polar relation of potentiality and actuality. How these are related to one another and to Being-Itself is answered in Tillich's concept of the elements of freedom and destiny.

Tillich states that "finite freedom is the turning point from being to existence."[2] This pushes the analysis further into the nature of the finitude-infinity polarity, and thus to the nature of finitude as a "mixture" of being and nonbeing. The question of whether Being-Itself can permit potentiality must then be answered in terms of freedom, that which "makes existence possible because it transcends the essential necessity of being without destroying it."[1] There are two points in Tillich's philosophy which are keys to the answer of this difficult problem.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

(1) The structure, elements, concepts of power, and categories which ontology analyzes to be the characteristics of being, do not literally pertain to Being-Itself. Being-Itself is the Ground, the prius, of such distinctions and differentiations which ontology discovers. It therefore is concluded that in the Ground of Being, the potentiality _is_ actuality--closely following the Aristotelian _actus purus_ analysis. This is the basis of Tillich's claim that all designations of Being-Itself must be symbolic.

(2) In answer to the question as to whether then there is potentiality in the sense of freedom in the Ground of Being, one must state that for Tillich freedom can be interpreted only in terms of destiny. Freedom is assured ontological status. It is the _sine qua non_ of transcendence. But it is freedom in polarity with destiny. In the Ground of Being one can only conclude that freedom is destiny, actuality is potentiality, since the Ground of

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 182.

Being is "beyond" the polarities and structures which are necessary for being "to be" something and not nothing.

It seems difficult to fathom fully what exactly Tillich means. It is obvious, however, that actualization of being, that is, the entire multidimensional unity of life, must be interpreted in terms of both freedom and destiny, potentiality and actuality. For the concerns of this dissertation it needs to be pointed out that all life as the actualization of being is to be interpreted in terms which represent this basic freedom-destiny, actuality-potentiality polarity. Destiny is finally to be understood as Being-Itself. In these concepts one finds the grounds for Tillich's basic Ausgangspunkt, namely, that value completes or fulfills being. Actualization then is in itself the value realization. Consequently, value (or unconditional meaning) is the moment by which and in terms of which Tillich unites and interprets life in all its dimensions and in all its functions as the actualization of potentiality. Here is the essential unity of essence and existence, so often stressed in Tillich's thought. It is on the basis of these considerations that the Ground of Being is also interpreted in terms of unconditional meaning, unconditional power, meaning, value, and the like.

Tillich then insists that freedom is an element in the nature of being. This, he claims, is his accomodation of the powerful tradition in classical theology which attempts to keep God from being fixed to a static concept of being. In this way Tillich seeks to establish "a relatively but not absolutely static a priori."[1] This also warrants the conclusion that from the side of destiny, there is nothing new. But one cannot look at "one side" of the polarity without looking also at the other. From the side of freedom, it can be stated that freedom is the actualization of what essentially is. One can of course criticize Tillich for circular reasoning. His answer is that such reasoning is necessary for matters of the spirit. More significant is the Tillichian surrender of such issues to the mystery of the abyss itself.

Some would regard this analysis as a static monism. But if this conclusion is reached, it is done so in part on the basis of a concept of freedom which Tillich cannot and does not accept. One might also be able to conclude that given Tillich's analysis of freedom as a moment in the structure and elements of being, there is here a kind of ultimate indeterminism. Again, this conclusion can be sustained only on the basis of a concept of freedom alien to Tillich's thought. One must accept or reject at the outset Tillich's concept of the freedom-destiny polarity. The interpretation of life as the actualization of being, an actualization fulfilled or completed in life in the spirit, will obviously have to interpret this actualization in terms of its destiny, Being-Itself. How Tillich thus defines the values or norms governing the functions of the spirit in terms of manifestations of the Ground of Being is the burden of this dissertation.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 167.

(4) Categories of Thought and Being. -- Categories of thought and being are: (a) time; (b) space; (c) causality, and (d) substance. These are differentiated from other ontological concepts in that they participate in the nature of finitude and consequently pertain to finite being and thinking. These, it can be pointed out, do not share the polaric structure.

v. The Moments of Essence and Existence

Because of the importance of these two concepts to the ontology and to the theory of value, it is necessary to develop a further exposition regarding them. Being is the prius of all reality and thought. Nonbeing is related to being, but logically and semantically the latter is prior to the former. Being-itself is consequently beyond all distinctions of word or thought since all such phenomena "exist" and as such are finite, that is, they "receive" being from that which "is" being. Everything which "is" is finite.

> Being is the beginning without a beginning, the end without an end. It is its own beginning and end, the initial power of everything that is. However, everything which participates in the power of being is 'mixed' with nonbeing. It is being in process of com-

ing from and going toward nonbeing. It is finite.[1]

Consequently, everything, except being itself which is not a "thing," is finite and has infinity. Man is the locus in which both infinity and finitude are not only actualized but experienced, and the experiencing of this is a manifestation of man's transcending his finitude, of his also participating in infinity.

Infinity is a negative word defined as the transcendence of finitude. "Infinity is a demand, not a thing."[2] "It is to be understood as a directing concept, not a constituting concept. It directs the mind to experience its own unlimited potentialities, but it does not establish the existence of an infinite being."[3] An epistemological consequence is the claim that the drive of the mind is infinite, but because it is bound to the finitude of its individual bearer, it cannot grasp infinity. This is an important moment in Tillich's thought, one which shall receive further treatment below. The brilliant interpretation of these concepts in psychological-existential terms helps to indicate the depth of Tillich's insights.

This polaric mixture of being and nonbeing in all that is leads to further considerations. "Finitude, in correlation with infinity, is a quality of being in the same sense as the basic structure and the polar elements. It characterizes being in its essential nature."[1] Being, as previously indicated, is in essential relationship to nonbeing and is also threatened (essentially) with disruption and/or self-destruction, as indicated by the categories and the dynamic tension between the ontological elements. The question then arises: "How can being, including within it the whole of its actuality, contain its own distortion?"[2] An answer to this demands a distinction between essence and existence, a distinction that is crucial to an understanding of value. Where is the "good" in this great structure? What is the good? How do values function within existence? Are there unambiguous values? If so, how does a mind chained to the ambiguous know these? How can Tillich actually relate the "realm of values" and the "realm of things?" Though we are yet a good way from the answers to the above questions, all the above analyses confirm the use of the principle of identity upon and within which will be found the answers. How should we understand these crucial concepts, essence and existence?

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 189.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 190.

[3] *Ibid.*

(1) Essence. -- In the history of thought essence has had both an empirical and valuating sense.

Essence as the nature of a thing, or as a quality in

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[1] Ibid., p. 202.

[2] Ibid.

> which a thing participates, or as a universal, has one character. Essence as that from which being has 'fallen,' the true and undistorted nature of things, has another character. In the second case essence is the basis of value judgments, while in the first case essence is a logical ideal to be reached by abstraction or intuition without the interference of valuations.[1]

The question as to why there is this two-fold character of essence receives a direct answer. It is the ambiguous character of existence,

> which expresses being and at the same time contradicts it--essence as that which makes a thing _what_ it is (_ousia_) has a purely logical character; essence as that which appears in an imperfect and distorted way in a thing carries the _stamp of value_ [italics mine]. Essence empowers _and_ judges that which exists. It gives it its power of being, and, at the same time, it stands against it as commanding law.[2]

In short, essence is the source of both the "is" and the "ought" of things.

(2) _Existence_. -- The history of thought also reveals how varied have been the definitions and uses of the term "existence."

> It can mean the possibility of finding a thing within the whole of being, it can mean the actuality of what is potential in the realm of essences, it can mean the "fallen world," and it can mean a type of thinking which is aware of its existential conditions or which rejects essence entirely. Again, an unavoidable ambiguity justifies the use of this one word in these different senses. Whatever exists, that is, 'stands out' of mere potentiality, is more than it is in the state of mere potentiality and less than it could be in the power of its essential nature. In some phi-

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[1] _Ibid_., pp. 202-203.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 203.

> losophers, notably Plato, the negative judgment on existence prevails. The good is identical with the essential, and existence does not add anything. In other philosophers, notably Ockham, the positive judgment prevails. All reality exists, and the essential is nothing more than the reflex of existence in the human mind. The good is the self-expression of the highest existent--God--and it is imposed on the other existents from outside them. In a third group of philosophers, notably Aristotle, a mediating attitude prevails. The actual is the real, but the essential provides its power of being, and in the highest essence potentiality and actuality are one.[1]

What is offered here is an "analysis" of reality which is supposed to make intelligible the world and ourselves in the world. It is a key which promises to unlock the door to the nature of reality. The key may prove more mysterious and difficult than that which lies behind the door it promises to unlock, but this is perhaps more of a weakness in the acquired habits of modern thought than in the Tillichian analysis. Further light is thrown on this analysis by Volume III of Systematic Theology. In essence Tillich is concerned to develop a philosophy of *life*, ontologically defined as "the actuality of being."[2] Life, so understood, is a "'mixture' of essential and existential elements. In terms of the history of philosophy we can say that we envisage the Aristotelian distinction between *dynamis* and *energeia*, between potentiality and actuality, from an existentialist viewpoint."[1]

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] Tillich, III, 11.

An important implication follows from this distinction. A philosophy dealing with life ontologically is required to consider it "essentially" and "existentially."

> The ontological concept of life and its universal application require two kinds of consideration, one of which we should call "essentialist" and the other "existentialist." The first deals with the unity and diversity of life in its essential nature. It describes what I venture to call "the multi-dimensional unity of life."[2]

This approach provides a universal concept of life descriptive of even the processes of genesis and decay, even of such phenomena as stars and rocks. Tillich's "multidimensional monism is to preclude any kind of dualism as well as a selective reductionist monism."[3]

In Volume II of Systematic Theology, there is lengthy treatment of the force and function of the essential which establishes certain points significant for our concern.

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[1] Ibid., p. 12. James Luther Adams offers further clarification of Tillich's analysis of reality, especially human nature, by saying of him that "in his conception of the cleavage in human existence he stands near to Jacob Boehmen, who viewed existence as participating in the depth of being but who interpreted the cleavage as the consequence of the working of a dark, creative, and destructive power which, like Lucifer, drives toward self-inflation. The principle opposition to the divine unity is not a satanic principle of mere negation; it is rather a demonic power that perverts the creative power into a mixture of form-creating and form-destroying energy in history." James Luther Adams, "Tillich's Concept of the Protestant Era" in Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 304.

[2] Tillich, III, 12.

[3] See ibid., p. 28 and I, 230ff.

(1) "It is finite freedom which makes possible the transition from essence to existence."[1] (2) "Man is free, in so far as he can receive unconditional moral and logical imperatives which indicate that he can transcend the conditions which determine every finite being."[2] (3) Christ "does not represent man to God but shows what God wants man to be. He represents to those who live under the conditions of existence what man essentially is and therefore ought to be under these conditions."[3] (4) It is essential man who represents not only man to man but God to man; for essential man by his very nature, represents God."[4] (5) Those who "participate" in Christ, participate in the New Being in which the gap between essence and existence is overcome; "it is conquered in principle, i.e. in power and as a beginning."[5] (6) The "new" of the New Being is in contrast to the old of the old situation under the law which is

> man's essential being standing against his existence, commanding and judging it. In so far as his essential being is taken into his existence and actualized

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[1] Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 31.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 93.

[4] *Ibid*., p. 94.

[5] *Ibid*., p. 119.

> in it, the law has ceased to be law for him. Where there is New Being, there is no commandment and no judgment.[1]

Whatever theological deficiencies may appear in this analysis, it can be seen how consistently Tillich deals with the essential and existential: their essential unity and existential polarity; the locus of the "ought" of life in the essential; the normative character of the essential--a normative character which shall appear as determinative in the analysis of the function of spirit, its relation to life and its appearance in man. It is precisely this analysis that has led Tillich to regard as hopelessly inadequate the philosophies of value whose non-ontological foundations produce either inconsistent, inadequate, irrelevant or impossible alternatives in values, norms and ethics.

There are several summary issues which can assist us in understanding the essence-existence contrast. (1) There is obvious justification for the Niebuhrian criticism that in Tillich the ontological outweighs the historical in the latter's analysis of the transition from essence to existence.[2] One might conclude that the fall is to be equated with creation. The tension which gives rise to this criticism, and the element which makes the equation objection-able to Christian thought is the latter's regarding of "the fall" as the moment of sin. To see this as some "necessary" moment in the divine life is to deny the intrinsic holiness of the divine. Tillich's "solution" is in the claim that it is not our finiteness that is tragic, but rather, "our finiteness in so far as it tries to elevate itself to infinity."[1] There is a sense in which, for Tillich, "the fall" must be regarded as good, a "necessary moment" in the realization of a good which is greater than the good of dreaming innocence, namely, the actualization of man's potentialities.[2]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] See R. Niebuhr's article, "Biblical Thought and Ontological Speculation," The Theology of Paul Tillich, noting especially pp. 220-227. This issue will be discussed further in Chapter III, part 2, section iv.

> I have praised the "tree of knowledge" of good and evil. Without this, man would always have remained in "dreaming innocence" or in a relationship to God where full humanity, the intended freedom for love, could never have developed. And therefore the Fall is, to quote Augustine, felix culpa, which means "happy guilt"--guilt that is necessary in order to actualize the potentialities which are in man.[3]

On this basis, then, it can be concluded that the identity principle is not lost in the transition from essence to existence.

(2) The essence-existence contrast is not to be regarded as a substantial dualism. If it were to be so in-

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[1] Paul Tillich, "The Conception of Man in Existential Philosophy," in The Journal of Religion, XIX (July, 1939), 210.

[2] This point will be discussed more fully in Chapter III.

[3] Tillich, in Ultimate Concern, by D. Mackenzie Brown, p. 184.

terpreted, Tillich's thought would be subject to all the charges he utters against supernaturalism. As was indicated in the first section of this chapter, Tillich's Weltanschauung precludes any dualism. As Hamilton correctly points out, it is relative.[1]

(3) Tillich's "re-interpretation" of essence is in his regarding it as necessarily constitutive of life, and consequently subject to fate. Any attempt to elevate essence beyond the historical is rejected.

> We therefore reject the definition of the relationship of essence and existence, which makes the essence unhistorical, without fate, and degrades existence in the scale of being and value in comparison with essence. Dialectics is observation of the essence, insofar as essence is in the hands of fate; not of the essence, insofar as it remains without fate.[2]

These three issues will permit us to see how values are based on essence, one of the aspects of life (the other being existence) understood as the actualization of being. On this analysis hangs the entire Tillichian attempt to unite value and reality.

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[1] Hamilton also raises a point of criticism which cannot be dismissed lightly. "But the problem immediately arises as to whether the system (which so frequently has been called existential) can have any place in it at all for an existence that is really real or for individuals who truly exist." System and Gospel, p. 89. This analysis is further clarified by pointing out here what will be mentioned in subsequent sections of the dissertation. The relationship between the essential and the existential is interpreted not in terms of separation but rather in terms of estrangement. Reunion is, for Tillich, an ontological ultimate. But this can only be in terms of what was originally united. It is in these terms that the whole process of life is interpreted in terms of reunion, an analysis which is the description of the work of love described as the power of being. What is "strange" cannot be reunited, rather only that which is essentially one. "Estrangement presupposes original oneness." Love, Power, and Justice, p. 25.

[2] Tillich, Interpretation of History, pp. 165-166.

vi. Being in Process

As indicated in the above outline of the analysis of being, nothing is suggested to warrant the conclusion that Tillich regards being as a static "reality" pure and simple. But this claim must be joined to the reminder that the dynamic aspect of being does not involve a "disunity" or dualism, a view which the remarks introductory to this section on ontology prohibit. Being-Itself, or the divine, is in process, the process of overcoming non-being, of overcoming estrangement.[1] In the words of Tillich,

> the power of Being is not a static possibility but it is the dynamic process in which a being actualized itself by providing time and space to itself. . . . In this process the principle of identity and differentiation are united. It is the source of all conflicts and all creativity.[2]

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[1] As James Luther Adams states it, "Tillich, like Schelling, holds that the meaning of history is found in the process whereby the divine, through the instrument of human freedom, overcomes estrangement through love." "Tillich's Interpretation of History," The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 300. J. Glenn Gray sees this similarly. Being taking non-being into itself through the dialectic of separation and reunion "is Tillich's formula for the most generalized activity of the world whole." "Review of Love, Power, and Justice," in The Journal of Philosophy, LI, (1954), 645.

[2] Tillich, "Being and Love," in Moral Principle of Action, Anshen, ed., p. 664.

Man as the dimension in which the spirit, understood as the unity of Sein and Denken or power and meaning, is actualized is thereby the locus in which Being-Itself fulfills itself. The processes "in God" are described as the process "in which separation is posited and overcome by reunion."[1] Again, the divine life is described as the

> divine self-love. Through separation within himself God loves himself. And through separation from himself (in creaturely freedom) God fulfils his love of himself--primarily because he loves that which is estranged from himself.[2]

Since this is the thrust of the analysis of the dynamic process in being then it will be necessary to show that the values governing life in the dimension of spirit are finally none other than different manifestations of Being-itself, related to each of the functions of life in the spirit. That we can anticipate such a conclusion is evidenced in the analysis of being and love.

By stating that "Being-Itself is Love,"[3] a further distinction is permitted. "God as Being-Itself is Love" and "God as Being-For-Us has love,"[1] are claims in which are grounded the trinitarian idea and the symbolism relating thereto.

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[1] Tillich, I, 242.

[2] Ibid., p. 282.

[3] Tillich, "Being and Love," in Moral Principle of Action, Anshen, ed., p. 662. Tillich defines Being-Itself as love also in Volume I, page 279. But one must be very careful here to note that love is for Tillich first of all an ontological term. Serious misinterpretations and answerless questions result in interpreting love first of all in terms of will, mind or purpose--in personalistic terms--and then ask if Tillich can possibly admit to this definition. One can say that Being-Itself is love only in terms that describe the actuality of being as life. Life process is interpreted by Tillich as a unity of trends, one toward separation one toward reunion. But separation and reunion are based on the

> The Ground of Being from which every being takes its power of being has the character of self-separating and self-returning life. Self-separating is the abbreviation for complete individualization. Self-returning is the abbreviation of the return of life to itself in the power of reuniting love.[2]

In this way Tillich offers an analysis of the triadic process of Being.

This analysis is distinguished from non-Christian interpretations which regard the separation as a kind of accident which happens to Being and contradicts its essential nature. In contrast, the Christian interpretation regards love "as the meaning of the separation as well as the return. Therefore Love is directly related to the lowest as

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distinctions between potentiality and actuality. It must then follow for Tillich that the terminology, when applied to Being-Itself or to God, is symbolic. It means that "the divine life has the character of love but beyond the distinction between potentiality and actuality. This means therefore that it is mystery for finite understanding." Tillich, I, 280.

[1] Tillich, "Being and Love," in Moral Principle of Action, Anshen, ed., p. 662.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 671. For a clarification of this analysis, see Tillich's discussion of the relation of the dialectical method and the movement of living reality moving "through self-affirmation, going out from itself and returning to itself." Vol. I, 234. See also Vol. I, 250 and Vol. III, 283-294.

well as the highest."[1] The pagan-Christian differences are reflected in the distinctions between the agape and eros types of love, although this difference is not to be regarded as ultimate since the equation of God and Being as love gives to "the whole process of self-realization and reunion. . . a divine character."[2] At any rate, in the trinitarian idea is seen a symbol depicting life and love as being rooted in Being-Itself. "It points to the principle of otherness and reunion which since Parmenides and Plato have moved ontological thought."[3]

Several concepts related to this trinitarian analysis must be summarily mentioned. (1) The criterion by which the thesis of the relationship of Love and Being-Itself is "its adequacy to interpret life in all aspects. Especially, it must be able to give a uniting ground to the different forms of what is called love."[4] Thus it is deemed necessary to expose the essential unity in the various types of love. The manner in which this is accomplished will be discussed in the section dealing with morality. Suffice it to say here that Tillich believes that he has in fact demonstrated this unity. (2)

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[1] Tillich, "Being and Love," in Moral Principle of Action, Anshen, ed. Pages 671-672 discuss this fully.

[2] Ibid., p. 672.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 661.

> The love structure of Being-Itself presupposes differentiation. . . . Everything which is shows this character. Being drives toward individualization. The individual thing is, according to Aristotle, the Telos (aim) of nature. It is the really real.[1]

The relationship of reality and individuality is seen in the assertion that the

> real is what has the power to resist non-being and what cannot be resolved into something else. According to this criterion the self-related being has complete reality in itself. It resists absolutely the dissolution into something else.[2]

But this "serious otherness" (which some refuse to regard as such) does not deny the essential identity in the Ground of Being. It is the "difference" by which the identity is actualized and by which identity is transformed into love. In this way the love structure of the Ground of Being or Being-Itself or the Unconditional is also a structure of reunion. In light of these passages, and with the whole system before us to evaluate, it is difficult to refute the thesis that the idealistic thrust of the Tillichian analysis here becomes undeniably clear. It seems obvious that we have here a reflection, even if a dim one, of the Hegelian claim that the Absolute fulfills its own life in the life of man. The main difference is the Troeltschian-Tillichian claim that the Absolute is not available for domestication in history. We have here, nevertheless, a variant of the Entfüllung theme:[1] a variant in that it is "open", takes into account the "abyss", is self-transcending. If this analysis is correct, it will have to be confirmed by a theory of values which posits as the values for man none other than Being-Itself: that out of which life flows; that by which it is creative; that to which life aspires must be one. The degree to which this is the case will be discussed in the section dealing with values and spirit.

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[1] Ibid., p. 663.

[2] Ibid.

vii. Summary Comments

There are strengths and weaknesses attendant upon the ontology which is here outlined. For the sake of brevity, it might prove helpful to summarize the main points which are generally stressed. (1) In an age in which philosophy has been in the main reduced to epistemology, Tillich's contributions and concerns stand rather unique. Here is a distinct moment in the contemporary intellectual arena. The fact that he has been able to maintain his ontological priorities by circumventing the empirical tradition which gave rise to the epistemological emphasis perhaps justifies the claim that

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[1] Several passages from Systematic Theology, Volume I, provide evidence for the claim that the "life" of God or the absolute is so interpreted as to warrant the conclusion that it fulfills itself in the life of man. One needs only to keep in mind the qualification that this fulfillment is never complete or final or absolute. Tillich does claim, however, that "there is no place to which man can withdraw from the divine thou, because it includes the ego and is nearer to the ego than the ego to itself." (p. 271) Again, the living processes in God are described as eternal processes "in which separation is overcome by reunion." (p. 242) Again, "the divine life is the divine self-love. Through the separation within himself God loves himself. And through separation from himself (in creaturely freedom) God fulfills his love of himself--primarily because he loves that which is estranged from himself." (p. 282).

> there are many indications of his being not a modern theologian at all but rather a nineteenth-century thinker in twentieth-century dress.[1]

However, Tillich's insistence on making epistemology dependent on ontology in the contemporary philosophical milieu

> means that Tillich's enterprise has to overcome a great psychological and intellectual hurdle. Tillich, like Kant, though from a completely different angle, finds it necessary to rehabilitate both philosophy and theology.[2]

On the basis of this achievement, Dillenberger is prepared to affirm that "quite apart from theology, it is first-rate philosophy."[3]

(2) There is in the analysis of being an element which makes this more than an ancient philosophy in modern guise, namely, the ideas of dynamic and process. That he has tried to relate being and becoming is a noble attempt,

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[1] J. Heywood Thomas, Paul Tillich: An Appraisal (London: SCM Press, 1963), p. 176. In this same work, Thomas refers to the modernity of Tillich as comparable to "that which a duly edited version of Schelling with a preface by Sartre could be imagined to possess." (p. 175).

[2] J. Dillenberger, "Tillich's Use of the Concept of 'Being'," in Christianity and Crisis, XIII (March, 1953), 30.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 31.

even if the conclusions indicate that being finally triumphs over becoming. Norman Pittenger asserts that Tillich calls the divine reality conceived by such men as Hartshorne and Daniel Day Williams as living, active, creative the "Ground of Being." Tillich, in his third volume of Systematic Theology, is said to make use of their thought, "not always with explicit acknowledgement. . . ."[1]

(3) D. E. Skinner raises a criticism which has been so often repeated that it hardly seems necessary to mention it again. However, the point concerning the status of the personal dimension is a critical one. Skinner claims that this dimension is "lost in the throes of being-itself."[2] There is no question but that the "personal" is subordinate to the ontological dimension. Frederick Sontag endorses this criticism by cautioning that "if being-itself is dominated by unity, as it seems to be for Tillich, then of course ontology will be at odds with the requirements of personality. . . . If unity is taken as the primary ontological concept, then it will depersonalize reality. . . ."[3]

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[1] Norman Pittenger, "A Contemporary Trend in North American Theology: Process Thought and the Christian Faith," in Religion in Life, XXXIV (Autumn, 1964). See pages 500 to 510 for his discussion of this.

[2] D. E. Skinner, "Critique of Tillich's Ontology," in Anglican Theological Review, XXXIX (January, 1957), 61.

[3] Frederick Sontag, "Ontological Probability and the Nature of God: A Reply to Tillich," in The Journal of Religion, XXXVI (October, 1956), 235.

(4) There is some caution concerning the ontological question. Is it in fact the question which is the key to the mysteries of being? Is it even an answerable question, and if not, is not an attempt to elaborate on an answer somewhat irrelevant? Elmer Sprague concludes, after examining Tillich's thought, that the "answer to the ontological question turns out to be made of no better stuff than the question itself."[1] If this criticism can be sustained, then there is need for some other approach to the "structure" of being. However, it can also be argued that the question may well be asked in forms other than that posed by Tillich, and if so, his approach has some vindication.

(5) Several criticisms take their departure from the necessity of asking what Tillich means by "Being-Itself," or, in other words, "God." If it is accepted that we cannot speak meaningfully about that which we cannot define and if definition involves description, and if, as Tillich claims, Being-Itself is indefinable but not undescribable, then we are in a circle from which there is no "out." William Rowe summarizes the problem.

> The difficulty we have uncovered in trying to explicate Tillich's concept of God can be expressed as follows: (1) to explicate Tillich's concept of God, we must first understand what 'being-itself' means;

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[1] Elmer Sprague, "On Professor Tillich's Ontological Question," in International Philosophical Quarterly, II (February, 1962), 87.

(2) being-itself is ineffable.[1]

John Fenton exemplifies this same concern by pointing out that

> if the ontological principle is literally true, then it is meaningless. Literally, it is self-contradictory. If the ontological principle is only symbolically true, then there is no way to discover what it means or how to use it properly.[2]

This ambiguity further intensifies the problem of religious language which now, according to Tillich's formulation, must no longer attempt to discover how one may refer from one realm of existence to another which is somehow above it or at least unlike it, but rather "one must refer from existence to 'something' which does not even exist."[3] Tillich's answer that the immanence of the transcendent constitutes the uniqueness of religious language leads to the conclusion

> the religious dimension of meaning is exclusively that universe of discourse which expresses the participatory relationship of beings to Being-Itself. Religious meaning neither competes with nor is it supported by meaning derived from any other source.[4]

One can quickly conclude from such representative criticisms that Tillich's failure to deal with the empirical tradition of philosophy creates problems for many minds, a disappointing oversight in the one who sought to correlate the Christian message to a modern world.

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[1] William Rowe, "The Meaning of 'God' in Tillich's Theology," in The Journal of Religion, XLII (October, 1962), 285.

[2] John Fenton, "Being-Itself and Religious Symbolism," in The Journal of Religion, XLV (April, 1965), 72.

[3] Ibid., p. 73.

[4] Ibid.

(6) There are issues upon issues to be raised in regard to any monistic-pantheistic interpretation of reality. It is not necessary to rehearse these at this point. In relation to the problem of value, however, there is one criticism which is most pointed to the ontology and which shall occasion further comment in the summary and evaluation of this dissertation. Given ontology as Tillich defines and analyzes it, how does one take seriously the experienced differences between good and evil; between truth and error (the epistemological dilemma)? It is to be granted that one may obtain or discover value grounded in being. But given the identity principle of idealism, how does one account for experiences of lack of value? In a review of Love, Power, and Justice, J. Glenn Gray raises this precise issue. "Tillich," he affirms, "does not take the problem of reconciling the existence of evil with the goodness of the divine very seriously."[1] The "degree-of-seriousness" issue is debatable since so much of Tillich's work deals with the destructive forces of life, but the question suggested by Gray's criticism, the question of how one accounts for experiences of dualistic contrast in

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[1] Gray, "Review of Love, Power, and Justice," in The Journal of Philosophy, LI (1954), 646.

a philosophy of identity, is indeed valid. For many, it will remain unanswerable.

These criticisms are but indications of areas in which the entire philosophy of Tillich evidences problems and/or weaknesses. It is now necessary to move to an examination of the epistemological counterpart to Sein, namely, Denken. The problem of epistemology is, for Tillich, already answered in the analysis of Being. However, an examination of epistemology will show further how values are known, and in doing this, reveal even further the ontological commitment which is all-determinative for Tillich's thought.

3. Epistemology

i. The Approach to Epistemology

Tillich's approach to epistemology is comparable to his approach to value since both are forged on the anvils of his experience of the crisis which has been described above. The abyss opened up by the war years shattered the idealistic synthesis of value and existence as well as that of absolute and relative truth. Standing in history, Tillich saw the abyss which prohibits synthesis but it did not take from him the vision or awareness of that which needs to be synthesized. As mentioned earlier, the crisis of historical existence did not do to Tillich what it did to those who sought to think and live without reference to the eternal. Tillich's interpretation of the crises in thinking, value, history and the like suggest that these crises are not of the same magnitude as they were to those for whom the dimension of depth was totally eclipsed. The material synthesis had been broken but for Tillich the boundary situation was still a place or a moment where could be maintained a dialectical synthesis. The experience of the "Yes" of the Unconditioned was heard by Tillich when most others heard only the "No" or nothing at all.

What was lost in terms of value and truth was the inevitable consequence of a false dualism, expressed either in theological or metaphysical supernaturalism or in terms of the Kantian formal-material bifurcation. The answer for Tillich was to straddle the absolute-relative borders which constituted the boundary situation by hanging on to that in which both borders were thought to be grounded and essentially identical. The split in the present was kept from total disruption by appeal to the insights of the past.

Given this Sitz im Leben, and the conclusion that the finite and the conditioned cannot reach the infinite or the Unconditioned (not because of the "absence" of the latter, it must be added), then the first "real truth" to be grasped is the truth of the epistemological circumstance. To discover this truth, however, the formal-material aspects of knowledge must be expanded to include another dimension, namely, that which is decisional and yet beyond decision. "The presupposition of all our thoughts," says Tillich, "was that truth is realized in a decision regarding the Unconditioned."[1] Decisions are made by the ego or "center" of man which, because it is the maker of decisions, lies beyond the ambiguities which are a necessary part of the realm of decisions. Here is the formal dimension of decisions, the "place" where the categories, interpreted by Tillich as the basic functions of consciousness, are operative. Each decision has its material side, that is, it is dependent upon a formed and consequently ambiguous world. To these formal and material elements, Tillich adds the element of "judgment," which is characterized as the meaningful interpretation of reality.

> All knowledge, even the most exact, the most subject to methodical technique, contains fundamental interpretations rooted neither in formal evidence, nor in material probability, but in original views, in basic decisions.[2]

To the question as to whether this "judgment" or "original view" is not itself subject to the ambiguities and relativities of history, Tillich replies that

> such a proposition must be removed from the context of knowledge. It must arise from another sphere than that of knowledge. It must be the expression of the relation of knowledge to the Unconditioned and therefore the expression of a basic metaphysical attitude. Our exposition leads inevitably to this

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[1] Tillich, Interpretation of History, p. 141.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

> conclusion. The judgment that is removed from ambiguity, the judgment of absolute unequivocal truth, can be only the fundamental judgment about the relationship of the Unconditioned and conditioned.[1]

This "judgment" is not finally to be regarded as a judgment but rather "the metaphysical meaning implied in judging."[2] This metaphysical meaning which interprets the relation of the conditioned to the Unconditioned is decisively experienced in those moments of greatest meaninglessness or despair, the point of standing on the boundary. Tillich claims that "der Ort der Grenze ist der für die Erkenntnis fruchtbare Ort."[3] Here one learns that "the knowledge" of what is true of all knowledge, namely, "that our subjective thinking never can reach the unconditioned truth,"[4] is itself beyond the very limitation which is its discovery. It is "awareness" of the whole of reality which contains in it the finite, the infinite and the "chasm" or "abyss" between and under them.

It is not difficult at this point to behold in clear outline the element of idealism which Tillich never rejected, namely, the identity principle. He confesses this abiding indebtedness to the "theonomous philosophy" of Schelling in declaration that he embraced German idealism, admitting further that

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[1] Ibid., p. 170.

[2] Ibid., p. 171.

[3] Tillich, Religiöse Verwirklichung, p. 11.

[4] Tillich, Interpretation of History, p. 170.

> I do not believe that I can ever unlearn what I learned there. . . . The point of procedure of every analysis of experience and every concept of a system of reality must be the point, where subject and object are at one and the same place. From there, I came to understand the idealistic principle of identity--not in the sense of metaphysical speculation, but in the sense of an analysis of the final elements implied in every knowledge. Up to now no criticism of idealism has convinced me of the inadmissibility of this procedure.[1]

Clearly we have here an expression of the idealistic tradition, revised by a touch of existential awareness of the human situation.

This background analysis is confirmed by the kind of criticism to which Tillich subjects other analyses of epistemology's foundation. (1) Ritschl is criticized for his failure to move beyond Kantian formalism and his rejection of being. (2) Troeltsch's attempt at synthesizing the formal and material aspects of knowledge could not discover the moment which was beyond the relativism into which his analysis sank. (3) Hegel fails to subject his epistemology to the full dynamic of history. Logos determines Kairos because Hegel does not envision the converse as also valid. Hegel loses view of the dimension of depth, the dynamic surge of the power of being which proves its own inexhaustibility by breaking through logos by means of a kind of metalogos. However, it needs to be pointed out that in rejecting Hegel's failure, he does not want to reject Hegel completely.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 60.

> To deny a straight line and a closed circle does not mean to affirm the meaninglessness of the world. As in the depths of the idea itself, identity unites with inner infinity, clearness with inexhaustibility. . . .[1]

(4) As mentioned earlier, idealism is criticized for its failure to realize that thinking stands in the fate which precludes the possibility of an absolute standpoint from where one can "close the system." However,

> it cannot be denied that a correspondence exists between the human spirit and reality, which is probably best expressed in the concept of 'Meaning,' and which led Hegel to talk of the unity of the objective with the subjective spirit in an absolute spirit.[2]

(5) Though Tillich is indebted to Kant for the latter's critical philosophy which denies the validity of constructing a super-world to explain this world, he rejects the Kantian analysis which makes the objective world formless and meaningless apart from a subjective appropriation of form and meaning by the knower on the known. The dichotomy of reality and logical forms is rejected. As Adams summarizes it, "Kantianism overlooks the striving of the

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[1] Ibid., p. 168.

[2] Ibid., p. 61. Even recently, Tillich said: "If you accuse me of idealism, I would answer that, if idealism concerns itself with finding the essential structure of reality, then I am an idealist; and probably you are also, if you attempt to form judgments at all. Otherwise, we must call ourselves positivists. But the very moment in which we make a judgment about anything we are, at least then, 'essentialist.' 'Essentialist' is probably a better word today than idealist,'. . . ." Ultimate Concern, p. 56.

real toward spiritual meaning. It loses the unity of subject and object, of being and being valid, which is given in creative penetration with meaning."[1] As will be discussed below in this section and the one dealing with man, in man's awareness of the Unconditioned and its relation to the conditioned the Ground of Being comes to awareness or fulfillment of meaning. This awareness is further articulated in every function of Geist as each points to, is based on the norm or value without which it could not "be."

(6) Existentialism is recognized as able to ask the question about the meaningfulness of life. But its material emphasis eclipses both the formal aspect of knowledge and even more the moment in which both the formal and material are gounded. (7) Lebensphilosophie, while correct in its focusing on life and the dynamic surge of life, can not in its own method reach "the whole" which is the key to meaning and hence the point which saves life from relativity. (8) Positivism is categorically rejected on the grounds of its rejection of the moment of transcendence, a rejection which for Tillich helped to foster the crisis in meaning. (9) Neo-Kantianism is in general rejected because of its failure either to admit its metaphysical background or its avowed aversion to metaphysics. From these criticisms of the then-contemporary epistemological alter-

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[1] Adams, "Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science and Religion," p. 154.

natives, one can conclude that Tillich was in pursuit of a new moment in the science of knowledge.

It is significant that Tillich's first major work after the First World War was not primarily a theology or a book on religion. This fact is a clue to the kind of concerns which he considered to be so important to his day. The rending of value from existence (in the Neo-Kantian philosophers and theologians) or the loss of the relationship of the Unconditioned to the conditioned left the age with a loss of meaning, a loss of the sense of the value of life. The separation of theology from the descriptive sciences reflected the disruption of meaning. Consequently, Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenständen und Methoden was an attempt to bring into systematic unity the various disciplines of positivistic science, historicism and theology. The reason that the work never received popular recognition is two-fold. Even for the German mind it is a highly speculative work.[1] On the other hand, the work had little appeal to the growing stream of empirical philosophy.

Tillich's concern for meaning was again the result of the war years which revealed circumstances threatening the meaning of life. This use of the word meaning, by the way, is to be contrasted to the use it has in linguistic analysis and phenomenology. Tillich is concerned to discover and/or preserve the "meaning of life." "In this sense, meaning is the characteristic concern of the human spirit, and hence it is, for Tillich, the foundation of his whole system."[1]

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[1] Adams regards the book as most significant. Its concern is a "subject on which only one other theologian of the twentieth century has written at length, namely, the British theologian, F. R. Tennant." Ibid., p. 122. It is also interesting to note that for six years following its publication only August Dell and Friedrich Büchsel attempted to criticize it.

This reference warrants further exposition. Tillich, it might be said, builds his entire system on the concept of spirit whose primary concern is the meaning or value of life. But what cognitive approach does one employ in approaching the realm of spirit, understood as the unity of _Sein_ and _Denken_? Spirit is the realm of the actualization of meaning (or, as we will later see, value). Tillich identifies his problem as based on the fact that "der blosse Logismus kommt nicht zum Seinsgehalt, der Alogismus kommt nicht zur Denkform."[2] What Tillich wants to establish is a "metalogic" which he claims to be singularly relevant to the knowledge of _Geist_. "Die Methode der Geistewissenschaften ist _metalogisch_; logisch um der Denkformen, metalogisch um des Seinsgehaltes willen. Beides aber ist eine Einheit."[3]

Tillich is then determined to overcome both naturalism and rationalistic idealism. He is critical of Hegel's mistake wherein the logical swallows up the metalogical. Given Tillich's ontology of dynamic, ongoing power which yet always has within it the moment of logos, one can then recognize the significance of metalogic. It can finally be understood as the means by which we intuit within reality the meta of all actualized logos. It is the means by which we grasp the living meaning, the transcending meaning, which is the support of all meaning grasped in the forms of thought, but which ever breaks through all forms of thought. It is through metalogic that one grasps the Gehalt-dimension of all reality.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 55.

[2] Tillich, _Das System der Wissenschaften_, in _Gesammelte Werke_, I (1959), 122.

[3] _Ibid_.

Hegel finds the grand synthesis of the dialectical process in the absolute idea, a point basic to the Hegelian system. Tillich obviously rejects this. But it is extremely significant that Tillich still obtains the synthesis, not in terms of an idea but in terms of meaning or value! Here is the point on which comparisons of Hegel and Tillich must be based. But here too is the point in which the differences must be kept clearly in mind. Tillich is not to be judged as falling back into a kind of rational idealism in the mode of Hegel. But that even in his epistemology and argument for a metalogic is to be found the basic idealistic passion for synthesis cannot be denied. It would be difficult to qualify Tillich's idealism, but one might call it, in contradiction to rational idealism, a kind of metarational idealism, to be interpreted on the basis of this analysis. The ideas central to Tillich's epistemology are developed in Das System der Wissenschaften.

It is not practical to attempt to outline this first major post-war work. However, a few key concepts should be mentioned. The key to this work is in a later work, in which Tillich mentions the three basic moments in the nature of meaning.

> Erstens das Bewusstsein des Sinnzusammenhanges, in dem jeder einzelne Sinn steht und ohne den er sinnlos würde. Zweitens das Bewusstsein um die Sinnhaftigkeit des Sinnzusammenhanges und damit jedes einzelnen Sinnes, d. h. das Bewusstsein um einen unbedingten Sinn, der in allem Einzelsinn gegenwärtig ist. Drittens das Bewusstsein um eine Forderung, unter der jeder Einzelsinn steht, den unbedingten Sinn zu erfüllen. -- Das erste Sinnelement also ist das in jedem Sinnakt gegebene Bewusstsein um den allgemeinen Sinnzusammenhang, um die Unmöglichkeit eines geforderten Sinnes, um die Totalität, um die "Welt". In jedem Sinnbewusstsein ist Weltbewusstsein enthalten. Aber das Weltbewusstsein ist selbst nicht das Letzte. Auch die Totalität des Sinnes braucht nicht sinnhaft zu sein, sondern könnte wie jeder einzelne Sinn in dem Abgrund der Sinnlosigkeit verschwinden, wenn nicht die Voraussetzung eine unbedingten Sinnhaftigkeit in jedem Sinnakt lebendig wäre. Diese Unbedingtheit des Sinnes ist aber nicht selbst ein Sinn, sondern sie ist der Sinngrund.[1]

Das System der Wissenschaften goes on to develop the details of this theory concerning meaning. Because every life that transcends its given psychological and biological elements is a spiritual life, and because every spiritual act is a meaning-fulfilling act, and because meaning is, as the reference from Religionsphilosophie shows, dependent on a system of meanings, then it becomes clear why the awareness of the unconditioned meaning of all meaning is the key to the sciences. Here, under the normative science of Geisteswissenschaft, which stands under the norm of the Unconditioned, the sciences of Denken and the sciences of Sein are united and also receive their "highest" significance. The products of the Geisteswissenschaft are science, philosophy, art, sociology, ethics, metaphysics and theology. Given Tillich's analysis, these disciplines earn a status of their own which precludes the possibility of their being reduced to either the disciplines of Denken or those of Sein. As indicated above, the analysis is very speculative and is introduced here simply to show the thrust of Tillich's epistemology which can now be treated in greater detail.[1]

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[1] Paul Tillich, "Religionsphilosophie," in Lehrbuch der Philosophie, herausgegeben von Max Dessoir (Berlin: Ullstein, 1925), pp. 789-790.

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[1] The best interpretation of this difficult work is the summary given by Adams in "Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science, and Religion." "Taking all of the factors mentioned into account, we see then that the Tillichian system of the sciences is concerned with the relations between mind and its objects, with the creative functioning of the human spirit (in what are called the cultural sciences), with the methods appropriate to these respective spheres, and finally with an ultimate intuition into reality which qualifies the mind and its objects as well as the human spirit in its characteristic creative productions." (p. 132).

ii. The Priority of Ontology to Epistemology

In a milieu in which epistemology has become one of the most critical and analytical of philosophy's disciplines, and when it has become so anti-metaphysical or anti-ontological, Tillich's claims regarding epistemology stand unique--not that they are so new but rather because they resurrect the basic ontological approach, enriched by some subsequent developments in European thought.[1] Insisting that attempts to reduce philosophy to mere epistemology or ethics or logical calculus have been unsuccessful, Tillich asserts that "the later adherents of the Neo-Kantian philosophy recognized that every epistemology contains an implicit ontology. It cannot be otherwise."[2]

His determination to re-orient epistemology is based on the claim that even the act of knowing is an act which is grounded in being. The ontology of love outlined above provides the key to understanding knowledge. Love and knowledge "are united in this that they overcome the strange objectivity. The whole process of consciousness is the overcoming of estrangement which we call the objective world, according to Hegel."[1] In fact, the ontological question as to what is being itself indicates the impossibility of avoiding this ontological grounding. If one asks why there is not nothing rather than something, the question becomes meaningless

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[1] There is no argument on Tillich's "prius" at this point. The full scope of the significance of his epistemology is as complex as it is broad. Leibrecht shows the aim of the analysis by pointing out that "Tillich always emphasizes the primacy of being over thought. It is the giveness of being which limits human reason. He thus affirms the limitation of finite reason. Without falling into the irrationalism and emotionalism of many a romantic thinker, however, he shows the need of 'ecstatic reason' to discover the unconditional in the conditional." Leibrecht, "The Life and Mind of Paul Tillich" in Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich, Leibrecht, ed., p. 8.

[2] Tillich, I, 19.

> for every possible answer would be subject to the same question in an infinite regression. Thought must start with being; it cannot go behind it, as the form of the question itself shows. If one asks why there is not nothing, one attributes being even to nothing. Thought is based on being, and it cannot leave this basis; but thought can imagine the negation of everything that is, and it can describe the nature and structure of being which gives everything that is the power of resisting nonbeing.[2]

Implied here are other emphases in Tillich's thought, not the least of which is the claim that knowing as an act shares in the dimension of history, and as such is of a decisional character which cannot be understood apart from its "being-structure." The background of this approach is clearly perceived by Rhein who analyzes this moment in Tillich's philosophy quite carefully, showing the "Entscheidungscharakter" of knowledge.

> Tillich geht von zwei einander entgegengesetzten Linien in der Philosophiegeschichte aus. Das eine ist die methodische Hauptlinie, gekennzeichnet etwa durch die Namen Descartes und Kant. In ihr geht es

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[1] Tillich, "Being and Love," in Moral Principle of Action, Anshen, ed., p. 670.

[2] Tillich, I, 163-164.

> um die "Gestalterfassung des Wirklichen". Dabei spielt für unser Problem keine Rolle, ob diese Erfassung intuitiv von der Ganzheit her, wie bei den Phänomenologen, oder analytisch-reflexiv von den Elementen her, wie bei den Kantianern, geschieht. In beiden Fällen ist die unveränderliche Form Gegenstand des Erkennens. Ihr gegenüber steht die zweite Linie, gekennzeichnet durch Namen wie Böhme, Schelling, Nietzsche, anknüpfend an die Mystik des Mittelalters und die Naturphilosophie der Renaissance, beeinflusst auch durch Luther. Sie richtet sich auf den Lebensprozess selbst, den sie als "Schöpfung, Widerstreit und Schicksal" versteht; deshalb ist sie, "Philosophie der Geschichte" (Schelling).[1]

One cannot simply stop by saying that knowledge is in history, in the Lebensprozess. History also must be seen as grounded in being. Unless being is the real and logical priority of history and knowledge, the latter is subject to the same fate as the endeavors to find values apart from ontological ground.

> Since knowing is an act which participates in being or, more precisely, in an "ontic relation", every analysis of the act of knowing must refer to an interpretation of being (cf. Nicolaie Hartmann). At the same time the problem of values pointed toward an ontological foundation of the validity of value-judgments. If values have no fundamentum in re (cf. Plato's identification of the good with the essential structures, the ideas of being), they float in the air of a transcendent validity, or else they are subjected to pragmatic tests which are arbitrary and accidental unless they introduce an ontology of essences surreptitiously.[2]

If one is prepared to accept this analysis that both epistemology and value are grounded in an ontology which is also the foundation of history, the way is clear to see how value can be known. First, however, it is necessary to examine the knowing processes in general.

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[1] Rhein, Paul Tillich / Philosoph und Theologe: Eine Einführung in sein Denken, p. 48.

[2] Tillich, I, 19-20.

iii. Reason

The significance of this ontological orientation for the issues in epistemology is many-sided. If one is oriented to the critical empiricism of modern philosophy then he has to work patiently at the task of following Tillich's analyses. One first must recognize what is meant by reason. At this point Tillich reintroduces what is called the "classical" concept of reason.

> Classical reason is Logos, whether it is understood in a more intuitive or in a more critical way. Its cognitive nature is one element in addition to others; it is cognitive and aesthetic, theoretical and practical, detached and passionate, subjective and objective.[1]

Tillich's indebtedness to this "classical" concept of reason is evidenced in his primary distinction between ontological and technical reason, simply stated, the distinction between reason and reasoning. Ontological reason is central to the best of philosophical tradition from Parmenides to Hegel and is defined as "the structure of the mind which enables the mind to grasp and to transform reality. It is effective in the cognitive, aesthetic, practical, and technical functions of the human mind."[2] The

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[2] *Ibid.*

"technical" concept of reason reduces ontological reason to one of its functions, namely cognition. In the technical concept

> only the cognitive side of the classical concept of reason remains, and within the cognitive realm only those cognitive acts which deal with the discovery of means for ends. While reason in the sense of Logos determines the ends and only in the second place the means, reason in the technical sense determines the means while accepting the ends from "somewhere else."[1]

Considerable insight into modern thought is shown in the analysis of the limitations and dangers of technical reason. Its eclipse of the other aspects of reason in the "Logos-sense" has had dehumanizing effects on man as well as problematic consequences in contemporary epistemologies. Against the trends of contemporary philosophy Tillich emphasizes the "ontological" concept of reason. It is also central to the theory of values.

> Technical reason, however refined in logical and methodological respects, dehumanizes man if it is separated from ontological reason. . . . Even in the means-ends structure of "reasoning" assertions about the nature of things are presupposed which themselves are not based on technical reason. Neither structures, Gestalt processes, values, nor meanings can be grasped without ontological reason.[2]

Once the case for ontological reason is presented, and provided one remembers that technical reason is but one aspect of ontological reason, then the way is clear to make the next important distinction in this concept of reason, namely, subjective and objective reason. Though there is here some over lapping of distinctions, ontological reason having been defined "as the structure of the mind which enables it to grasp and to shape reality,"[1] subjective reason is defined as "the structure of the mind which enables it to grasp and to shape reality on the basis of a corresponding structure of reality. . . ."[2] The important distinction is that the latter is always actualized in "an individual self which is related to its environment and to its world in terms of reception and reaction."[3] Though this terminology presents some difficulties, it suffices for the purposes of this dissertation simply to follow the analysis as it is given.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

[2] *Ibid.* One needs to keep in mind the general distinction between "essential perfection" and "existential imperfection." Ontological reason is here treated *essentially*.

Objective reason is the structure of reality grasped by the subjective grasping reason, and is defined as "the rational structure of reality which the mind can grasp and according to which it can shape reality."[4]

The next significant moment in the analysis involves the concept of the depth of reason, a designation which is occasionally and erroneously called "depth reason." Rather than another "kind" of reason, it is a quality which "is expressed through every rational expression,"[1] in both the objective and subjective structures of reason. Its referent or that to which it points could be identified as "being-itself," "ground," the Unconditioned, or such other designations providing one realizes the symbolic character of such terms.

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[1] Tillich, I, 75.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

[3] *Ibid.* The terminology is ambiguous in the sense that it is difficult to imagine what is exactly the difference here. Tillich admits that the terms are not exclusive, adding that "we transform reality according to the way we see it, and we see reality according to the way we transform it."

[4] *Ibid.* p. 77.

> In the cognitive realm the depth of reason is its quality of pointing to truth-itself, namely, to the infinite power of being and of the ultimately real, through the relative truths in every field of knowledge. In the aesthetic realm the depth of reason is its quality of pointing to "beauty-itself," namely, to an infinite meaning and an ultimate significance, through the creations in every field of aesthetic intuition. In the legal realm the depth of reason is its quality of pointing to "justice-itself," namely, to an infinite seriousness and an ultimate dignity, through every structure of actualized justice. In the communal realm the depth of reason is its quality of pointing to "love-itself," namely, to an infinite richness and ultimate unity, through every form of actualized love. This dimension of reason, the dimension of depth, is an essential quality of all rational functions. It is their own depth, making them inexhaustible and giving them greatness.[2]

Once an ontological interpretation of reason and the analysis of the structures of reason are presented, Tillich describes the way in which the dynamic and static elements in objective reason function, how realities evidence a rational structure. He then discusses actual reason, that is, reason in the processes of being (finite), existence (self-contradictory) and life (ambiguous). Significant for the problem of this investigation is the conclusion (or assumption?) that actual reason is finite, and as such, is ever bound to the categories of finitude. While actual reason can grasp and shape the phenomena which *appear* to it, it remains incapable of grasping reality itself. But man is not content to remain within the boundaries to which the finitude of reason confines him. There is an innate rejection of this "bondage," a quest for the Unconditional, for the infinite. Tillich suggests that the drive for this Unconditional in all functions of the spirit is actually spurred on by the nature of the moral experience.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 79.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

> The only point at which the prison of finitude is open is the realm of moral experience, because in it something unconditional breaks into the whole of temporal and causal conditions. But this point which Kant reaches is nothing more than a point, an unconditional command, a mere awareness of the depth of reason.[1]

iv. Knowledge

If one accepts the ontological concept of reason, or the "classical concept," as Tillich identifies it, and if it is remembered that what participates in Being-Itself shares in the drive toward reunion, then he can readily comprehend the ontological structure of knowledge. "Knowing is a form of union. In every act of knowledge the knower and that which is known are united; the gap between subject and object is overcome."[1] Thus in each act of knowledge some estrangement is overcome. It is on the basis that "ontology precedes every other cognitive approach to reality,"[2] that the conclusion is reached that "one cannot escape ontology if one wants to know!"[3]

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 82.

Knowledge is divided into two types, namely, "controlling knowledge" (closely correlated to technical reason) which "'objectifies' not only logically (which is unavoidable) but also ontologically and ethically,"[4] and "receiving knowledge" in which the element of detachment is secondary (in contrast to controlling knowledge in which the element of union is secondary). In "receiving knowledge" the emotion is the vehicle since "no union of subject and object is possible without emotional participation."[5] "The unity of union and detachment is precisely described by the term 'understanding',"[6] whose literal meaning suggests what is called intimate participation. Another designation is

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[1] Ibid., p. 94.

[2] Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 20.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Tillich, I, 97.

[5] Ibid., p. 98.

[6] Ibid.

"responsible understanding" which refers to"subjectivity as such, to the norms, values, creations and meaning of personal life."[1]

Tillich makes this distinction in types of knowledge because he is trying to provide accreditation for a kind of knowledge other than "controlling" knowledge. It is the prevalence of this type of knowledge which has ripped value from its ontological mooring. Tillich refuses to permit life to become distorted through "objectification," which is the inevitable consequence when life is "known" through controlling knowledge.

> Controlling knowledge claims control of every level of reality. Life, spirit, personality, community, meanings, values, even one's ultimate concern, should be treated in terms of detachment, analysis, calculation, technical use. The power behind this claim is the preciseness, verifiability, the public approachability of controlling knowledge, and, above all, the tremendous success of its application to certain levels of reality. . . . The public mind is so impregnated with its methodological demands and its astonishing results that every cognitive attempt in which reception and union are presupposed encounters utter distrust. A consequence of this attitude is a rapid decay of spiritual (not only of the Spiritual) life, an estrangment from nature, and most dangerous of all, a dealing with human beings as with things. In psychology and sociology, in medicine and philosophy, man has been dissolved into the elements out of which he is composed and which determine him.[2]

"Receiving knowledge" is grounded or based upon the distinction between ontological and technical reason. In the former, reason, as indicated above, has the power to "grasp" and "shape" reality. It can "understand" reality in the sense indicated above. This is more than an attempt to isolate something of a "Lebensvernunft" as might be erroneously concluded from these remarks. Ontological reason makes "receiving knowledge" possible, by comprehending the essence of things or events. It understands such through grasping and shaping reality.[1]

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[1] Tillich, The Journal of Religion, XIX (1939), 202.

[2] Tillich, I, 99.

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[1] It cannot be denied but that this is obscure terminology. Dorothy Emmet confesses her bewilderment at the distinction between grasping and shaping. If he means that theory and action are mutually determinative, then she claims that this also is the case in technical reason. "I think the difficulty is that Tillich has what is really an idealist view of the 'ontological reason,' and that he is combining it with the language of 'Being' and 'Essence' derived from the Scholastic realist tradition." "Epistemology and the Idea of Revelation," The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 206. It is yet difficult to understand Emmet. She suggests that Tillich although "may" mean that, even though ontological reason is concerned only with concepts by which we describe anything that "is" we yet must ask as to "How. . .we know that these concepts somehow reflect the structure of the world." (Ibid.) It seems that Tillich closely follows Kant in the transcendental, analytical methodology. But this is not really the main problem. The whole analysis is obscured by lack of clarification of the special moments which constitute the interpretation. This lack of clarity is also seen earlier in Tillich's writings when he discusses this same problem. "In jeder Gestalterkenntnis müssen also zwei Elemente unterschieden werden: die Wahrnehmung, die Aufnahme der Erscheinungen, und das Verstehen, die Erfassung des Wesens. Das Wesen besteht nicht aus der Summe der Erscheinungen, aber das Wesen kann auch nicht erschaut werden abgesehen von seiner Erscheinung; sondern in den Erscheinungen und durch die Erscheinungen hindurch wird mittels der Sinnprinzipien das Wesen erschaut. Es sind also nicht zwei Akte, die in der Gestalterkenntnis zusammenwirken, sondern es ist ein Akt, der zugleich Wahrnehmen und Verstehen ist." Tillich, Das System der Wissenschaften, in Gesammelte Werke, I (1959), 286.

Mention was made earlier[1] of the problem of how we come to know values, or essences. In regard to this, Tillich introduces the "ideating" method which is to be understood as ultimately dependent on the ontological foundations of the philosophy; on the distinctions between essence and existence (and these to be understood only in the analysis of "being"); on the analysis of reason as both ontological and technical; and finally on the claims made concerning "receiving knowledge" as opposed to "technical knowledge." In Volume III of Systematic Theology, the question of "knowing" this essential structure of being is again raised.

> . . .How can we know about the logos-structure of being, about the essential nature of man and his world? We know about it only through its ambiguous manifestations in the mixture which is life. These manifestations are ambiguous in so far as they not only reveal but also conceal. There is no straight and certain way to the norms of action in the dimension of spirit. The sphere of the potential is partly visible, partly hidden. Therefore, the application of a norm to a concrete situation in the realm of the spirit is a venture and a risk. It requires courage and acceptance of the possibility of failure. The daring character of life in its creative functions holds true also in the dimension of the spirit, in morality, culture, and religion.[2]

v. Awareness

As evidenced in the preceding remarks, Tillich gives considerable emphasis to the "Awareness of the Unconditional."

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[1] See earlier section of this chapter, 1, iii.

[2] Tillich, III, 29-30.

In spite of the fact that some repetition is inevitable, the importance of this concept demands its further analysis in an exposition of epistemology. It will become obvious that it is not only epistemology which is dependent on awareness but also ontology, man, and finally the functions of the spirit.

As that which precedes the subject-object dichotomy, awareness is the prius of all knowledge and action, of all *theoria* and *praxis*. It is therefore something that is given to man by the power of being in him and consequently is understood and analyzed as a *Gestalt* of faith. It is to be identified as the center of the person (ego) which is the *sine qua non* of all decisions and yet, as indicated earlier, is beyond decision. It is also regarded as Ultimate Concern. In other words, self-awareness is to be interpreted as *true* knowledge of oneself. Like true knowledge as it is defined above, self-knowledge or better, true self-awareness, is obtained at the shock-producing boundary.

Awareness is unconditional. Experience and knowledge are conditional and uncertain. Given the ontological basis of this distinction, it could be no other. For it is in and through man that the Ground of Being reaches or realizes or actualizes its self-awareness in self-transcendence. As the prius of experience and knowledge, it is not involved in the separation which characterizes experience and knowledge. It is Tillich's insistence that man's uniqueness is marked by a self-awareness which alone provides the answer to the ontological question. Man has within self-awareness the material which, upon reflection, will show the structure of being and its elements. If this is so, and if God is understood as the Ground of Being, it follows for Tillich that the cosmological, empirical or experiential approach to God leads to a God who stands over against the self, stands as it were as a stranger. The structure of this approach is as follows.

"Man is immediately aware of something unconditional which is the prius of the separation and interaction of subject and object, theoretically as well as practically."[1] This is what is termed the "ontological awareness of the unconditional,"[2] and as such is "immediate, and not mediated by inferential processes,"[3] is present "in terms of an unconditional certainty."[4] We do not "know" the unconditional since knowing presupposes separation of subject and object. Rather we are "aware" of it in and by the totality of our being, not one part of it. "*Man*, not his cognitive function alone, is aware of the Unconditioned."[1] Here is the rockbed of the entire philosophy which Tillich expounds. This "Unconditional" is that beyond which there is no meaning or symbol. It is that which makes God to be God; it is "the power of being in which every being participates;"[2] "the *prius* of everything that has being;"[3] the *prius* of subject and object."[4]

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[1] Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 22. In "Being and Love" it is argued that "man can understand himself only in terms of an immediate awareness of his 'structure of subjectivity.'" Moral Principle of Action, Anshen, ed., p. 676.

[2] Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 22.

[3] Ibid., p. 23.

[4] Ibid.

This leads to immediate conclusions concerning the locus of value. Tillich seems to follow Augustine closely at this point of establishing *primum esse* as the ultimate power in which all things participate. One cannot question or doubt without participating in the *verum ipsum* which is also the *bonum ipsum* "because nothing which is less than the ultimate power of Being can be the ultimate power of good."[5]

> Only in the Unchangeable can be found the *prius* of all goodness. In relation to *esse ipsum* no difference between the cognitive and the appetitive is possible, because a separation of the functions presupposes a sep-

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 24.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 25.

[3] *Ibid*.

[4] *Ibid*.

[5] *Ibid*., p. 14.

aration of subject and object.[1]

On this basis Tillich attempts to interpret the ontological argument

> as the rational description of the relation of our mind to Being as such. Our mind implies _principia per se nota_ which have immediate evidence whenever they are noticed: the transcendentalia, _esse, verum_, _bonum_. They constitute the Absolute in which the difference between knowing and known is not actual. This Absolute as the principle of Being has absolute certainty. It is a necessary thought because it is the presupposition of all thought.[2]

This is the precise claim that being is value.[3] Here, too, is the important distinction between value and valuations. Value _is_ in Being-itself. Value_s_ are grounded in Being-itself, in the essence of man and world. These are discovered, though ambiguously, via the ideating method suggested above, or by subjective reason. Valuations are values valu_ed_ by some person or community. These distinctions are of paramount importance. One cannot "know" value in the sense in which he knows objects or simply "knows" anything. Value is beyond the subject - object dichotomy. Value is in the Unconditioned, the Absolute. Of this we have an ontological awareness, an unconditional awareness.

Were value to be understood any other way, it would never be "certain" in the sense in which Tillich understands certainty. The Absolute would again sink into relativity. Values would never be transparent to the unconditional ground which gives them value, with the result that there would be nothing "absolute" in the values valued by valuating beings or persons. It is also precisely around these points that several criticisms have been most pertinent.[1]

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[1] _Ibid_.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 15.

[3] See the above section, "Religion and Values."

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[1] James Luther Adams correctly points out that in the concept of the unconditional we have not something which transcends the world but rather that which qualifies the world--"it is its depth dimension." "Tillich's Concept of the Protestant Era" in Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 302. Adams goes on to say that "if one asks how the human spirit becomes intellectually aware of this unconditional meaning-reality, Tillich answers that it is through phenomenological intuition, an intuition that can be justified through the ontological argument, though he warns against the frequent perversion of this argument which connects it too narrowly with rational dialectic and which thereby degenerates into 'objective' spatialized thinking. pp. 302-303. Further difficulties in his approach are most perceptively brought out in Peter Bertocci's article, "An Impasse in Philosophical Theology," in International Philosophical Quarterly, V (1965), 379-396. He correctly points out that Tillich's understanding of knowledge and the conditions which make knowledge possible is quite arbitrary. By placing reason in the confines of finitude, the infinite can never be reached. Bertocci pleads a good case in asking why reason must be so analyzed; why certainty has to be prescribed and described in a priori fashion. The question as to what happens to grace and faith is well taken. The thrust of Bertocci's criticisms is to be found in the claim that Tillich offers ontological foundations of knowledge which provide only formal certainty. Any material symbols or analyses are all subject to the finite and ambiguous probabilities in all "knowing" in the traditional sense. "What final epistemic good does it do then to insist on an ontological method that keeps knowledge and reason from floundering among the probabilities when in fact any symbol that is to guide us must receive its warrant by careful and imaginative analysis and synthesis of human experience?" (p. 385) Dorothy Emmet is also critical of several aspects of epistemology in Tillich's thought. The distinction between ontological and technical reason is too laden with hidden assumptions. "What is needed. . .is a

vi. Truth

The preceding discussions have already referred to the concept of truth without clearly differentiating its meanings or uses throughout Tillich's philosophy. One must recall that Tillich's first concern is what we might term Lebenswahrheit. This has been mentioned in the introductory remarks of this analysis of epistemology. One might say that this is the truth which is paramount in Tillich's concern.

Given the principle of identity and the analysis of being as power (as love) driving for reunion, the truth is ultimately to be understood as Being-itself whose fate or destiny is historical existence. Consequently, "die Wahrheit steht im Schicksal wie das Sein im Schicksal steht."[1] With this grounding of truth in dynamic being every static concept of truth is denied, as is every rela-

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fuller discussion on how far what Tillich calls the concepts of the ontological reason are prescriptive and how far they are descriptive. . . ." "Epistemology and the Idea of Revelation," in The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 208. It must also be asked in what way Tillich would relate technical and ontological reason, for obviously they cannot be absolutely separate. Why should he be so insistent on keeping technical reason from the realm of our ultimate concern? Is this, as suggested above, a most arbitrary and unnecessary bifurcation? Randall goes so far as to claim that "it is [Tillich's] epistemology which seems the least adequate part of his thought, and raises the most questions. The one strand of the philosophical tradition which he does not take very seriously, and consequently fails to illuminate, is the empiricism stemming from Locke." Randall, "The Ontology of Paul Tillich," in The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 133.

[1] Tillich, Religiöse Verwirklichung, p. 18.

tive concept of truth. The awareness of the "*Grenzsituation*" precludes any understanding of truth as it is conceived in traditional Catholicism or classical thought.

One could term this kind of truth "existential truth," but only if there is an immediate clarification. Existential truth is judged as having "no criterion beyond fruitfulness for life. The dismissal of reason as guide to truth is the surrender of any objective standard of truth."[1] Truth is grounded in being. Like reason, truth is both objective and subjective.

> The truth of something is that level of its being the knowledge of which prevents wrong expectations and consequent disappointments. Truth, therefore, is the essence of things as well as the cognitive act in which their essence is grasped. . . . A judgment is true because it grasps and expresses true being; and the really real becomes truth if it is grasped and expressed in a true judgment.[2]

Objective truth, like objective reason, is finally to be seen in relation to subjective truth and subjective reason.

It is Tillich's claim that only man is aware of the difference between surface and depth in reality. There is an illusory character in reality which must be penetrated if one is to avoid error in judgment. Though it is not made explicit, one must conclude that one "errs" if he fails to grasp the essential component of every natural and historical phenomenon, including himself. However, one cannot be in total error, any more than he can be in absolute non-being.

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[1] Paul Tillich, "The World Situation," in *The Christian Answer*, H. P. Van Dusen, ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945), p. 31.

[2] Tillich, I, 102.

vii. Verification

It is obvious in the analysis of truth that what is needed is a kind of verification which is applicable to controlling knowledge and a kind which is suitable for receiving knowledge. While controlling knowledge is "verified by the success of controlling actions,"[1] it is the case that "receiving knowledge is verified by the creative union of two natures, that of knowing and that of the known."[2] What is proposed is an experimental verification (for controlling knowledge) and an experiential verification for receiving knowledge. While admitting that the former mode of verification has had tremendous success in technical reason

> it is not permissible to make the experimental method of verification the exclusive pattern of all verification. Verification can occur within the life process itself. Verification of this type (experiential in contradistinction to experimental) has the advantage that it need not halt and disrupt the totality of a life-process in order to distil calculable elements out of it (which experimental verification must do). The verifying experiences of a nonexperimental character are truer to life, though less exact and definite. By far the largest part of all cognitive verification is experiential. In some cases experimental

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[1] _Ibid_.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 103.

> and experiential verification work together. In other cases the experimental element is completely absent.[1]

In experiential verification, "the life-process itself makes the test."[2]

What is proposed is a kind of knowledge by participation which is called "intuitive," but in the sense that it is neither irrational nor does it "by-pass a full consciousness of experimentally verified knowledge."[3] In doing this he suggests a verification that "goes beyond" both rationalism which "tries to develop principles and norms in terms of self-evidence, universality, and necessity,"[4] and pragmatism which takes "the so-called principles of reason, the categories and norms, to be results of accumulated and tested experience, open for radical changes by future experience and subject to ever repeated tests."[5] Pragmatism is also limited in that it cannot remain within its methodology and prescribe a criterion for the processes which it seeks to verify.

Rationalism, in the sense in which it is defined by

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

[5] *Ibid.*

Tillich, is limited by the fact that

> rational self-evidence cannot be attributed to a principle which contains more than the mere form of rationality, as, for instance, Kant's categorical imperative. Every concrete principle, every category and norm, which expresses more than pure rationality is subject to experimental or experiential verification. It is not self-evident, even if it contains a self-evident element (which, however, cannot be abstracted from it).[1]

There is another way in which verification takes place, as has been outlined above, a verification that has lived beyond the criticisms of rationalism and pragmatism.

> This method of verification is certainly not precise and not definite, but it is permanent and effective. . . . Somehow it combines the pragmatic and the rational elements without falling into the fallacies of either pragmatism or rationalism.[2]

It should be pointed out, however, that this method of verification of receiving knowledge, of ontological reason, of Lebenswahrheit, while true to processes of life, is threatened by meaninglessness. If this situation is truly recognized, and one refuses to resign from the task of gaining true knowledge, one is driven to the quest for revelation which claims "to give a truth which is both certain and of ultimate concern--a truth which includes and accepts the risk and uncertainty of every significant cognitive act, yet transcends it in accepting it."[3]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 105.

[3] Ibid. Tillich addresses this issue in regard to ontological judgments by asking if there is a way of verifying

It is in this manner that the whole ontological approach and the system are to be verified. Within this analysis the verification of values will also be found, providing one can accept as valid the ontology which not only makes such a system possible but which demands the kind of verification suggested by Tillich--as ambiguous and lacking in clarity as the proposed method might well be. In summarizing the verification which he is seeking to validate, he claims that it somehow combines the pragmatic and the rational elements. What goes undeveloped are the particular moments in the "somehow."

In his article on the science of values, Tillich asserts that a science of human values is possible if an ontological approach is possible. Given the above analysis of the concepts of truth, knowledge and reason, one concludes that the mystical intuition of the essential nature of being is somehow publicly verifiable. It has already been shown that essences, the source of values, is grasped by ontological reason. The question then arises as to how man knows himself. It was indicated that man has an intuitive or experiential knowledge of his true being. Man's

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such judgments. "There is certainly not an experimental way, but there is an experiential way. It is the way of an intelligent recognition of the basic ontological structures within the encountered reality, including the process of encountering itself. The only answer, but a sufficient answer, which can be given to the question of ontological verification is the appeal to intelligent recognition." Love, Power, and Justice, p. 24.

intuitive grasp of himself involves his recognition of that which he is and that which he essentially ought to be. Experientially, he would regard as values those which correspond or conform to his essential nature. The import of this analysis is Tillich's attempt to avoid both the reduction of value to privately-intuited value and the location of value in some transcendent and hence unknowable realm.

Experimentally, man discovers a plurality of value systems. Thus values become relative. Experiential reason provides the means for grasping essences, but this, as mentioned earlier, is intuitive or "private." The question again is asked as to "how does one verify the norms representing the structure of man's essential nature?"[1]

It has already been stated that Tillich rejects any form of a self-contained pragmatism. And yet if one notes the references concerning the relationship of experiential knowledge and the proposal that this is verified by the processes of life itself, the claim that Tillich "falls back on criteria he has previously rejected,"[2] has some weight. However, the point raised sheds light on the relationship of reason to knowledge and verification.

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[1] Louis C. Midgley, "Paul Tillich's New Science of Values," in The Western Political Quarterly, XV (June, 1962), 243.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 244.

With this said, it yet needs to be pointed out that Tillich's analysis of verification leaves questions unanswered. When asked about verification by James Luther Adams,[1] Tillich answers only in terms of another question.

> If this basic theological decision (which is a matter of destiny and freedom together) is to become an object of empirical verification, in which kind of decision is the method of empirical verification rooted--especially if it unavoidably includes value judgments?[2]

4. Spirit and Man

In the early treatise, Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenständen und Methoden, Tillich devotes considerable effort to provide a systematic classification of sciences according to Sein, Denken and Geist. What is important for this study of value theory is the manner in which spirit is related to being and thought. Preliminary mention was made in Part One of this chapter, of the way in which Geist is analyzed as the locus of the actualization of norms or values. The analysis involves far more, however, than what was discussed earlier. In the concept of Geist is to be found the nature of life in its self-awareness, self-creation and self-transcendence. In dialectical ontology, Geist is the medium in which Sein and Denken are related. In life under the dimension of Geist will be found also Tillich's anthropology, which might more accurately be termed, "pneumanthropology." In as much as value, the question and recognition of value, is peculiar to man as the locus for the actualization of spirit, Tillich's philosophy of value cannot be completed, that is, the moments of the relevancy of norms and values cannot be found, without a more thorough investigation of the more constitutive and determinative concepts involved.

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[1] Adams, "Tillich's Interpretation of History," The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 309.

[2] Tillich, "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 347. He implies the same thing by indicating that "a system has circular character just as do the organic processes of life." Vol. II, 5. This issue will be further discussed chapter III.

i. Spirit and Creativity

The ontological functions of self-integration, self-creation, and self-transcendence become in the dimension of spirit morality, culture and religion. In every creative act there is a duality of moments involved, namely, "ein Element des Seins, durch das die Schöpfung ursprüngliche Setzung wird, und ein Element des Denkens, durch das die Schöpfung bestimmte, geformte Setzung wird."[1] These two moments function together in a manner which becomes the sine qua non of life in the dimension of spirit. It is stated that even here, however, there is an essential structure, logos, as indeed there would have to be given the definition of life as the actualization of being. However, becoming (or growth actualization) is not to be understood as chaotic. It participates in *logos*, *Denken*. There is an implicit normative structure which might be termed the "source of the ought" in human life in the dimension of the spirit. This basically means that to be of the spirit is not to be free from such norms or values but rather it is to be subject to the norms of such functions. Continuing the analysis, Tillich claims that

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[1] Tillich, Das System der Wissenschaften, in Gesammelte Werke, I (1959), 212.

> das Sein ist das Prinzip der ursprünglichen Setzung, des Unbedingt-Wirklichen, und das Denken ist das Prinzip der Form, des Unbedingt-Geltenden. -- Weil in jeder Schöpfung Denken und Sein eins sind, darum ist jede Schöpfung zugleich individuell und allgemein. Schöpfung ist *individuelle Verwirklichung des Allgemeinen*. Je individueller und allgemeiner zugleich ein Wirkliches ist, desto deutlicher ist sein schöpferischer Charakter. Die höchste Form des Schöpferischen ist darum die geisttragende Gestalt. Während die äquivalente Kausalität mit Gesetz und Notwendigkeit an dem Schöpferischen vorbeigeht, ist die Produktive Kausalität mit Individualität und Freiheit sein vollkommener Ausdruck. Das geistig-individuelle ist im eigentlichen Sinne das Schöpferische. --Die religiöse Symbolik hat für dieses Verhältnis einen Ausdruck gefunden, wenn sie dem Menschen Anteil gab an der göttlich urschöpferischen Potenz und die Vollendung des göttlichen Werkes durch das menschliche Werk erwartete. In den geistigen Schöpfungen des Menschen offenbart sich der Abgrund des Unbedingten tiefer als in den immer auch gestzgebundenen Gestalten des unmittelbaren Daseins.[1]

The implications of this are many but the particular thrust immediately relevant is the claim that life in the dimension of spirit is creative life; it is the production of the new. Life thus understood is a "going beyond" the finite phenomena and realities, beyond the conditional and the particulars, in the direction of the unconditional, the universal, the absolute. Man as living in this dimension actualizes the absolute; he existentializes the essential.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 212-213.

Mention was made of the fact that life is thus the creation of the new because life in this dimension is marked uniquely by freedom. But at this moment freedom must be posited in polar tension with destiny in a two-fold sense, namely, that out of which freedom is actualized (the psychological dimension--to be discussed below) and the logos or structure of reason which marks everything that is. So, in one sense, namely, from the perspective of destiny, there is nothing new. At any rate, the "new" is never a violation of the essential structure of being. The result is that everything is guaranteed to be of value and/or meaning. Again, one encounters the evidence that the essential is ever the source of values and norms. Consequently, it is in the dimension of spirit that the "is" and the "ought" are always "mixed" though ambiguously. But here the awareness of the unity of the "is" and the "ought" is actualized.

Because freedom plays such an important role in the whole area of the "existential" it should be noted how the relationship between Sein, Denken and Geist assures freedom its determinative place.

> Alles Seiende ist denkgeformtes Sein und das Seiende ist um so wirklicher, je mehr Denken in das Sein aufgenommen ist. Das wirklichste Sein ist die individuelle geisttragende Gestalt, d. h. dasjenige Sein, in dem das Denken als Denken, als gültige Form, verwirklicht wird. In allem übrigen Sein wird das Denken als Seinsform, als bedingte, begrenzte unmittelbare Form verwirklicht. In der geisttrangden Gestalt aber reisst sich das Denken los von seiner Bedingtheit, Unmittelbarkeit; es tritt allen Seinsformen gegenüber mit der Unbedingtheit seiner Forderung, es tritt dem Sein gegenüber als Geltung. Voraussetzung der Geistverwirklichung ist also die vollkommene Loslösung eines Seienden von der unmittelbaren Gebundenheit an seine endliche Form. Voraussetzung des Geistes ist die Freiheit. Nur für die freie individuelle Gestalt gibt es die unbedingte Forderung; nur auf dem Boden der Freiheit kann Geltendes verwirklicht werden. Hier liegt die absolut klare und scharfe Grenze des Geistigen gegen das Psychische und Soziologische. Geist ist erst da wirklich, wo in individuellen Gestalten, die als solche ihren Strukturgesetzen unterworfen sind. Darum ist jeder geistige Akt ein Durchbruch durch die Grenzen des unmittelbar Gestalthaften; ein Durchbruch, aber kein Zerbrechen. Denn es liet im Wesen der geisttragenden Gestalt, dass sie in sich etwas verwirklicht, das nicht aus ihr stammt, das Gültige. Vom Gültigen handeln auch die Denkwissenschaften. Ihre Gebilde und Sätze drücken die ewig gültige Form des rein in sich ruhenden Denkens aus. Geist ist das noch nicht, wenn auch seine Erfassung geistiges Tun ist. Geist ist erst da, wo Seinendes unter die Geltung tritt, wo die unbedingte Forderung ins Sein aufgenommen wird. Das ist die Verbundenheit des Geistes mit dem Sein, die der Logismus ebenso übersieht wie der Psychologismus die Freiheit des Geistes vom Sein.[1]

Tillich puts much emphasis on the fact that creativity is always brought about or is achieved only by the mixture of the particular and the universal or, as he states it, die Intention auf das Allgemeine. It is the direction toward the unconditional that is unique in acts of the spirit.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 210-211.

> Im schöpferischen Akt ist also enthalten die Intention auf das Allgemeine und der individuelle Gestaltcharakter, der seinshafte Stoff, in dem sich das Allgemeine verwirklicht. Die Intention kann sich immer nur auf das Allgemeine richten, das ist die Wahrheit der rationalen Auffassung. Richtete sie sich auf das individuell-Gegebene, so würde sie nicht Geistiges, Geltendes verwirklichen wollen, und das Individuelle würde aufhören, Stoff zu sein; es würde seine Unmittelbarkeit verlieren und zerstört werden, statt schöpferische Kräfte zu entfalten. Der Wille, individuell zu sein, zerstört die Schöpferkraft. Und doch kann die Intention auf das Allgemeine sich nie anders verwirklichen als in der individidullen Gestalt. Verwirklichung heisst ja nichts anderes als eins werden mit dem seinshaft-Individuellen. Bleibe das Allgemeine Allgemeines, so bleibe es eine Abstraktion und käme nicht zur Verwirlichung. Die Einheit von _Intention auf das Allgemeine und Verwirklichung im Besonderen_, dieses und nichts anderes ist Schöpfung und Geist.[1]

Though the above references indicate a measure of obscurity in Tillich's analysis, the implications are quite clear. Every act of man _qua_ "pneumanthropos" is in a sense unique to the dimension of spirit. The three areas of "creativity" are identified as morality, culture and religion, all of which will be delineated below. The above analysis attempts to provide an ontology of spirit and by implication to provide an ontological foundation for norms within spirit. These are the values toward which life in the dimension of the spirit strives.

All that man as spirit does, from understanding the cosmos to building match-stick houses; from investigation of the atom to becoming a personality; all are termed _Schöpfungen des Geistes_ and as such "stehen darum unter den

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 214.

Normen und unter der Kritik des Geistes."[1] Since self-awareness, is basically and essentially ontological awareness, that is, awareness of the structure polarities and elements of being, then it must also follow that self-awareness in the dimension of the spirit is in part normative. Consequently, value is again established as an a priori. One does not deduce the "sollen" from the "ist." The "ist" presupposes the "sollen." Man then is not only aware of thinking, or speaking, or becoming a person or seeking the unconditional but he is also aware of how he ought so to think, speak, create. Though these are acts of freedom which make man to be man, it needs to be recalled that freedom is finally subjection to ultimate norms or values.

ii. Life and the Spirit

Given the ontological orientation of Tillich's concept of Geist, it is now necessary to see its place and role in terms of life which is defined as "the process in which potential being becomes actual being."[2] In other words, one can analyze life as the actuality of being. It is Tillich's intention to use life in this broadest of interpretations to include everything from atoms to stars. Since everything which "is" is "alive" in the most fundamental sense indicated here, it must be concluded that everything is to be regarded as an actualization of being, as a realization of meaning, as an expression of value. Structure (reason) and power (being) actualized in the unity of spirit make all realms "realms of life" potentially --actually only in man in the dimension of actualized spirit. It is only in man that the structure of both mind and world become actual in the unity of spirit.

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[1] Ibid., p. 113.

[2] Tillich, I, 241.

In order to show the fullest significance of this particular analysis of life, Tillich develops the concept of "dimension of life." This concept makes it possible to consider life in its totality without the erroneous and misleading implications of the concept "levels of, life."[1] There is an admitted valuation in the arrangement of dimensions, the most valued dimension being the one in which is to be found the presence of other dimensions as conditions for its actualization. He states that this places man at the "highest" point of value or the highest grade

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[1] Tillich admits that the metaphor "dimension" like the term "levels" is taken from the spatial imagery. But the former term is preferred because "it describes the difference of the realms of being in such a way that there cannot be mutual interference; depth does not interfere with breadth, since all dimensions meet at the same point. They cross without disturbing each other; there is no conflict between dimensions. Therefore, the replacement of the metaphor 'level' by the metaphor 'dimension' represents an encounter with reality in which the unity of life is seen above its conflicts. These conflicts are not denied, but they are not derived from the hierarchy of levels; they are consequences of the ambiguity of all life processes and are therefore conquerable without the destruction of one level by another." III, 15.

> from the point of view of valuation, presupposing that the criterion of such value judgment is the power of a being to include a maximum number of potentialities in one living actuality. This is an ontological criterion, according to the rule that value judgments must be rooted in qualities of the objects valuated, and it is a criterion which should not be confused with that of perfection. Man is the highest being within the realm of our experience, but he is by no means the most perfect. These last considerations show that the rejection of the metaphor "level" does not entail the denial of value judgments based on degrees of power of being.[1]

It is not necessary to the understanding of the ontological significance of man to elaborate the manner in which the dimensions of life emerge in the cosmic process. They are generally outlined as follows: (1) inorganic; (2) organic--(a) biological; (b) psychological; (3) spiritual; and (4) historical. The dimension of the spirit, the dimension of the personal-communal is the human realm and as has been mentioned, is the highest actualization of being as far as we know today. The historical dimension "comes alive" in man, though in a more precise sense it is an aspect of every other dimension.

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[1] Ibid., p. 17. That there is a valuation implied in the regarding of man as the most dimension-embracing of all creatures is not denied. The fact that man has come this far in the cosmic process makes all that has gone on before or what will come infinitely worthwhile. Asking whether we would regard all of creation as "in vain" should it be destroyed, Tillich answers, "No!" At least "once a living being would have come into existence in whom life achieved its highest possibility--spirit. This is the ultimate source of man's greatness. . . . The depth of all things has become manifest in one being, and the name of the being is man." "The Conception of Man in Existential Philosophy," in The Journal of Religion, XIX (1939), 111.

iii. Man

With these foundational concepts it is now possible to focus attention on the concept of man which is so determinative for this philosophy. To do this most adequately it is necessary to discuss the important elements in the understanding of man in Tillich's thought.[1]

(1) Definition. -- In Volume II of Systematic Theology a definition of man is given which expresses the ontology already outlined.

> Man is a whole man, whose essential being has the character of dreaming innocence, whose finite freedom makes possible the transition from essence to existence, whose aroused freedom puts him between two anxieties which threaten the loss of self, whose decision is against the preservation of dreaming innocence and for self-actualization.[2]

It is this self-actualization in freedom that brings into actuality not only man *qua* man but also the dimension of spirit. It is necessary to stress the fact that there is no discernible historical moment when this actualization took place. The dimension of spirit is, as is each dimension, dependent on preceding dimensions for its actualization. "Every act of the spirit presupposes given psychological material and, at the same time, constitutes a leap which is possible only for a totally centered self, that is to say, one that is free."[1] This statement introduces other concepts which need clarification and exposition.

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[1] In Tillich's early work, Der Begriff der Übernaturlichen there is an analysis of man which tries to avoid a positivistic naturalism and any form of supernaturalism as it was structured in the imagery of dualism. In the form of a "belief-ful-realism" it is claimed that "der Mensch steht seiner Natur nach einerseits in der Natur im materialen Sinn, andererseits über derselben als Geist; aber der Geist ist selbst natürlich, und die menschliche Natur umfasst sinne sinnliche Natur und seine geistige Natur; der Mensch ist zugleich Natur im materialen und formalen Sinne. Im Menschen treffen beide Gebiete zusammen: die Natur und das Natürlich-Übernaturliche. Das Natürliche aber ist das Übergreifende: der Mensch ist von Natur Natur und Geist." (p. 18).

[2] Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II: Existence and the Christ (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 36.

(2) Role of Freedom. -- Life under the dimension of spirit is described in terms of Tillich's ontology. Evident in the examination of spirit is the basic ontological structure which is described in terms of separation of subject and object. This separation or estrangement is the cause of the ambiguities and imperfections in the functions of the spirit understood in terms of the polarities of individualization and participation; dynamics and form; freedom and destiny; and the essential-existential distinction as well as the categories of finitude.

It is freedom, however, that is the sine qua non of the actualization of spirit. In the ontological scheme, "freedom in polarity with destiny is the structural element which makes existence possible because it transcends the essential necessity of being without destroying it."[2] It is further claimed that man's freedom, like freedom in general, is to be understood only in terms of its polaric interdependence with necessity. In man life is "experienced," it becomes "aware of itself." Only because of his freedom is man able to experience the structure of being. Without freedom there would be no self-awareness. This freedom is understood as freedom of man in his totality. There is no problem of freedom of will or freedom of the mind. Man as such is free.

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[1] Tillich, III, 27.

[2] Tillich, I, 182. This suggests a rather dialectical schema in which Tillich points out that the actualization of freedom in life has in relation to it a decisional

In summary then, it is claimed that the elements of ontology are fully discernible in man. Individualization and participation become ontological polarities expressed in life in the spirit as the "person" emerging in "community" with others. Dynamics and form become vitality and intentionality in man, the source of man's creativity. Freedom and destiny are, as mentioned above, the structure and power by which man transcends the givenness of environment, the bases of his going beyond the psychological dimension which makes him aware of his awareness and his en-

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prius which is finally a value decision. He claims that "norms and values cannot be grasped by a mere description. There is a decision implied, rooted in freedom and confirming freedom. But freedom does not mean mere arbitrariness and decision does not mean choice without any criterion. There is an essential relation between freedom and reason. Freedom falls down if it decides against reason; that is against its essential content. Freedom either confirms itself or destroys itself, which is the possibility of good or evil." "The Conception of Man in Existential Philosophy," in The Journal of Religion, XIX (1939), 203.

vironment.

In a sense the entire philosophy could find its methodological Ausgangspunkt in anthropology. Man is the door to the mysteries of being. "Man occupies a pre-eminent position in ontology, not as an outstanding object among other objects, but as that being who asks the ontological question and in whose self-awareness the ontological answer can be found."[1] In fact it can even be stated that we are not describing an object when we itemize or analyse the constituents of being in the ontological analysis outlined earlier. As a being who is aware of the structures that make cognition possible, living and acting and knowing through them, man could not be man without them. "They are he himself."[2] The self of the self-world correlation is therefore "not a thing that may or may not exist; it is an original phenomenon which logically precedes the question of existence."[3]

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[1] Tillich, I, 168.

[2] Ibid., p. 169.

[3] Ibid. Though mention will be made of this again in the section on morality it is perhaps pertinent to point out how utterly important this moment is in his philosophy. As should now be quite obvious, in talking about value one is talking about being. The whole question of "knowledge" or "awareness" of this structure is given some kind of an a priori status. Such awareness is the locus of freedom, the "self," as well as the moment of verification or validation of the entire analysis. It is not enough to subscribe to "ontological priority" to reach Tillich's conclusions. It must be acceptance of Tillich's ontology. The degree to which this particular moment is actually descriptive and not arbitrarily prescriptive is the great question mark which one must posit at the end of the entire philosophy!

(3) Centered Self. -- Much emphasis is given in Tillich's concept of man to the centered self. References have already been made to the earlier designation of this phenomenon as the ego, as that which makes decisions but is beyond the ambiguity of decisions. Important to an understanding of this anthropological designation is the statement that

> every self is self-related and a complete self is completely self-related. It is an independent centre, indivisible and impenetrable, and therefore rightly called an individual.[1]

The implications of this approach become clearer in light of the claim regarding the relation between center and ultimate concern, namely that "as the ultimate is the ground of everything that is, so ultimate concern is the integrating center of the personal life."[2] As such, the "center" unites all the elements of a personal life, including the body and the conscious and unconscious forces within each personality. Again, in Volume III of Systematic Theology, centeredness is described as

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[1] Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, pp. 25-26.

[2] Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 106. Because "ultimate concern" has become an important concept in Tillich's understanding of religion, an early expression of the relation of religion and the unconditioned illumines this later reference to the centered being and the ultimate. "Weil aber kein Bewusstsein möglich ist, ohne in irgeneinder Form und an irgendeinem Punkte auf Unbedingt-Wirklichem zu ruhen, so ist Religion eine notwendige, ja die alles tragende Funktion des Geistes, diejenige, in der der Geist auf das gerichtet ist, was tiefer ist als er selbst, weil es ihm selbst Wurzel und Halt, Sinn und Bestand gibt." Theologie der Kultur, pp. 35-36.

> a quality of individualization, in so far as the indivisible thing is the centered thing. To continue the metaphor, the center is a point, and a point cannot be divided. . . . A fully individualized being, therefore, is at the same time a fully centered being. Within the limits of human experience only man has these qualities fully; in all other beings, both centeredness and individualization are limited. But they are qualities of everything that is, whether limited or fully developed.[1]

The relationship between freedom and the centered self is clearly stated in the analysis of the moral act as peculiar to the centered self. In analyzing the transcendence of the spiritual over the "givenness" of the other dimensions of life, it is stated that

> the same situation obtains in a moral act. Here, also, a large amount of material is present in the psychological center--drives, inclinations, desires, more or less compulsory trends, moral experiences, ethical traditions and authorities, relations to other persons, social conditions. But the moral act is not the diagonal in which all these vectors limit each other and converge; it is the centered self which actualizes itself as a personal self by distinguishing, separating, rejecting, preferring, connecting, and in doing so, transcending its elements. The act, or more exactly the whole complex of acts, in which this happens has the character of freedom, not freedom in the bad sense of the indeterminacy of an act of the will, but freedom in the sense of a total reaction of a centered self which deliberates and decides. Such freedom is united with destiny in such a way that the psychological material which enters into the moral act represents the pole of destiny, while the deliberating and deciding self represents the pole of freedom, according to the ontological polarity of

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[1] Tillich, III, 32.

freedom and destiny.[1]

In order to stress the implications of this analysis of the centered self, reference must be made to the importance accorded this entity in the understanding of man when it is claimed that it is man's structural centeredness which gives him uniqueness.

> He alone has not only consciousness (which is a high, but incomplete, centeredness) but self-consciousness or complete centeredness. This structural centeredness gives man his greatness, dignity, and being, the "image of God." It indicates his ability to transcend both himself and his world, to look at both, and to see himself in perspective as the center in which all parts of his world converge. To be a self and to have a world constitute the challenge to man as the perfection of creation.[2]

It seems that Tillich's analysis attempts to place an unavoidable responsibility upon man. By responsibility is meant "the obligation of the person who has freedom to respond if he is questioned about his decisions."[3] Freedom then is experienced by us as being able to "cut off" (decide) possibilities; as weighing alternatives (deliberating); and as being responsible for these actions. It is through the medium of the personal center that we realize what we can do. Too, this personal center, being defined as ultimate concern, is the link to the whole structure of the unconditional, the infinite, the universal, the absolute. It can be understood as that which reaches for that which is beyond because it "is" beyond. Here is the source of "ought" and the impetus in man to achieve unconditioned value and meaning. Man has no ontological choice, for to be man is to be of the spirit which is the actualization of the unity of power (being) and meaning (structure). It is this that makes man "unbound" from his vital existence. He can respond either with a "Yes" or a "No."

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[1] Ibid., pp. 27-28. This analysis is very much dependent on the distinction between psychological and spiritual "functions," or better stated, the distinctions between the functions of the psyche and the spirit. In the work, Das System der Wissenschaften, he claims that the relationship as well as the distinction between the two are to be found in the fact that "psychische Funktionen sind nicht geistige Funktionen, obgleich sie die Existenzform der geistigen Funktionen sind." Das System der Wissenschaften, in Gesammelte Werke, I (1959), 229. The "center" is "beyond" psychological analysis. It is that which makes psychology possible. It is also the sine qua non of valuations. The values which determine life will be found only in relation to the spiritual center--not in anything "below" this.

[2] Tillich, II, 49.

[3] Tillich, I, 184.

This is manifest in the fact that man can raise the question of the

> true and that he can demand the fulfilment of the good. Anyone who raises a question about true reality is in some way separated from reality; whoever makes a demand upon reality presupposes that it is not at hand. Man must raise the question, however, and must make the demand; he cannot escape this fate, that is, the fate of being man.[1]

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[1] Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 197. Tillich's purpose is to describe moral freedom within ontic individuals. However, it must be remembered that freedom is first of all an ontological concept. As will be seen below, morality also is to be understood in terms of the ontology which Tillich embraces. In this ontology, freedom cannot be understood apart from the polar element of destiny or fate. If this is kept in mind, many ambiguities will be less ambiguous.

(4) Person, Community and Personality. -- In order to show the norm, the "ought" in the center of all human activity, of becoming and doing, it will be helpful to note Tillich's interpretation of personality. Actually, this plays a most important role in the subsequent analysis of the whole creative thrust of man as seen in the relationship between morality, culture and religion. Tillich claims that "person" should be understood as the "reality out of which personality grows."[1] Consequently,

> it is like everything else, something given, a nature with a unique power and form. We call it "person" and attribute to it the capacity of becoming personality. Only on the basis of that kind of being which we acknowledge as a person in our social evaluations can personality develop.[2]

What is being indicated here is the moral dimension of "personhood." So conceived, person

> is a moral concept, pointing to a being which we are asked to respect as the bearer of a dignity equal to our own and which we are not permitted to use as a means for a purpose, because it is purpose in itself. This is the basis of personality, the individual human being, the person who alone among all beings has the potentiality of self-determination and, consequently, of personality.[3]

Continuing this same theme and pointing to a most pertinent conclusion, Tillich claims

> personality can also be defined as that individual being which is able to reach universality. Freedom

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[1] Ibid., p. 115.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

> is the power of transcending one's own given nature; but it would not be real freedom if the individual merely exchanged its peculiar nature for another one.[1]

The thrust of this analysis relates to what was mentioned above at the conclusion of the discussion on the "centered self." The freedom of personality is finally and essentially "freedom for universality on the basis of individuality [italics mine]."[2] In personality we have a being in which "the individual is transformed by, and united with, the universal structure of being."[3] Consequently the earlier claim of Tillich that man is the door to ontology now becomes clearer. There is in the analysis of personality an element which is all-determinative, namely the unconditional demand which requires that every potential personality become an actual personality.

> Without this element, personalities would develop in the same way as other natural processes--by accident or by necessity. The result of such a process would not be personality but merely another part of nature. The cosmos would devour its own children. Therefore, it is not left to the arbitrary decision of the individual self whether it wants to become a personality. The individual cannot escape the demand to rise above its natural basis, to be free,to become personality. Any attempt to escape this demand confirms the demand by the disintegration which the escape produces in the person.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 116.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., pp. 116-117.

[4] Ibid., p. 118. It is on this basis that Tillich offers a critique of "vitalistic" philosophy and philosophical personalism. The former is wrong "because it does not pene-

In other words, the experience of the unconditional demand is the ethical manifestation of the ontological structure of being. Again, the "is" and the ultimate ought are identical.

The unique relationship between personality and community is a theme which receives repeated emphasis in Tillich's philosophy. The becoming a personality, a self, is the foundation and presupposition of self-creation and self-transcendence. Self-integration in the dimension of the spirit is a reflection of the basic ontological polarity of individualization-participation. In the dimension of spirit, in man, this becomes person (the ideal of individualization) and communion (the ideal of participation). Thus we have the personal-communal or the marks of the dimension of spirit. Reference will be made to this part of the analysis in the next section of this chapter. It will suffice at this point to note the role of community in the analysis.

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trate into the level of being in which personality is rooted. It penetrates only into the vital basis of personality but not beyond it. And philosophical 'personalism' is wrong because it does not see that personality is not something given but something which has reality only in a free self-realization on the basis of a pre-personal vitality. Only in this latter way is the idea of personality established in its religious sanctity, its ethical dignity, and its ontological profundity." Ibid. This critique which Tillich offers is not clear. Is he denouncing personalism or personality-ism? Does not his own analyses demand the distinction?

> Subpersonal beings can be subjected and appropriated by the personality without an absolute resistance from their side. But personality cannot be appropriated at all. It is either destroyed as personality, namely, in its power of self-determination, or it is acknowledged and made a member of a community. The permanent resistance of every personality against any attempt to make it a thing, to appropriate it and deprive it of its self-determination, is the presupposition for the rise of personality as such. Without this resistance of the "thou" to the "ego," without the unconditional demand embodied in every person to be acknowledged as a person in theory and practice, no personal life would be possible. A person becomes aware of his own character as a person only when he is confronted by another person. Only in the community of the I and the thou can personality arise.[1]

In the I-Thou structure of human experience the person becomes a personality, an actualized centered person, which finally is the bearer of "the spirit, its creativity, and its self-transcendence."[2] This introduces the next major section of this chapter which will discuss value and the functions of the spirit in terms of morality, culture, and religion. But one final anthropological consideration is in order, namely, the relationship of spirit to Spirit.

(5) Spirit and SPIRIT. -- It is necessary that the consideration of man make at least a passing reference to the fact that understood as spirit, man is thus provided the data which he can use in symbolic fashion to understand God as Spirit, the Divine Spirit or Spiritual Presence. There can be little doubt but that this aspect of the philosophy makes rich contributions to contemporary philosophy

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[1] Ibid., p. 125.

[2] Tillich, Morality and Beyond, p. 27.

of religion.

Man's immediate self-awareness is an awareness of being determined in his nature by the dimension of the spirit. As to the relation of the Spirit to spirit, Tillich claims that the former is "in" the latter. However, this does not mean that it rests there but rather that the Spirit drives the human spirit out of itself.

> The "in" of the divine Spirit is an "out" for the human spirit. The spirit, a dimension of finite life, is driven into a successful self-transcendence; it is grasped by something ultimate and unconditional. It is still the human spirit; it remains what it is but at the same time, it goes out of itself under the impact of the divine Spirit. "Ecstasy" is the classical term for this state of being grasped by the Spiritual Presence. It describes the human situation under the Spiritual Presence exactly.[1]

As the dimension of dimensions, as the "dimension of depth," the Spiritual Presence is operative via man in all dimensions which constitute man. But it is not a new reality, a metaphysically transcendent entity which is operative in man. Consequently, it is not a source of norms in the sense of supernaturalistic interpretations. It is the presence of the Spirit, however, which finally makes man to be man, which makes it possible and necessary to make the quest for the unconditional, which is finally the dimension of depth in the functions of the spirit in human life. The eternal unity between God and man, and the mutual immanence of one in the other preclude this kind of dualism. No, even at this point the monism of the philosophy remains, hopefully having avoided a humanistic deity or a deified humanism. How successful these are actually avoided is a point seriously debatable.

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[1] Tillich, III, p. 112. Tillich's terminology here illustrates most clearly his ontological priority. Given the ontology of spirit which he outlines, it is obvious that man and God are first and last of all to be interpreted in transpersonality terms. To do other than this would violate Tillich's commitment.

Tillich's analysis of man attempts, like his theory of value, to offer an anthropology which avoids supernaturalism and naturalism and all the errors consequent upon each of these alternatives. In summary, the "can" (freedom) of man is in ontological tension with the "ought" or "must" (destiny). The ontological understanding of man is the key to the depths of reality, including value. The entire analysis comes into focus in the presentation of the functions of the spirit.

5. Values and Norms in the Functions of the Spirit

The Unconditional, the Ultimate, the Absolute, the Ground of Being and Meaning was in Tillich's view of his day either severed from history or the finite by supernaturalism or it was lost by its being identified with the natural-historical, the latter understood under the growing impetus of positivism. This "severance" is the basis for the crisis in meaning or value referred to so much in both Tillich's German and English writings.

Taking Troeltsch's problems but rejecting many of

Troeltsch's solutions, Tillich sees the whole issue as that of the relationship of religion and culture. Tillich was not opposed to relating religion and value, nor was he opposed to the Kantian critical-transcendental method whereby religion and consequently value was recognized as an a priori. However, this formalism failed at two crucial points. (1) When the issue of the content of this formal a priori was raised, a reconciliation could not be effected. Troeltsch tried but his efforts plunged him further into the relativity which precluded the unconditional. (2) As clearly indicated in Tillich's criticism of Rudolf Otto's concept of the holy[1] and the evaluation of Albrecht Ritschl,[2] the mistake of the formal, a priori approach was its isolating the religious and consequently value as one function in one realm along side of other functions and realms of the spirit. Meaning and value were preserved but unrelated to history, the same mistake as was made in supernaturalistic philosophy and theology. These oversights permitted the rise of a positivism which threatened to be the time-devouring father of all time. With positivism's Weltanschauung came the threat to life itself, as was confirmed in the war years of Tillich's existence.

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[1] Paul Tillich, "Die Kategorie des 'Heiligen' bei Rudolf Otto," in Theologische Blätter, II (Januar, 1923), 11-12.

[2] Paul Tillich, "Albrecht Ritschl zu seinem hundertsten Geburtstag," in Theologische Blätter, III (March, 1922), 49-54.

The protests against positivism (existential philosophy, neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, Lebensphilosophie) were finally rejected as inadequate solutions to the problem of meaning. Nothing short of an ontology of life, of life and activity as grounded in Being-Itself, would be able to cope with the issues. If value is the a priori of life; if value is the absolute, the unconditional moment without which there would be no moments; if it is to be both historical and absolute, then it must be grounded in that which is also the a priori of all that exists, namely, Being-Itself.

The first issue to be raised concerns the Tillichian interpretation of an act of the spirit, "spiritual act." Though this "appears to be not only a speculative concept but also an unclearly defined one,"[1] there are enough clear indications of the analysis to provide us with at least a partial understanding of it. As has already been discussed, the ontology implicit in this issue is the analysis of spirit as the unity of being and thought. As such, it is conceived as the fulfillment of both. It is the unity of power and meaning; the telos of matter and mind.

The previous section of this chapter shows that man as the bearer of the spirit, as the medium of the coming to self-awareness and self-transcendence of the Ground of Being, possesses freedom as an essential attribute of his being. Freedom is the pulse of actualized spirit, invigorating it in a continual triadic dialectical process which is articulated in man who shares with the divine the essential attribute of creativity.

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[1] Adams, "Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science, and Religion," pp. 177-178.

Man is neither mind nor nature; he is both. As mind he is related to the universals; as nature or material he is a particular. As spirit he brings into actuality, creates, a world beyond the world he encounters. Though freedom is the sine qua non of this creativity, an analysis of this freedom has already revealed that it is under a norm or value. The decision which is prior to the actualization of freedom is an unconditional decision--as it is also a decision for the unconditional. Consequently, creativity, the spiritual act, is done in unity with the eternal forms and norms of being. Only an individual in whom mind (universals) and matter (principle of individuality) are dynamically and essentially related by spirit can actualize this ability to create--the primary attribute of freedom.

In the previously mentioned article, "The Conception of Man in Existential Philosophy," freedom is analyzed as technical, moral, creative and religious. This parallels the analysis of the functions of the spirit as morality, culture, and religion. Technical freedom is subsumed under culture. Each particular spiritual act is actually the combination of form (Gestalt), content (Inhalt) and import (Gehalt). In a helpful summary of this aspect of Tillich's thought, Adams states that

> the form is glimpsed in the multitude of theoretical and practical activities of the spirit, scientific and aesthetic, juridical and social. The content is the objective element in its simple character (Sosein); this content is raised by the form into the cultural-spiritual sphere. But in addition to form and content every spiritual act has a meaning, an import, which is the substance that gives the form and its content significance. This import is the meaningfulness that gives to every particular meaning its reality and power; it is the ground for an inner infinity of meaningfulness.[1]

In this understanding of the spiritual act are found the structures upon which autonomy, heteronomy and theonomy are based. It is not appropriate to treat these here since they are best grasped under the analysis of culture.

The analysis of the spiritual act can also be further illumined by a passing reference to Tillich's "philosophy of the spiritual act." First of all, this philosophy will focus on the form of the act; it will focus on the history of cultural creations; it will have to offer a philosophy of the norm whereby the various meaning-fulfilling acts are grounded in the meaning of the whole. This is the function of a theonomous metaphysics or theology. The establishing of this basic triadic methodology and the assuring of theology a necessary place in the scheme of the sciences were the main burdens of the previously discussed work, Das System der Wissenschaften.

Tillich has attempted to add a further moment to the traditional Kantian bifurcation of form and content, namely, import or meaning. Everything that is, because it participates in being, has this three-fold structure. All objects of creation are so to be understood. Meaning is the goal of being whether in atoms or angels. Man is the locus of the self-awareness of meaning, but man does not, as Kant had thought, attribute import or Gehalt to neutral or otherwise formless realities. The essential dimension of each actual thing or person precludes this method. In summary, the dimension already added to nature, to reason, is being added to the productions of man's creativity. We have here a "metaphysics" of both theoria and praxis.

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[1] Ibid., p. 58.

Using this analysis to focus on value, it becomes obvious that values or norms live in the actualization of being. They are in things essentially, otherwise these things would not even exist. In each actualization, in each spiritual act, there is a realization of meaning; in the spiritual act the value inherent in all forms of existence becomes alive, actual, aware of itself. Values live in the realization of meaning. Life is the realization of meaning and values.

Value is however a word with subjective connotations. As suggested earlier in this dissertation, meaning is used frequently throughout the analysis in an attempt to avoid the connotation of subjectivity Tillich found in the term value. But for some, especially today, meaning is also subject to the same judgment as value. What must be understood, regardless of which term is employed, is that the spiritual acts which characterize life in the dimension of spirit, human life, are not arbitrary, not based on relative meaning, import or value. There is a moment of the unconditional in all acts. Norms or values are the determinative characteristics of spirit. There are numerous values, meanings or norms, each pertaining to different dimensions of life, of nature, or even history. Spiritual values are oriented to the Unconditional. If one keeps this qualification in mind, he can relate spirit to value in the intended Tillichian manner.

It is not denied that value has a subjective moment. After all, value or meaning becomes actual, alive, in man through and in whom Being-Itself also achieves self-awareness. There could be no talk about values without there being a reference to those who value. In man, value --Being-Itself--is actualized. Being becomes actual meaning. In spiritual acts value becomes actual, embodied, incarnate, real. There is in the creative life of man a combination of form, content and import.

If the intent to ground all phenomena or actualizations in Being-Itself is to be sustained, it must be shown how these functions are related to Being. In other words, is there in the system of Tillich a consistent structuring of spiritual acts of man in terms of Being, of the Unconditional? Only if this is so can we accept as consistent the unity of *Denken*, *Sein*, and *Geist*. Only if this is the case can all reality be grasped as coming *from* the Ground of Being; existing by the Ground of Being; reaching *for* and/or returning *to* the Ground of Being.

That Tillich does in fact meet this standard of consistency is immediately obvious in the following scheme in which the relationship between (1) the elements of being, (2) the functions of life, and (3) the functions in the dimension of the spirit becomes clear.

(1) Individualization-Participation; (2) Self-Integration;
(3) Morality

(1) Dynamics-Form; (2) Self-Creation; (3) Culture

(1) Freedom-Destiny; (2) Self-Transcendence; (3) Religion

There is, as has been suggested, an extremely dialectical relationship between the various moments of this analysis. The burden of the following analysis is as follows. If the spiritual act in essence is always moral, cultural and religious--if it is a unity based on and reaching for the Unconditional; if as Tillich suggests, this Unconditional is the a priori (a value a priori), then in relation to each of these functions there must be an unconditional norm or value, an expression of unconditional meaning in each of them. In all of them it must be shown that the Unconditional is the object of all striving--of all transcendence--the source and means of the spiritual act.

Can the analysis of values and the functions of the spirit sustain the thesis that in Tillich's thought Being-Itself is reaching for Itself through the medium of man's freedom (which is ultimately Being's freedom)? Are the particular values to be finally identified as but manifestations of Being-Itself? An examination of the functions of the spirit will indicate the answers to these questions.

i. Morality

It could be asked with justification why an exposition of the value theory would include morality, in as much as the analysis of the spiritual act shows the traditional triad of norms (the good, the true and the beautiful) to be the values of the creative function of the spirit, that is, culture. There are several reasons, however, why morality must here be examined. (1) Essentially, a spiritual act, that is, a human act, is simultaneously moral, cultural and religious. There could not be one without the other. (2) Each act of the spirit, each function, is claimed to have the moment of the Unconditional as the object of Gehalt. It is necessary, therefore, to determine the absolute in this function which is logically at least prior to the functions of creation and transcendence. (3) No theory of values can overlook the ethical dimension. An understanding of Tillich's ethical theory is important to the concern of the dissertation. Ethics cannot be comprehended apart from an understanding of morality. Also, morality as a function is interpreted as logically prior to the remaining functions. The source of the moral ought is of great consequence in any analysis of value.

Morality is defined as "the experience of the moral imperative."[1] It is the moment which makes man man. Man, because he is a totally centered individual, is the only being to be regarded as moral. Total centeredness, as discussed above, consists of having a self and world to which one belongs. This centeredness is actualized through freedom which distinguishes man from the environment-bound lower beings. This world, "a structured whole of infinite potentialities and actualities,"[2] is encountered in each particular reality. In each tree man sees "treehood," in each person, "personhood." Centeredness means the ability to transcend an environment of particulars to a world, a structured universal.

The ontological question, as indeed any question, can be asked only by a centered being. To such only can there also come answers. In every question man transcends the environment around him to a world that is both around and in him. His ability to ask is correlated with ability to receive. His freedom which makes him respondable is also the freedom which makes him responsible. The ability to ask questions and receive answers and commands is a true depiction of freedom in the spirit, understood as "the openness for norms of unconditional, or essential, validity."[1] As was discussed in the analysis of ontology, it is the essential moment of life that is the source of norms and values of unconditional validity. A moral act is a responsible act, a response to an unconditionally valid demand of one's essential nature, the source of the moral imperative.

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[1] Tillich, Theology of Culture, P. 134.

[2] Tillich, III, 38.

What is being attempted in this description of a centered self is the discovery, analytically and therefore necessarily, of the moment of unconditional demand. Tillich interprets the unconditional demand in terms of reflecting the moments of the first polarities of being, individualization-participation, which in the dimension of the spirit are expressed as person-community. Therefore the ontological or the essential moment in this dimension becomes the command to become "a person within a community of persons."[2] Because only the centered person is the bearer of the spirit in terms of its creativity and self-transcendence, and in light of the fact that the moral aim is interpreted as preservation of the person with these potentialities, "we can say that the moral imperative demands the actualization of man's created potentiality."[1] Man is essentially a person, essentially centered, but it is only in freedom that the essential is made actual. Therefore, all of man's decisions and choices are ultimately based on the unconditional imperative. Becoming a person, fulfilling the demand, is a life-long process which is actually unrealizable in finality in history.

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[1] Ibid., p. 39.

[2] Tillich, Morality and Beyond, p. 27. Here in essence, is the moment in which the "is" (ontological) and the "ought" (axiological) are identical.

It must be asked as to whether this command is really unconditional. It will be recalled from the discussions in the previous sections of the dissertation that there are operative throughout the system certain assumptions regarding the nature of the Unconditional. (1) It must be immediate, beyond the subject-object dichotomy which precludes certainty and therefore unconditionality. (2) Only the essential in life can be the unconditional for life. (3) Following Kantian methodology, only the formal reflects the unconditional. The unconditionality of the moral command passes the test of these three criteria. (1) No command coming from the "outside" is to be regarded as unconditional, be it the command of church, state or a God supernaturally conceived. (2) The moral command is interpreted as putting our essential self over against our actual self. It is the "ought" in relationship to the "is." (3) The imperative is formal, specifying in itself no particular content. Regardless of what content it may assume, or to say the same thing, the manner in which it is actualized, the moral command is unconditional because it always remains essential.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

Were it only formal, however, it would never be actual. It is Tillich's claim that in terms of the ontological polarities of individualization-participation the locus of the moral imperative will be discovered. As quoted earlier, "the encounter with another person implies the unconditional command to acknowledge him as a person. The validity of the moral imperative is basically experienced in such encounters."[1] Here is the experience which actualizes in experience the Unconditional.

The kind of encounter in which this is experienced is participation, without which we would never know what it is like to be in the place of the other person. Without it there would be no sympathy. The pronoun "You" would not be usable "because it implies the participation that is present whenever one addresses somebody as a person."[2] Then the question is to be asked as to what kind of participation is required--in what way does or ought one participate? Since the centered individual, the person, cannot be "taken into" one's own center without destroying that which the other self is (and in the "destruction" of the other is destroyed "the self"), the participation is prescribed by the concept of acceptance. In spite of the peculiarities of the other, one participates in him by accepting such peculiarities. This is the thrust of *agape*. With this term we have a convergence of the nature of Being, discussed earlier as love, and the moral dimension or the self-integration or self-constitution, or self-awareness, in the dimension of the spirit. By *agape* is understood that "which gives concreteness to the categorical imperative, centeredness to the person and the foundation of the life of the spirit."[1]

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[1] Tillich, III, 45. The background for this claim is to be found in the significance of "encounter." Tillich states that the confrontation of another ego through the self back onto the self, thus creating the self that "has" a world. Consequently, if the "I" is born in encounter with the "Thou," a failure to "respect" the other as a person would destroy both the "Thou" and the "I."

[2] *Ibid*.

The determination to give both form (participate!) and content (acceptance) to the moral imperative is Tillich's answer to the crisis in values in this function. The Kantian separation left the historical content of the moral functions of the spirit without absolute grounding. As was pointed out in the introductory remarks concerning Tillich's rejection of certain alternative theories of value, the consequence is a positivistic approach to value whereby the unconditional is reduced to biological, psychological, or sociological necessities. If the crisis in values[1] is to be met, it will be met in a theory of values wherein the Unconditional is immanent in the conditional, wherein there is a synthesis of the absolute and the relative.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 46.

At this point it is necessary to note here an example of the dialectic which is operative throughout Tillich's philosophy. The experience of the moral demand shows both the identity with and the estrangement from the Ground of Being; it shows the relation of the essential to the existential. The fact that we can and do experience the unconditional ought is evidence of our basic unity with our essence. Our experience of the difference between what we ought to be and what we are testifies to our being estranged from our essential being. This distinction introduces a central concept to Tillich's moral theory, namely, law.

(1) Law. -- The contrast between natural and revealed law is regarded by Tillich as ethically irrelevant. The natural law is the law of love, the essential nature of man. The substance of all formulations of law is interpreted in terms of love. The ambiguity of the law is that once it is formulated, it loses its kairotic relevancy. It cannot reach the here and now of our experience; commandments are always dated. Too, every formulated law is an abstraction; every circumstance is concrete. How can they be related?

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[1] As a reminder, it can be stated that the crisis in values is in terms of the destructive alternatives of either demonic absolutism or demonic relativism.

A further ambiguity is seen in the fact that we have no guarantee that particular ethical decisions characteristic of the moral life can ever fulfill the law of love, the unconditional command in the I-Thou encounters.[1] Obviously, given these circumstantial ambiguities, it is not possible to guarantee that one can actually reach personal self-integration. Certainly no law, which is a commentary on man's estrangement, can effect reunion. It only confirms the estrangement, by increasing the gap between "is" and "ought." This analysis does not lead to the conclusion that the law is thus invalid. It does express man's essential being. This is the basis of its relevance to and significance for life.

There is an immediate, if not ultimate, purpose of laws, understood as they are by Tillich, in that they "guide the conscience in concrete situations."[2] It is further argued that

> everyone needs such guidance for his daily life and its innumerable large and small ethical questions. A considerable amount of moral habit is necessary in order to fulfill the demands of an average existence. Therefore, the tables of laws, which are commandments of the divine-human wisdom of all generations, are gifts of grace, although they can become destructive when elevated to absolute validity and substituted

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[1] This analysis is based on Tillich's basic claim regarding the absolute in history. There can be no absolute certainty in any of our decisions which are ever in the arena of possibilities and probabilities. Subject to challenge (see below) is this formalistic concept of absolute.

[2] Tillich, Morality and Beyond, p. 44.

> for *agape* and its power to listen to the voice of the "now."[1]

This situation produces three attitudes toward the law. (1) The pietistic, moralistic, or pharisaic interpretation attempts to effect reunion through the law. (2) The libertine approach renounces the relevancy of law. (3) The mediating approach, Tillich's, accepts the law as practically valid as a practical guide but unable to effect ultimate reunion of the actual and essential self in the personal-communal realm of life.

Without *agape* as the creation of the Spiritual Presence[2] by which there is given the love that is commanded by law, law fails to demonstrate (a) the source or power of motivation; (b) the principle of choice demanded in each concrete situation; (c) the unconditional validity of the moral imperative. *Agape* can do all this. But *agape* is *given*, it is not obtained. The ambiguity of the moral laws yet does not exclude them from revealing something of man's essential nature to which we have only an indirect, ambiguous "approach through the revelatory experiences which underlie the ethical wisdom of all nations, but which are not unambiguous even though they are revelatory."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

[2] What is meant by Spiritual Presence is best seen in correlation with the method by which Tillich interprets the essential and existential aspects of life in each dimension. History's essence is the Kingdom of God. Life's essence is eternal life. The essence of life in the dimension of the spirit is Spiritual Presence. Being's essence is the Ground of Being symbolized in the concept of God.

(2) Ambiguous Law and Unambiguous Love. -- Having thus shown the locus of morality to be in the self-integrating function of life in the dimension of spirit, and having already alluded to the ambiguity which permeates morality, and having already indicated that the answer to this is in unambiguous love, it is now necessary to discuss the particulars of the ambiguities and show how Tillich relates each of these to love, *agape*.

Clarification of Tillich's position is possible only through a careful delineation of the moments of the analysis. Love is to be understood in relation to life which he defines as "being in actuality."[2] To this definition one must add another, namely, love as "the moving power of life." As mentioned earlier in the dissertation, "Being-Itself" cannot be defined, but the best metaphor of interpretation is in the concept of "power of being." It is further implied that being is not actual "without the love which drives everything that is towards everything else that is."[3] From these passages, representative of countless other similar statements, one can conclude that love is the description of the power of being which Tillich uses as the metaphorical designation of the "nature" of Being-Itself. Love is the constitutive element of the very process of life itself.

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[1] Tillich, III, 48.

[2] Tillich, *Love, Power, and Justice*, p. 25.

[3] *Ibid*.

Tillich's analysis of man in terms of a centered self includes within it the claim that actually man is a self that has a self. He is self-related. Under the conditions of estrangement, however, man is estranged from himself. He cannot self-integrate. He has not yet become a center in the way analyzed in the previous section dealing with man. Laws are necessary because of estrangement. That is, they confirm the estrangement of the actual and essential self. They are therefore impotent to bridge the gap between essential and actual man.

What is described for us up to this point is not the real state of man but only the existential state of man. But the essential and existential are ever mixed. And this fact accounts for Tillich's emphasis on grace as an ontic reality. Consequently, we are each a person with a self. We are centered individuals by grace. We are, though ambiguously and fragmentarily, partially what we ought to be. There is an a priori reunion effected, and the a priori here is the precise moment in terms of which Tillich understands grace. Love has already reunited! It has worked to make us really something of an existentialized version of what we essentially are, persons in community with other persons. Consequently, what the moral imperative demands (that we become a person in community with other persons) we already are--though ambiguously and fragmentarily. But again, this is an analysis which seeks to structure for us the Gestalt of grace. The command to love is fulfilled by love or agape.

The unconditional moral demand is to participate and thereby become a person in and through a community of persons. As has already been mentioned, it is in the encounter of person to person that the experience of the unconditional becomes most obvious, most actual. To the question as to what kind of participation is demanded, Tillich answers that we "participate in the center of the other self and consequently accept his particularities. . . ."[1] Participation via acceptance is precisely the mode of agape. It is only in this way that the unconditional command to acknowledge the other as a person is fulfilled both formally and practically. In essence, then, the unconditional moral imperative is the demand to love!

But what of the content of the moral demand? Content is by necessity relative. There is a "universe" full of commands and laws. In this sense, we are born into a "moral universe" which is

> produced by the experience of all former generations. It is a mixture of natural interest, especially of the ruling classes, and wisdom, acquired by the leading people. A moral universe is not only an ideology,

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[1] Ibid., p. 45.

> that is, a product of the will to gain and to preserve power. It is also a result of experience and real wisdom. It gives the material in which moral decisions are made. And every single decision adds to the experience and the wisdom of the whole. In this sense, we all are dependent on authority, on factual authority, or, as Erich Fromm has called it, rational authority.[1]

The question becomes one of the relationship between such content, discovered or contributed, to the unconditional imperative. Are we forced into an irrelevant formalism or a meaningless relativism? Tillich claims that this ambiguity is overcome in love which

> unites the unconditional character of the formalized moral imperative with the conditional character of the ethical content. Love is unconditional in its essence, conditional in its existence. It is against love to elevate any moral content, except love itself, to unconditional validity, for only love is by its very nature open to everything particular while remaining universal in its claim.[2]

This reference raises the question as to what precisely Tillich means. Obvious is the fact that there are parallels to what is described today as "situational" or "contextual" ethics. The difference, however, would emerge at the point at which a concept of being, Tillich's ontology, would be basic to the analysis. He would insist that without a doctrine of being this ethical theory would sink into a subjectivism or relativism destroying thereby the validity of the norm as absolute or unconditional. In order for Tillich to avoid this consequence, he analyzes being, essence, good, fulfillment, and the like, in terms of the processes and structures of being which are both prescriptive and descriptive.

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[1] Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 139.

[2] Tillich, III, 273.

It is the concrete situations of life which are occasions for ethical prescriptions. But like the world of phenomena which we grasp and shape or, to put it another way, which we receive and to which we react, such experiences are without meaning until logos is discovered in them, in these instances, ethical norms. But again, the problem is the relationship between such norms (abstract) and the situation (concrete). They are related only in love,

> because love unites with the particular situation out of which the concrete demand grows. Love itself uses wisdom, but love transcends the wisdom of the past in the power of another of its elements, courage. It is the courage to judge the particular without subjecting it to an abstract norm--a courage which can do justice to the particular.[1]

Stated in another way, "love alone can transform itself according to the concrete demands of every individual and social situation without losing its eternity and dignity and unconditional validity."[2]

Again, one finds expressed here a central Tillichian concept. For Tillich, each new moment in the process of being, actualized as life, creates new forms. This is in keeping with the basic ontological polarity of dynamics-form. In history new relationships are ever arising between individuals and groups. New actualized relationships teach new duties because new actualizations bring into existence new forms--new incarnations or actualizations of logos. Consequently, when one lives in terms of the continually "new" he must let the uniqueness of new actualizations be determinative in his application of the unconditional norm, love. Laws are born out of yesterdays. They can be misused in such a way as to impose alien forms on new forms. This is heteronomy. This is injustice. What Tillich is basically arguing is the case for love as the only absolute which is completely or absolutely relative. It is eternal, unconditional and valid precisely because it takes into account the concrete situation, seeking in given circumstances the maximum fulfillment of potentialities understood as maximum reunion of the parts with parts and these with the whole.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 274.

[2] Tillich, *Morality and Beyond*, p. 89.

There is always a risk in combining the absolute and the concrete, the norm and the situation to which and in a sense out of which the norm is realized. The absoluteness of the norm is not to be confused with the relativity of the content. For example, love could demand that in certain circumstances one should not tell the truth. This is the basis of his interpretation of the role of the Protestant Principle, even in the realm of the self-integration of life in the dimension of the spirit. What seems evident here is that Tillich is trying to develop an ethic of kairos. And, it might further be suggested, that as he is trying to use love as the medium in which the absolute/ unconditional is related to the relative/conditional, so he develops a concept of kairos which is the meeting moment of the eternal ("unchanging") and the temporal (history--the realm of becoming, growth and change). At any rate, love is the command and in a sense the content which makes up the moral imperative. Love, in the sense of agape,[1] is the universal applied to the particular.

But what of the ambiguity of motivation? The law commands the unity of the essential and existential, but it actually serves only to increase this estrangement. This situation leads Tillich to claim that

> the question of moral motivation can be answered only transmorally. For the law demands, but cannot forgive; it judges, but cannot accept. Therefore, forgiveness and acceptance, the conditions of the fulfillment of the law, must come from something above the law, or more precisely, from something in which the split between our essential being and our existence is overcome and healing power has appeared. It is the center of the Christian message that this conquest took place in the Christ, in whom a new reality beyond the cleavage appeared.[2]

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[1] Agape is analyzed in the next section, (3) Love as Being, as well as in the previous section dealing with law and love.

[2] Tillich, Morality and Beyond, p. 64.

This is not to deny that the embodiments of moral law are totally void of motivating power. Thus embodied in laws of state, convention, etc., the moral law

> exercises motivating power through tradition, public opinion, personal habit, and the threats and promises connected with all of them. In this way the commanding law has the power to produce moral action in an institutionalized form.[1]

But fulfillment of a law still is not the fulfillment of *the* moral imperative which is impossible in the state of separation from the Ground of one's being. However, "*agape* transcends the finite possibilities of man."[2] This is the crux of the impasse which Tillich takes as the point of departure for the discovery of the reality of grace.

> Love as commandment is impossible because man in existential estrangement is incapable of love. And since he cannot love, he denies the unconditional validity of the moral imperative, he has no criterion by which to choose within the flux of ethical contents, and he has no motivation for the fulfilment of the moral law.[3]

Here is the moment of grace. The command to actualize one's essential personhood, the command to love, is fulfilled by love. The manner in which this happens is the operation of grace.

> The Spirit elevates the person into the transcendent unity of the divine life and in so doing it reunites the estranged existence of the person with his essence. And this reunion is just what the mo-

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 55.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 40.

[3] Tillich, III, 272.

> ral law commands and what makes the moral imperative unconditionally valid.[1]

In a sweeping summary in which Spirit, love, and grace are equated, Tillich claims that

> theologically speaking, Spirit, love, and grace are one and the same reality in different aspects. Spirit is the creative power; love is its creation; grace is the effective presence of love in man. The very term "grace" indicates that it is not a product of any act of good will on the part of him who receives it but that it is given gratuitously, without merit on his side. The great "in spite of" is inseparable from the concept of grace. Grace is the impact of the Spiritual Presence that makes the fulfilment of the law possible--though fragmentarily. It is the reality of that which the law commands, the reunion with one's true being, and this means the reunion with oneself, with others, and with the ground of one's self and others. Where there is New Being, there is grace, and vice versa. Autonomous or heteronomous morality is without ultimate moral motivating power. Only love or the Spiritual Presence can motivate by giving what it demands.[2]

Consequently, the conclusion is inevitable that grace, either common or special, that is, grace at work in all realms of life and that bestowed by those grasped by the Christ, effects a reunion, though fragmentary, of our essential and existential selves.

In regard to this analysis it is imperative to remember that Spiritual Presence has not the primary function of revealing new norms for morality. Even the so-called revealed norms of the Bible fall under the judgment of the Spiritual Presence, of Love. The norm of love judges every

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 274.

"now." This is what is meant by the suggestion mentioned above that Tillich offers here a kairotic ethic. It is precisely this because

> the "Spiritual Presence," the presence of the divine Ground of Being toward and in the human spirit, opens man's eyes and ears to the moral demand implicit in the concrete situation. Tables of laws can never wholly apply to the unique situation. . . . "The letter kills" not only because it judges him who cannot fulfill the law, but because it suppresses the creative potentialities of the unique moment which never was before and never will come again. The Spirit, on the contrary, opens the mind to these potentialities and determines the decisions of love in a particular situation. . . . Love, as the ultimate principle of morality, is always the same. Love entering the unique situation, in the power of the Spirit, is always different. Therefore love liberates us from the bondage to absolute ethical traditions, to conventional morals, and to authorities that claim to know the right decision perhaps without having listened to the demand of the unique moment. The Spirit is the Spirit of newness.[1]

(3) Love as Being. -- We have established in the analysis of morality (a) the relation of centeredness to the unconditional command; (b) the role of the essential in morality; (c) the structure of individualization-participation as the structure of morality; (d) the significance and ambiguity of law; (e) the nature of *agape* as the creation of the spirit in which the ambiguities of law are overcome, though fragmentarily. There is, however, a seeming contradiction in the analysis. Love is stated as a law, a command. It would seem to follow that at least here is one law that is not subject to the ambiguity of law. The

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[1] Tillich, *Morality and Beyond*, p. 43.

answer which is given is again a significant moment in the analysis of value. Love is both a law and not a law. "It is not a matter of ought-to-be--even if expressed in imperative form--but a matter of being."[1] It is both value and Being-Itself, as has already been shown in the section of this dissertation which analyzes Tillich's ontology. Love can only be the absolute "ought" because it is the absolute "is." It is love that gives the power of being to all man's laws--to his accumulative wisdom.

Love is understood as the power of being racing toward reunion with itself. In man's awareness, in his constitution as a centered person, the Unconditional achieves actual awareness. It could not be otherwise, given the ontology which supports this analysis. The absolute of man's morality, understood as actualization of his essential nature in community, the supreme value of life, of being, is love. Here in this first of the functions of the spirit we see the identification of the norm which gives meaning to a function with Being-Itself. It is Being-Itself, reaching for Itself in self-transcendence.[2]

So interpreted and so understood, all the kinds of love commonly experienced in man are united on the basis of a common ontological source. ". . . Being-Itself, the power in every power, is, at the same time, Love."[1] Epithymia or Libido is understood as basically "the normal drive towards vital self-fulfilment,"[2] "union with that which fulfils the desire,"[3] not desire itself. Philia is the power working toward reunion of equals. Eros "strives for a union with that which is a bearer of values because of the values it embodies."[4] Agape, the kind of power of Being-Itself, is operative in all kinds of love. In all different manifestations of this drive as determined by the "objects" with which reunion is sought, agape is to be understood as the love of loves, the absolute, unconditional Love which is the ground of all love. It is Being-Itself.

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[1] Tillich, III, 272.

[2] Tillich makes this point most clearly in "Being and Love," in Moral Principle of Action, Anshen, ed., "Love is possible only within the process of self-realization which is the process of reality itself. Therefore Love is real only as the power of being." (p. 664).

(4) Comments. -- Any criticisms raised against Tillich's ontology would by necessity apply to his analysis of morality. For the sake of brevity and for the purpose of further illuminating the key points in the proposed structure of morality conceived in terms of self-integration through individualization-participation, a few of the most

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[1] Tillich, "Being and Love," in Moral Principle of Action, Anshen, ed., p. 664.

[2] Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 30.

[3] Ibid., p. 29.

[4] Ibid., p. 30.

pertinent criticisms will be cited.

Paul Ramsey argues that

> an ethic grounded in ontology inclines inevitably in the direction of monism, and from the point of view of traditional theological ethics displays two main inadequacies: a defective doctrine of creation and a deficient Christology.[1]

The drive of being toward reunion is sufficient ground to interpret Tillich in the form of absolute idealism which describes the absolute as going through estrangement from itself to reunion with itself. This interpretation is for Ramsey confirmed by Tillich's close correlation of finite individuality with the fall.

The charge has often been levied that Tillich's doctrine of the Unconditioned is ethically irrelevant. His distinction between morality (self-integration) and ethics (the temporalized-spatialized expressions of morality) is regarded as being subject to a kind of formalism that excludes the problems encountered in practical day-to-day ethical concerns. In defense of Tillich, James Luther Adams states that Tillich is not to be "classed with Karl Barth and his ascetic attitude toward nature and spirit but rather with Nietzsche's conception of 'the creative' beyond good and evil."[2]

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[1] Paul Ramsey, "Review of Love, Power, and Justice," in Philosophical Review, LXIV (January, 1955), 155.

[2] Adams, "Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science and Religion," p. 85.

In keeping with the earlier criticism of Tillich's propensity to monistic thinking, Kenneth Hamilton suggests that the important distinctions which make ethics both possible and necessary are totally missing. "The absence of any true dualistic element in the system accounts for its failure to preserve either the personal or the moral dimension of human life."[1]

One of the most pointed criticisms from a theological perspective is that of George Tavard. Several points are interpreted by him as critical. (1) Tillich's contrast between love and law is highly arbitrary and perhaps even artificial. "For in the concrete situation of the Christian who is totally committed to God, love never contradicts the law: it fulfills it."[2] This failure to understand the relationship between law and love is the cause of Tillich's missing his stated goal of objectivity in ethics and morals. Tavard claims that Tillich is finally too subjective in his analysis. The transmoral conscience is one which escapes rather than fulfills the objective laws, by resting in subjectivity. (2) The distinction between good and bad is untenable, given Tillich's interpretation. Life, including the moral life, is a mixture of drives

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[1] Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. 196. Tillich would deny this on the grounds that dualism makes valueless and meaningless any acts of freedom.

[2] Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message, p. 157. Unclear, however, is what is meant by this use of the word, "fulfill."

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[1] Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. 196. Tillich would deny this on the grounds that dualism makes valueless and meaningless any acts of freedom.

[2] Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message, p. 157. Unclear, however, is what is meant by this use of the word, "fulfill."

Regardless of the strength or weaknesses of these criticisms, they serve to indicate the crucial links in the theory of morality and being which Tillich develops. The moral function will be further illumined in the following interpretations of the functions of creation and transcendence, to which the moral function is essential.

ii. Culture

Culture is defined as "that which takes care of something, keeps it alive, and makes it grow."[2] The relationship between an act of the spirit and culture has been anticipated in the analysis of the nature of a spirit-

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 145.

[2] Tillich, III, 57.

ual act. Because of the crisis which resulted from the attempts to correlate religion and value as one a priori among other a prioris, Tillich attempts throughout his works to provide a new understanding of history or of culture. The culture he structures is theonomous. Consequently, religion must be seen as a necessary moment in culture, interpreted as the Inhalt of the spiritual act. Each act of the spirit (which is always cultural) must be seen as an actualization or achievement of meaning or value. On this basis, religion must be re-interpreted, since "weder die Hegelsche Fassung, die die Religion dem Theoretischen, noch die Kantische, die sie dem Praktischen, noch die Schleiermachersche, die sie dem Gefühl zuweist, haben sich halten können."[1] Tillich's alternative is an understanding of religion as "ein Verhalten des Geistes, in der Praktisches, Theoretisches und Gefühlsmässiges in komplexer Einheit verbunden sind."[2]

If meaning and value are to be discovered, they will be found in a grasping of the meaning or value of the whole of reality in which individual meanings can participate. Without a coherence of all meanings in meaning-itself there could be no solution to the difficulties of the age. This concept regarding meaning has been discussed earlier in the dissertation. Here again is reference to Tillich's conviction regarding the need for a new Weltanschauung in which the descriptive and normative sciences would find their respective places and roles. As metaphysics shows the necessary structure of natural phenomenon, so a kind of metalogic is supposed to provide us with a grasp of the "logic of logic," with the "meaning of meanings."

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[1] Tillich, Theologie der Kultur, p. 33.

[2] Ibid., p. 34.

If this analysis is followed, then it is to be understood also as the manner in which the unconditional element in each conditional form is to be discerned. The early claim that there is a method for each of the three constituents of "spiritual reality" is now explained further. The descriptive sciences focus on the *Inhalt*; logic grasps the *Denkformen*; metalogic grasps the *Gehalt*. James Luther Adams provides a succinct summary of the use of metalogic by suggesting that it is intended to combine the principle of identity of thought and being, the ecstatic theory of meaning (actually an a priori), the theory of the spirit-bearing *Gestalt* to the end that

> in metalogic he envisages a dialect of the universal and the particular, the absolute and the relative, the creative and the fateful, the ground and the abyss. In the individuations of the cultural life, the principle of life, of creation, of *Gestalt*, of form and the eruption of form, come to purest realization.[1]

As the product of *Geist* in which *Sein* and *Denken* are united, cultural realities (in realms of both *theoria* and praxis) are understood as spiritual. They are constituted ~~by~~ form, content and import (Form, Inhalt and Gehalt). It is in the cultural sphere that the power of being which permeates both thought and being comes into fulfillment. Since he is bearer of the spirit, wherever man is found is found also culture, the symbols of meaning on which the spirit feeds. But it is also clear that finally in this cultural sphere, unique in its drive to go beyond itself, is to be detected the Ground of Being reaching for Itself. This "reaching for Itself" is Tillich's interpretation of the dialectical process within Being-Itself wherein its dynamic moment is expressed in its freedom whose destiny is Being-Itself. This is, if we seek it, the theonomous and consequently necessary element in all cultural creations.

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[1] Adams, "Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science, and Religion," p. 155.

Culture as a function of the spirit becomes the self-creation of life, based on the ontological polarity of dynamics and form, the power and structure of creativity. As indicated earlier in dealing with the dimension of spirit, it is here that the new is created. Something is produced or made or actualized or realized that is "beyond" the encountered reality. Taking his cue from the root meaning of culture, Tillich says that

> man can cultivate everything he encounters, but in doing so, he does not leave the cultivated object unchanged; he creates something new from it--materially, as in the technical function; receptively as in the functions of theoria; or reactively, as in the functions of praxis. In each of these three

> cases, culture creates something new beyond the encountered reality.[1]

In the area of culture the new is first and always the double creation of language and technology. There is no creativity without universals. Because language is essentially the medium of universals, it is consequently fundamental to all cultural functions. As discussed earlier, without transcendence of the environmental (the particulars) by way of freedom, there could be no creativity. There would be only animal-like conformity to environment. It is the universal that liberates from the here and now. It is a medium of transcendence. Technology, the handmaid of language, releases us from the bondage to natural conditions through the production of tools. But tool production is impossible without universals, since productivity in general presupposes Geistesfreiheit.

Tillich sees in the basic duality of language and tools reflection of another duality, namely, the receptive and reactive moments in all creativity. This is closely correlated with the definition and analysis of reason which were discussed in the section dealing with epistemology.

> By their duality, the two basic functions of culture, the word and the technical act, point to a general duality in the cultural self-creation of life. This duality is based on the ontological polarity of individualization and participation and is actual in the life processes under all dimensions.[2]

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[1] Tillich, III, 57.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

On the basis of fundamental duality of reception and reaction, culture is interpreted as consisting of two distinct moments: theoria and praxis.

In order to understand fully what is intended here, it is necessary to attempt to relate culture to morality, that is, self-creation to self-integration. It has been stated and implied many times in Tillich's writings that self-integration is the *sine qua non* of the other functions of self-creation and self-transcendence. "Every cultural act is the act of a centered self and is based on the moral self-integration of the person within the community."[1]

The relationship between self-integration and self-creation is nowhere more clearly grasped than in the moment of freedom. Man, by decision, actualizes his potential personhood, actualizes freedom. He gains a self and a world. This freedom, once articulated, receives its symbolic expressions in the creations of culture. A being with self-awareness is analytically a being with language and tools. He receives and reacts to his environment. A being who gains self-awareness by actualizing his freedom is immediately a self-transcending being who both theorizes and practices, receives and reacts. Freedom is the moment common to both self-integration and self-creation.

The communal aspect of the polarity of individualization-participation is another moment in which the integration and creative functions of the spirit are related. It is in the encounter with other "Thous" that man's "going out from himself" is stopped. In this moment he is thrown back on himself. It is by this encounter with others that he is stopped "in his unstructured running from one 'here and now' to the next. . . . Here lies the common root of morality and culture."[1] Here is born the self which has a world, language, technology and creativity.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

There is finally one more relation to be indicated as operative between morality and culture. "As culture gives content to morality, so morality gives seriousness to culture."[2] In the analysis of man and spirit, it was pointed out that the center of self, the foundation of self, the analytically-transcendentally necessary "center," was identified as ultimate concern--ultimate seriousness. The unconditional moral imperative from which man as man cannot escape gives birth to this ultimate, unconditional concern which is man's center. Tillich claims that "where there is seriousness, there is the unconscious or conscious force of the unconditional character of the moral imperative."[3] It is in this way that the moral function based on the Unconditional gives to culture its seriousness and meaning.

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[1] Ibid., p. 58.

[2] Ibid., p. 160.

[3] Ibid., p. 161.

Having thus given the foundation for culture and having shown the reason for the two basic functions of self-creation called *theoria* and *praxis*, it is now possible to examine each of these and to note the nature and function of what was once the fundamental triad of values, namely, the good, the true and the beautiful.

(1) *Theoria*. -- Under the function of *theoria* Tillich subsumes the material that in traditional philosophy would be treated in epistemology and aesthetics. Basically, the values of truth and beauty[1] are implied by *theoria*, although these are sufficiently re-interpreted to fit the scheme and assumptions of the total philosophy. By *theoria* is meant

> the act of looking at the encountered world in order to take something of it into the centered self as a meaningful, structured whole. Every aesthetic image or cognitive concept is such a structured whole. Ideally, the mind drives toward an image which embraces all images and a concept which contains all concepts, but in reality the universe never appears in a direct vision--it only shines through particular images and concepts. Therefore every particular creation of theoria is a mirror of encountered reality, a fragment of a universe of meaning.[2]

From this analysis one must conclude that the absolute is but ambiguously seen in encountered reality. *Truth* as such is not within the grasp of a finite creature. His truths point to or approximate *the* truth which is the desired goal of cognitive processes. The source of the ambiguity is the same as it is for all reality, namely, the separation of subject and object. In knowledge it is the separation between the knower and the known. In art it is the distance between the subject and the expressed object. Consequently, existential estrangement precludes the possibility of completely reaching what essentially or potentially is always there, the unity of subject with object. We attempt to overcome the distance with either concepts (knowledge) or images (art) but the attempts are never perfect. However, as indicated in the discussion of essence and existence in the section on ontology, the cause of this ambiguity is also the condition necessary for any and all acts of freedom by which the essential is existentialized or actualized.

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[1] These terms are defined below.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 62.

> In the act of cognitive creativity of life (as, analogously, in all functions of the self-creation of life under the dimension of spirit, including morality and religion) there is a fundamental conflict between that which is intended and the situation that both causes the intention and at the same time prevents its fulfilment. This conflict is based on the estrangement between subject and object, an estrangement which is, at the same time, a condition for culture as the whole of creative receiving or transforming acts.[1]

This leads to a most important discussion which the material at hand more or less permits to be incorporated at this point. What Tillich is seemingly saying is that in all functions, there is an absolute or unconditional which we cannot grasp or actually see, but which makes vision possible. This is expressed in the above reference to the quest for the concept of concepts and the image of images. In every aspect of the functions of spirit there is a drive or a quest for the Unconditional in unconditional seriousness. Beyond things which have being one quests for Being-Itself. Beyond the goods or values, one demands Value-Itself. In the cognitive functions one demands Truth-Itself. This quest is, according to Tillich, the necessary consequence of the ambiguous manifestations of the Unconditional in the conditional.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.

Tillich suggests that both Augustine and Kant recognized the unconditional element in every encounter with reality. They erred in that they tried to go beyond their "safe analysis," and arrive at a concept of God "which is more than esse ipsum, verum ipsum, and bonum ipsum, more than an analytical dimension in the structure of reality."[1] In other words, one must recognize that "the ontological bases of the moral principles and their unconditional character cannot be used for the establishment of a highest being. Bonum ipsum does not imply the existence of a highest being."[2] Here Tillich's basic ontology is most evident. The ontological argument, while admittedly limited, is primarily an analysis of the presence of this unconditional element in the structure both of reason and of reality. There is nothing that is more important for theology or philosophy than the recognition of this interpretation of Anselm's argument.

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[1] Tillich, I, 207.

[2] Ibid., p. 208.

It must be asked how this element of the unconditional appears in the theoretical and practical functions of reason, permitting the bifurcation which is demanded at this point. The answer is that

> the unconditional element appears in the theoretical (receiving) functions of reason as _verum ipsum_, the true itself as the norm of all approximations to truth. The unconditional element appears in the practical (shaping) functions of reason as _bonum ipsum_, the good-itself as the norm of all approximations to goodness. Both are manifestations of _esse ipsum_, being-itself as the ground and abyss of everything that is.[1]

From this it can be concluded that value as the structure and/or meaning of life in the dimension of spirit is the unconditional element which bestows by virtue of its presence in all cultural functions and indeed all functions of life in the dimension of spirit, the attribute of being valuable. What is and what is created, both being created in different senses of the term, are actualizations of value. Again, this holds for both the theoretical and practical functions of culture. This will be clearly seen in the following analysis of the nature of each _form_ of creativity.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 207.

(a) Truth. In the previous discussion of Tillich's epistemology several points were discussed which actually could be re-stated here. Such points will here be assumed. The basic polarity of self-world (subject-object) is determinative here in ~~a~~ two-fold sense. First, this makes knowledge or the cognitive act possible. Secondly, this is also the point at which the ambiguities in the cognitive function emerge. As indicated above, this ambiguity is not peculiar to this particular function.

The cognitive act "is born out of the desire to bridge the gap between subject and object."[1] Truth is the result of such reunion. As he appeals for the classical concept of reason, so also is there an appeal by Tillich for the classical use of the word true and truth. Limiting the word "true" to either analytic sentences or empirically proven propositions is a matter of convention but not of necessity. Statements to be either true or false must somehow involve reality or phenomena described or valued in the propositions. "There must be an explanation of the fact that reality can give itself to the cognitive act in such a way that a false judgment can occur and in such a way that many processes of observation and thought are necessary in order to reach true judgments."[2]

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[1] Tillich, III, 64.

[2] Tillich, I, 101.

We are subject to disappointment of expectations in our confrontations with "reality." There is, therefore, born in us a desire for the true reality which is found only as one looks beyond the misleading appearances. What the mind is after is the essential nature of reality. "The surface must be penetrated, the appearance undercut, the 'depth' must be reached, namely, the *ousia*, the 'essence' of things, that which gives them the power of being."[1]

However, subjective reason is ever correlated with objective reason. Translated, this means that value is actualized *in man*. Nothing would be true if it were not such for someone, namely, "for the mind which in the power of the rational word, the *logos*, grasps the level of reality in which the really real 'dwells'."[2] It is again clear that "essence" is the meaning-value source of reality--its truth. But given the conditions of estrangement, truth, in the sense of re-union is ambiguous. Essentially there is union in revelation but even this is finally but fragmentary. It is clear, however, that an ontology in terms of which Truth is analyzed reveals the process of truth as the process in which Being-Itself reaches for Itself.

(b) *Authentic Expressiveness*. Included in the functions of *theoria* are both the cognitive and aesthetic activities, alike in many ways and yet each unique in its own right. There are some qualities of being which only the creative artist can grasp. The difference between art as an aspect of *theoria* and cognition is that the task of the former "is not that of apprehending essence but that of expressing meaning."[1]

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] *Ibid*.

> The result of such creativity has been called the beautiful and has sometimes been combined with truth, sometimes with the good, sometimes with both, in a triad of highest values. As a term, "beauty" has lost the power it had in the Greek combination of the beautiful and the good (*kalon k'agathon*), and in recent aesthetics it has been almost unanimously rejected because of its connections with the decadent phase of the classical style--beautifying naturalism. Perhaps one could speak of expressive power or expressiveness. This would not exclude aesthetic idealism or naturalism but would point to the aim of the aesthetic function, that is, to express. The tension which arises in the aesthetic function is that between expression and the expressed. One could speak of expressive truth or untruth. But one should instead speak of the authenticity of the expressive form or of its unauthenticity.[2]

The background of this quotation is interesting and illuminating. It is not surprising that Tillich would find in art the symbol for his experience of the abyss with its form-transcending, surging, dynamic power. Consequently, art has a very basic function in the life of the spirit. The two indirect ways of expressing ultimate reality are philosophy and art, the former using cognitive concepts while the latter employs aesthetic images. The one direct way is religion.

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[1] Paul Tillich, *The Religious Situation*, trans. H. Richard Niebuhr (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), p. 85.

[2] Tillich, III, 64.

In his earlier writings Tillich refers to the way in which expressionism influenced him following the war. It opened his eyes "to the form-destroying power of the content and the creative ecstasy which is its necessary result."[1] Mention is made of his attraction to a picture by Botticelli which struck him "like a revelation." Such encounters and reflection led "to the fundamental categories of my philosophy of religion and culture, namely, form and content."[2]

The criterion of authenticity is given as expression of "the encounter of mind and world in which an otherwise hidden quality of a piece of the universe (and implicitly of the universe itself) is united with an otherwise hidden receptive power of the mind (and implicitly of the person as a whole)."[3] There are limitations in all such expressiveness, namely, the limitations that come from the discovery of only one hidden quality with only images rather than with the totality of one's being. This imposes on all such creations an element of reality and an element of unreality. This is the ambiguity. Beauty then can but be experienced in its ambiguity, but whether it is termed beauty or expressiveness or authentic expressiveness, it is basically a quality of being.[1] Without this there could be no beauty, no expressiveness.

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[1] Tillich, Interpretation of History, p. 16.

[2] Ibid., pp. 15-16. Adams suggests that this preference for expressionism may well be reflected in the relative insignificance which is attached to content in the discussion of the categories. "Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science, and Religion," (p. 84) Tillich partly confirms Adams' analysis by admitting that he "always learned more from pictures than from theological books." "Art and Ultimate Reality," Lecture at the Museum of Modern Art in New York City, February 17, 1959, p. 22.

[3] Tillich, III, 64. One might be more willing to accept this if Tillich had specified the meaning of "authentic expression." It would seem that one simply "intuits" the instances in which this occurs. But again, is not this position to be criticized as too subjective?

One final caution of Tillich needs to be repeated here. If his analysis is adequate, then it is necessary to expect that both cognitive and artistic functions of theoria will be operative through all of man's history. It is not only the "professional knower" or the "professional artist" who experiences truth or beauty. Rather it is the case that

> we have pre-scientific and pre-artistic functions of the spirit. They permeate the whole life of man, and it would be very wrong were the term "creative" to be applied only to vocational, scientific, and artistic creativity. For instance, the knowledge and expressive power embodied in myth--often experienced at a very early age--has become for most people the door into all aspects of culture.[2]

This is an important clarification, for it must be affirmed if one is to find consistency in the nature of value that since man has been man, his self-creations have always been characterized by the attributes of true and beautiful. It is the self-creation of life in the dimension of spirit that actualizes and symbolizes these norms, traditionally regarded as values. It is the power of being as love that drives man to seek unity with that with which he is in essential unity, ultimately, the Ground of Being, the Unconditional whose presence in man is the basis of the quest in self-creation. This unity accounts for man's expressions of truth and beauty, though such expressions are ambiguous.[1]

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[1] By "quality" is meant "manifestation." One will err in his interpretation of Tillich if he interprets quality in terms of attributes. Tillich here simply states his case. He does not argue the point.

[2] Tillich, III, 64.

(2) Praxis. -- The basic and succinct statement of what is meant by praxis is the assertion that it

> is the whole of cultural acts of centered personalities who as members of social groups act upon each other and themselves. Praxis in this sense is the self-creation of life in the personal-communal realm.[2]

As such, praxis includes acts of inter-personal relationships, namely, "of persons on themselves and on other persons, on the groups to which they belong and through them on other groups, and indirectly on mankind as a whole."[3]

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[1] John Dixon criticizes Tillich's interpretation of art as being too Platonic. Matter is both a means to and barrier of artistic creations. "For Tillich there is a vision whose communication is obstructed by the very material which is the means of its realization." "Is Tragedy Essential to Knowing?" "A Critique of Dr. Tillich's Aesthetic," in The Journal of Religion, XLIII (October, 1963), 281.

[2] Tillich, III, 65.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

It is at this point that one might feel that the structuring of this analysis of the functions of culture is somewhat confusing. Tillich admits that this is perhaps the case in that one might argue to place praxis under ethics. He indicates, however, that

> in the functions of praxis, life creates itself in a particular way under the dimension of spirit. There are tensions in all of the functions which lead to ambiguities and the quest for the unambiguous. It is difficult to find traditional names for them, for there is much overlapping and a frequent lack of differentiation between the activities themselves and their scholarly interpretations. One can speak of social relations, of law, of administrations, of politics, and one can speak of personal relations and personal development. And in so far as there are norms directing the cultural acts in all these modes of transformation, one could subsume the whole realm under the term "ethics" and distinguish between individual and social ethics. But the term "ethics" designates primarily the principles, validity and motivation of the moral acts as described earlier, and it is probably more expedient for our understanding of the functions of the spirit to define ethics as the science of the moral act and to subsume the theory of the cultural functions of praxis under the whole of a "theory of culture." The decisive reason for such a semantic distinction is the fundamental position which the moral act assumes when understood as the self-constitution of spirit. At the same time the terminology makes it obvious that the special content of morality is a creation of the cultural self-creativity of life.[1]

There are other moments of relationship between praxis and other constituents of culture. Described as "action aiming at growth under the dimension of spirit,"[2] praxis is identified as a continuation of the technical act in the same way that *theoria* is related to language. In other words, the different functions of *praxis* use tools which liberate man from the mere givenness of his life and make growth possible. These include such tools as economy, medicine, education, and the like.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

Granted that this is the nature of *praxis*, it can and must be asked as to what are the values or norms toward which all such activity or creativity aim. There is basically one value or norm which is the goal of creations of *praxis*, namely, the good, which serves this function of cultural creativity as truth and authentic expressiveness operate in the functions of *theoria*.

> . . . "The good," the *agathon*, the *bonum* . . . must be defined as the essential nature of a thing and the fulfilment of the potentialities implied in it. However, this applies to everything that is and describes the inner aim of creation itself. It does not provide a special answer to the question of the good toward which *praxis* aspires. To supply this we need other concepts which are subordinate to the good but which express a particular quality of it.[1]

The two norms or values which clearly express *the* good in this area are humanity and justice.

(a) *Humanity*. Humanity is the goal or aim of man's fulfillment with respect to himself. But given the polarities of individualization-participation, such cannot be achieved apart from others. There is no "humanity" apart from community. There are obvious dangers and limitations connected to the use of this term, especially in light of the philosophy of humanism. In spite of these limitations Tillich suggests calling the value which makes meaningful these activities humanity. But because self-determination is in correlation with others, there is a term which he suggests applying to the group which functions in the same way as humanity does in the individual. This is called "justice," interpreted as the fulfillment of the essential aim of social groups in their interrelations.

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[1] *Ibid*. Though there are obvious differences, it is quite obvious that Tillich is not only indebted to the Aristotelian distinction between *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, but also to the Aristotelian understanding of "the good," as interpreted in the opening lines of the *Nichomachean Ethics*. *Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τ'ἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται*. Aristotelis, *Ethica Nichomachea* (I. Bywater), (Oxonii: Typographeo Clarendoniano, 1954), p. 1.

> Man strives for his own humanity and tries to help others reach humanity, an attempt which expresses his own humanity. But both sides--determining one's self by one's self and being determined by others--manifest the general ambiguity of the personal self-creations of life. It is the relation of the one who determines and the one who is determined. Semantically speaking, even the term "self-determination" points to the ambiguity of identity and non-identity. The determining subject can determine only in the power of what it essentially is. But under the conditions of existential estrangement, it is separated from what it essentially is. Therefore, self-determination into fulfilled humanity is impossible; nevertheless, it is necessary, because a self determined completely from outside would cease to be a self --it would become a thing. This is the "ambiguity of self-determination," the dignity and the despair of every responsible personality ("responsible" in the sense of responding to the "silent voice" of one's essential being).[1]

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[1] Tillich, III, 75.

It might be helpful and appropriate to indicate the way in which Tillich differentiates this value from the humanism which was at one time given considerable philosophical accreditation. In an early address dealing with this problem, Tillich declared that

> the ideal of humanity emancipates personality and society from the demons of old, sacramental custom. Human kind is lifting itself up, out of subhuman and inhuman religion among other things. What is lost, however, is the superhuman, the religious questioning of human sufficiency, the judgment upon even the perfected human spirit. The ethics of humanity like the metaphysics of humanity reduces the relation to the eternal to a human and finite function. And that means the destruction of the function.[1]

Tillich demands a humanism under the designation of life in the dimension of spirit. Thereby he keeps in his humanism the ever-important reality of the unconditional, the eternal, the essential, the religious.

(b) Justice. The aim at which groups strive is justice, the social form in and by which the dynamics of group life moves and transcends itself. It is obvious that groups can be examined through sociology or through historiography, but still there is the normative question as to what social groups are intended to be--that is, what is their essential nature. Groups could not have being without form which is the meaning of the concept of justice operative in groups. Consequently, justice

> is the aim of all cultural actions which are directed

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[1] Tillich, The Religious Situation, pp, 151-152.

> toward the transformation of society. The word can also be applied to the individual, in so far as he behaves in a just way. But more frequently another term, namely, righteous, is used in this sense: he who is righteous exercises justice.[1]

Justice in the personal-communal dimension of life cannot be fully appreciated without relating it to ontology. In polarity with dynamics, in terms of which all life transcends itself, justice is interpreted as open-ended or incomplete forms of transcendence or growth. This incompleteness is the basic cause of the risk which Tillich claims to be characteristic of all creativity, but it is also the condition which makes life more than mere self-expression. In other words, "justice is the form in which the power of being actualizes itself. . . . It must be able to give form to the encounters of being with being."[2] Justice is the form of the relations between powers.

This analysis of justice lends itself readily to the ontology of love which is interpreted as "the principle of justice."[3] If love is interpreted as the drive or direction in the power of being "towards the reunion of the separated, it follows that the justice of being is the form which is adequate to this movement."[4] In personal relations, as indicated in the above section dealing with morality, the encounters are prescribed by love which demands _acceptance_, not destruction, of the _form_ of the other person. In the social relations of group with group an ontology of justice demands that these encounters be "in forms which determine the process of self-transcendence."[1]

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[1] Tillich, III, 67.

[2] Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 56.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

[4] *Ibid.*

Tillich points out several ambiguities in the form of social encounters, locating them in the inevitable tensions existing between inclusiveness and exclusion; competition and equality; the ambiguity of leadership (the leader and the led); and the ambiguities of legal form. These are not exhaustive by any means. The point which is deserving of recognition pertains to the ultimate source in the ambiguities of justice, namely, "the infinite gap between subject and object under the conditions of existential estrangement."[2] This gap, of consequence in the functions of _theoria_ as well as in those of _praxis_, becomes the gap between the

> existing human subject and the object for which he strives--a state of essential humanity--and the gap between the existing social order and the object for which it strives--a state of universal justice. This practical gap between subject and object has the same consequences as the theoretical gap; the subject-object scheme is not only the epistemological but also the ethical problem.[3]

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 54.

[2] Tillich, III, pp. 67-68.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 68

(3) Summary Concepts. -- A distinction of consequence to the theory of value is the difference between a person and a group in the application of norms. Groups do not have "centers" except by analogy. Consequently, without this important "center" the group cannot know, deliberate or decide in the way which marks an individual. Its inability to respond to the moral demands removes it from responsibility in the sense in which individuals bear responsibility.

This then is Tillich's theory of culture, understood in the forms of *theoria* and *praxis*. It is obvious that the key in the entire analysis is man as bearer of spirit. This cannot be overstressed. Several points by way of conclusion must be made.

(1) The interpretation of culture cannot be understood apart from Tillich's understanding of being which underlies the analysis of every function of man as bearer of the spirit, in whom potential meaning is actualized.

> Culture, creating a universe of meaning, does not create this universe in the empty space of mere validity. It creates meaning as the actualization of what is potential in the bearer of the spirit--in man. This statement has already been defended against the anti-ontological philosophers of value.[1]

(2) It is inevitable that this analysis should prompt another question, namely, the nature of the ultimate aim of the self-creation of life in culture. In other words, "What

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 84.

is the meaning of the creation of a universe of meaning?"[1] The answer to this is of two sides, one the macrocosmic, the other the microcosmic.

> The macrocosmic can be expressed in the following way: the universe of meaning is the fulfilment of the potentialities of the universe of being. Thus, in the human world, the unfulfilled potentialities of matter, as they appear, for example, in the atom, are actualized. However, they are not actualized in the atoms, or molecules, or crystals, or plants, or animals themselves, but only in so far as parts and forces that are actualized under these dimensions are present in man. This leaves the question of the fulfilment of the universe as a whole open for the consideration of the self-transcendence of life, its ambiguities, and the symbol of unambiguous or eternal life.[2]

The other side of the answer follows the same theme.

> In the microcosmic answer, man is seen as the point at which and the instrument through which a universe of meaning is actualized. Spirit and man are bound to each other, and only in man does the universe reach up to an anticipatory and fragmentary fulfilment. This is the root of the humanistic idea as the microcosmic answer to the question of the aim of culture, and this is the justification of humanism, which is not the principle of a particular philosophical school, but is common to all of them.[3]

At first glance this reference would seem to contradict the earlier refutation of humanism. Tillich avoids this by adding the claim that the ambiguities of all cultural self-creation must be recognized. The self-transcending function of life cannot and must not be disregarded. The self-creativity of life would become absolutized with the result of breaking down the functions of the spirit in this area. Humanism, in other words, is correct up to a point. It is in error when it fails to recognize that values and meanings are at best ambiguous. It is in error when through blindness or through a loss of the transcending function of life it ceases to ask for and to seek the unambiguous life.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 85.

(3) The values which are both realized and not realized, visible and hidden, in the self-creation of life in the dimension of spirit, are identified as the true, the beautiful, the good. These, interpreted in Tillich's own way, are finally understood as manifestations of Being-Itself. As the source of power of all life, Being-Itself is Love. As it transcends Itself, reaching for the Unconditional in terms of cultural self-creation, Being-Itself is the True, the Beautiful, the Good.

iii. Religion and the Holy

In a very fundamental manner, religion, understood as the self-transcendence of life toward the Unconditioned, has already been thoroughly discussed throughout this dissertation. Definitions have of necessity been repeated. The identification of the religious and the value sphere and their subsequent separation from history have been interpreted as the primary expression of the problems with which Tillich concerns himself. There is still need, however, to examine this function of the spirit from the perspective of the norm or value which governs it, and to show religion as a necessary moment in the actualization of Being-Itself.

It is question-provoking to suggest that religion must be treated in an examination of the norms and values of life under the dimension of spirit, since it is sometimes the case that a value theory lists as ultimate the norms provided and/or sanctioned by religion. For Tillich, religion, in the traditional sense, neither gives the unconditional norms nor singularly embodies the unconditional values of life. Yet the placing of religion in a discussion of this sort is justified by the earlier analyses concerning spirit, the freedom which is its essence, but a freedom which is always freedom under the ultimate toward which it strives. Consistency demands that a value or norm of religion thus also be found, even if in traditional schemas such would appear unwarranted.

Mention was made above of the contrast between religion as an aspect of culture, that is, with its institutionalized commands and ritual, and religion as ultimate concern, Tillich's preferred definition. It is on the basis of the latter designation that religion is analyzed in terms of the ontological polarities of freedom and destiny, correlated with the self-transcendence of life under the dimension of spirit. The direction of this transcendence is pictured as "vertical," that is, a striving for or a striving toward ultimate, infinite, unconditional being. It is suggested that "one can also think of Aristotle's doctrine that the movements of all things are caused by their *eros* toward the 'unmoved mover'."[1] The comparison is striking.

It is with difficulty that a description of this function of life in the dimension of spirit is provided. Self-transcendence "described" presents something of a contradiction or a paradox in light of the earlier claims made concerning the confinement of thought and language to the categories of finitude. At this crucial point, Tillich finds "inwardness" as the locus of the data of the awareness. Self-transcendence of life can only be discussed

> in terms which describe the reflection of the inner self-transcendence of things in man's consciousness. Man is the mirror in which the relation of everything finite to the infinite becomes conscious. No empirical observation of this relation is possible, because all empirical knowledge refers to finite interdependences, not to the relation of the finite to the infinite.[2]

The manner in which life transcending itself is manifested in "the mirror of man's consciousness" is in the awareness of the greatness and dignity of life. "Greatness can be used as a quantitative term and in this sense can be measured; however, the greatness of life in the sense of self-transcendence is qualitative."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

[2] *Ibid.* One cannot but note the centrality of this statement to the entire philosophy and religion which Tillich structures. The ontological argument, it will be recalled, is true in that it demonstrates the relation of the finite to the infinite, the conditional to the unconditional. This interpretation, plus the claim that man is the door to ontology, combine to provide the *sine qua non* of the entire ontological analysis of life and consequently of value. Man's self-awareness is *the* expression *par excellence* of the ontological argument.

In that the claim is repeatedly made that essentially all functions of the spirit are one, it is necessary to ask what relation the function of self-transcendence has to the other functions of self-integration and self-creation. In other words, what is the relationship of religion to culture and morality? Basically the answer has already been implied. In the unconditional aspect of the moral act, the self-transcendence of life is operative. In insisting that all the creative products of culture symbolize an inexhaustible meaning, that they reflect the absolute or the unconditional, the self-transcendence of life is effective in this dimension. There is a depth of meaning in all the meanings created in the cultural acts. There is, in other words, the value actualized in all existent values. This can be seen more clearly in the analysis that

> life is sublime in every realm dominated by the dimension of the spirit. The self-integration of life in the moral act and the self-creativity of life in the cultural act are sublime. Within them, life transcends itself in the vertical direction, the direction of the ultimate. But because of the ambiguity of life, they are also profane; they resist self-transcendence. And this is inevitable because they are separated from

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[1] Tillich, III, 88.

> their essential unity with religion and are actualized independently.[1]

Value, meaning or whatever, cannot survive without the infinite, unconditional reservoir of value or meaning to which the self-transcendence of life points. The fact that self-transcendence is so easily eclipsed in the creativity of man is the basis of Tillich's doctrine of autonomy, heteronomy and theonomy. The significance of these terms for the theory of value will be discussed briefly below.

With this understanding of the nature of religion and the nature of self-transcendence, it follows that "religion must first of all be considered as a quality of the two other functions of the spirit and not as an independent function."[2] This conclusion is clearly anticipated in Tillich's adding Gehalt to Form and Inhalt, the sine qua non to his philosophy of culture. The implicit ambiguity in religion is in the fact that self-transcendence does not "come alive" without the finite phenomena which must be transcended. The universal lives only in the particulars. The result is that there is need for the concrete, the individual or the particular reality which at the same time must be transcended and must not be transcended. In other words, even "religion as the self-transcendence of life needs the religions and needs to deny them."[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 96.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 98.

It was mentioned above that the self-transcendence of life is mirrored in man's consciousness as greatness and dignity. Its ambiguity is further revealed in that self-integration and self-creation of life in the dimension of spirit also impose structures, logoi, beyond which man cannot go. If he does, he becomes tragic. In a sense the realization of the greatness of life is the moment of the profanization of life. In order to maintain the self-transcendence of life in these circumstances, such transcendence is expressed in a separate function, namely, religion. This is the situation in which Tillich identifies the two ambiguities of religion.

The first ambiguity by which the holy is profaned is termed the "institutional way." The greatness of life is in religion as the experience of the holy, the manifestation of which is the foundation of every religion. "Every religion is the receptive answer to revelatory experiences."[1] And yet, life-transcending itself remains within itself. It becomes "institutionalized," and in a way becomes very unholy. It loses part, or perhaps most, of its transcending function, namely, pointing to the Unconditional, the infinite, the holy.

The second is the "reductive ambiguity," "based on the fact that culture is the form of religion and that morality is the expression of its seriousness."[1] In brief, one could imagine religion as morality and culture. This is precluded because "if one takes away the veil of self-transcendence, one finds cognitive insight and aesthetic expression."[2] The depth of the ambiguity is that religion as self-transcendence can be dissolved into its material elements only because it has the ambiguity of self-transcendence.

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[1] Ibid., p. 99.

What then is the role of religion in the Tillichian sense? As already stated, religion as a separate function is not the answer to man's quest. It _is_ man's quest for unambiguous life to which religion is related, not as the answer but as the medium of the answer. Religion is the experience of the holy or the value dimension of life in all its functions. The "norm" of religion is _the holy_, defined "as the quality of that which concerns man ultimately. Only that which is holy can give man ultimate concern, and only that which gives man ultimate concern has the quality of holiness."[3]

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 100.

[2] _Ibid_.

[3] Tillich, I, 215. Phenomenologically, the holy is distinguished from the other norms or values in terms of the particular function to which it is related. Essentially, all the functions are but distinct moments in life in the dimension of the spirit. As such, they are one.

Again we come to the cornerstone of Tillich's philosophy by pointing out the earlier analysis of the centered self and its relation to ultimate concern. The holy becomes the assumption, the a priori of morality and consequently of culture and religion. The holy is not "an addition" to reality, it is the depth of it. It is the "all in all." Consequently, one cannot ultimately understand the "holy norms" or "holy values" as opposed to the "profane norms" or "profane values." There ultimately can be no conflict between the values of religion as opposed to the values of culture. Though, of course, existentially there is conflict, essentially the values of morality, culture and religion are under the norm of the holy and express in their depth the holy, Being-Itself.

In Dynamics of Faith[1] Tillich suggests that every experience of the holy is both ontological and moral, the former communicating the awareness of the holiness of being, the latter manifesting the experience of the holiness of what ought to be.

This experience, interpreted as self-awareness, is the experience of ultimate concern. It is the centered self which is the prius of all functions and all self-awareness. Because our ultimate concern is both the ontological and moral experience of the holy, it represents what we essentially are and utters the demand of what we ought to be. It is the impetus to all other functions.

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[1] Note especially chapter four of this volume.

What can be concluded regarding the relationship of religion to value? There would be no realizations of any value at all were it not for the reality of religion in the sense of ultimate concern. It is ultimate concern that is the basis of self-awareness, for the "birth of man," in whom the universe of value and meaning comes alive. In another sense, the traditional sense of religion, religion is always tending to obliterate _the_ Value in values. It takes away their ultimate dimension. It profanes them and consequently makes them of no ultimate value. Created is the dreaded "anarchy of values."

This situation creates tension between religion and culture in the situation of existential estrangement. If one suddenly concluded that there is no value such as truth, beauty, justice, humanity (the good), or that there was nothing sacred or holy, and if one really was unconditionally serious, was ultimately concerned about the valuelessness of life--about its meaninglessness--then in this state one finds and experiences the value which had eluded him. This is the significance of the relationship of religion as ultimate concern and value. As such, value is an omnipresent reality. Value is the Holy. It is the prius of all knowledge and all action. As is demonstrated in the book, _Love, Power, and Justice_, "no discussion of concepts like love, power, and justice, is possible without touching the dimension of ultimate concern, the dimension of the holy."[1]

6. Values and Life

The crisis which shattered the meaningfulness of life (as commonly structured) in Tillich's post-war days was never so great that he was forced to abandon claim to the Absolute. The cultural milieu in which there was confessed loss of a sense of meaningfulness of life, a sense of valuelessness or emptiness in the cultural realm, never totally captured the young Tillich. He was taken by these circumstances to the brink or the boundary of despair. But once there, he was held or grasped by the meaning of the Protestant Principle. Meaning and value penetrated through the meaninglessness of the day. This awareness was experienced as the *Gestalt* of grace without which it would be impossible for anything to have existence, even the question or the experience of the meaninglessness or valuelessness of life. The essence of life in the spirit was triumphant.

The inextricable essence of life in the dimension of spirit is characterized by Tillich as the Spiritual Presence. At the boundary there dawns the awareness that, all appearances to the contrary, the Unconditional is never separated from life in the spirit. In morality, culture, and religion there is always the impact of the Spiritual Presence, of the Absolute, Unconditional, Ground, Value of life. Mankind is never alone. ". . . There is always New Being in History."[1] Life in terms of morality, culture, and religion (Form, Inhalt, Gehalt) would be impossible were there not participation in the unambiguous life in the dimension of spirit--in the Spiritual Presence.

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[1] Tillich, *Love, Power, and Justice*, p. 108.

However, all of life is estranged from its ground. Life in the spirit is a mixture of existential life and the "life" of the Spiritual Presence. Consequently, the depth can be hidden. The Gestalt of grace can be obscured, and in fact it is obscured. As indicated earlier, everything that exists has the two-fold characteristic of hiding and revealing. Life in all dimensions is ambiguous, and life in the spirit is no exception.

Drawing now from the analysis of culture as discussed in the earlier sections, it is possible to note the effect of this ambiguity in terms of a few very important and central concepts. Nothing can exist without taking a form in which to exist. Given the necessary polarity of dynamics-form, there is no denying this claim. All value in things and people is finally to be correlated with this analysis. Tillich is prophetically concerned with justice in which he saw the intrinsic claim of everything to its essential form. However, under the conditions of existential estrangement, forms of being--in culture, especially, as interpreted in the analysis of art--can be actualized in three distinct ways.

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[1] Tillich, III, 140.

Life in the dimension of spirit can be so interpreted dualistically that the meaning-giving, value-bestowing form is added to given reality. This was being done in terms of supernaturalistic theology and neo-Kantian philosophy. This method is interpreted by Tillich as potentially heteronomous, defined as "die Zerbrechung der selbstgesetzlichen Formen menschlichen Denkens und Handelns durch ein dem Geist fremdes und äusserliches Gesetz."[1] This approach, commonly advocated in the name of religion as it is traditionally understood, is rejected by Tillich in the name of the intrinsic holiness and goodness of life as it is here and now. Heteronomy lives on a dualism which is regarded as destructive to life. In terms of the concern of this dissertation it would have to be argued that values "out there" in some transcendent realm, imposed and validated on the basis of their being transcendentally grounded, destroy, by their being separate, the essential value on which all life feeds. Values come out of life; they cannot be imposed upon life.

The rejection of heteronomy in favor of an autonomy is interpreted by Tillich as an advance of the human spirit.

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[1] Paul Tillich, "Theonomie," in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Band 5, (zweite Auflage; Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1931), col. 1128.

It permitted the surge of expression of being without life-killing imposition of strange forms. Again, these distinctions are best comprehended in terms of the experience of art from which Tillich draws them.

Given the conditions of estrangement, autonomous life in the spirit can become self-destructive. It can, and does, turn from the transcendent which is correctly regarded as no longer above it. But it errs when it fails to recognize the transcendent depth within itself. It ceases to participate in the self-transcendence which is characteristic of all forms of being. That this was happening was confirmed in Tillich's mind by both the First World War and positivism. The Gehalt dimension was eclipsed. Value, the Unconditional, was lost. Self-destroying relativism or self-destroying absolutism were seemingly the only possible alternatives. There was to be found a third way which avoided the destructiveness of both relativism and demonism.

Tillich seeks to provide a new Weltanschauung in order to assure a permanent and necessary place to the self-transcending moment in every expression of life. In the natural realm this is characterized as "belief-ful realism," while in the cultural function of the spirit it is characterized as theonomous culture. This is Tillich's answer to the destructive alternatives of either autonomy or heteronomy, alternatives he regards as descriptive of the crisis of the day.

> The question of the final criterion for human thinking and acting has become acute today, to an extent never seen since the struggle between Roman Paganism and ancient Christianity. . . . The question of heteronomy and autonomy has become the question of the final criterion of human existence.[1]

Theonomy is to avoid the dangers of heteronomy and autonomy. A theonomous culture means essentially that

> alle Funktionen des Geistes, die gesamte Kultur in all ihren Formen, Symbol einer unbedingten Verbundenheit mit dem Unbedingten ist; dass die Formen des Denkens, der Kunst, des sittlichen und politischen Lebens nicht in ihrem Eigenwart und ihrer Eigengeltung von Bedeutung sind, sondern in ihrer Funktion als Ausdruck eines religiös erfüllten Lebens.[2]

Theonomy serves as a guard to destructive demonization of life by "pointing" to the Unconditional. In the "pointing to" it prohibits "identifying with." In all of life in the spirit there is ambiguity. No value is absolute, although theonomous values point to the absolute value. The ambiguities in morality, culture, and religion are all interpreted in terms of the basic polar structure of being, of subject and object. Though finiteness precludes the overcoming of ambiguity, a theonomous culture (the state of culture under the impact of the Spiritual Presence, or one "in which the ultimate meaning of existence shines through all finite forms of thought and action,"[3]) points to the essential unity in which morality, culture, and religion are one. It points to the Spiritual Presence, the essence of life in the spirit.

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[1] Tillich, Interpretation of History, p. 28.

[2] Tillich, "Albrecht Ritschl zu seinem hundertsten Geburtstag," in Theologische Blätter, III (1922), 50.

[3] Tillich, Protestant Era, p. xvi.

To help clarify the concept even more, Tillich lists three qualities of a theonomous culture. (1) The first quality is "that it communicates the experience of holiness, of something ultimate in being and meaning, in all its creations."[1] (2) The second quality of such a culture is "the affirmation of the autonomous forms of the creation process."[2] (3) The final quality is marked by its "permanent struggle against both an independent heteronomy and an independent autonomy."[3] It is this permanent struggle which initiates the quest for a new theonomy which is grasped always and only by the impact of the Spiritual Presence. Spiritual Presence is the sine qua non of theonomous culture. In short, theonomy transforms heteronomy and autonomy.

It is the Spiritual Presence which works to effect an unambiguous, though but fragmentary, unity of morality, culture, and religion--a unity which was disrupted under the conditions of existential estrangment. Since a fragmentary reunion is possible, the Spiritual Presence creates not only a theonomous culture but a theonomous morality as well. When "theonomous" is applied to culture and morality it "has the meaning of the paradoxical phrases 'transcultural culture' and 'transmoral morality'."[1]

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[1] Tillich, III, 251. It is interesting that Leibrecht claims that "Tillich's call to theonomy is his greatest challenge to modern thought." Leibrecht, "The Life and Mind of Paul Tillich" in Walter Leibrecht, ed., *Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich*, p. 17.

[2] Tillich, III, 251.

[3] *Ibid*.

A theonomous morality is one in which the ambiguities of the moral imperative's validity, the relativity of the content of the moral imperative, and the power of the moral motivation are all resolved in terms of agape. It is not necessary to repeat the manner in which this is accomplished. This leads Tillich to conclude that ethics as such have a moment of theonomity, even if it is obscured or denied.

> Theonomous ethics in the full sense of the phrase, therefore, is ethics in which, under the impact of the Spiritual Presence, the religious substance--the experience of an ultimate concern--is consciously expressed through the process of free arguing and not through an attempt to determine it. Intentional theonomy is heteronomy and must be rejected by ethical research. Actual theonomy is autonomous ethics under the Spiritual Presence.[2]

Consequently all ethics, being the symbols of ultimate concern, fall under the judgment of agape. This includes an ethic which is supposedly revealed as well as an ethic which makes no such claim.

The ambiguity of self-determination, like other ambiguities, is "rooted in the fact that the self as subject and the self as object are split and that the self as subject tries to determine the self as object in a direction from which the self as subject is itself estranged."[1] The implication is that no centered self in existential estrangement is fully identical with itself. However, when

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 266.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 267-268.

> the Spiritual Presence takes hold of a centered person, it re-establishes his identity unambiguously (though fragmentarily). . . . The self which has found its identity is the self of him who is "accepted" as a unity in spite of his disunity.[2]

In the same manner, the ambiguities of personal encounter are resolved by the impact of the Spiritual Presence which is the "third thing" in which both sides in the encounter belong while it transcends them both. "Neither surrender nor subjection are adequate means of reaching the other one."[3] The Spiritual Presence working in life makes personal encounter possible without either of these consequences.

In the areas of theoria, it is the function of the Spiritual Presence which effects an unambiguous, though fragmentary, unity of the subject-object, the separation of which makes for the ambiguities which were discussed in the section above dealing with culture. Under the impact of the Spiritual Presence the subject-object structure is overcome--at least to a degree. And according to this degree,

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 260.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 261.

> observation is replaced by participation (which includes observation) and conclusion is replaced by insight (which includes conclusion). Such insight on the basis of participation is not a method which can be used at will but a state of being elevated to what we have called the transcendent unity.[1]

In the same way, the answer of the unambiguous holds true for the aesthetic function of theoria. All, rather than one or some, of man's cognitive encounters with reality become developed.

In similar manner, the ambiguities of humanity and justice are overcome by the impact of the Spiritual Presence, a designation of the essential structure of life in the spirit. Essentially, it must be remembered, morality, culture and religion are united in one function. But it must also be remembered that

> this picture of the essential relation of the three functions of the spirit is both "transhistorical remembrance" and "utopian anticipation." As such it judges their actual relations under the conditions of existence. But it is more than an external judge. It is actual in so far as essential and existential elements are mixed in life and since the unity of the three functions is as effective as their separation. It is just this that is the root of all ambiguities under the dimension of the spirit. And only because the essential element is effective in life--though ambiguously--can its image be drawn as the criterion of life.[2]

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 256.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 95.

Tillich gives a succinct summary of the essential relation of the three functions of the spirit, a summary which will help in understanding what is meant by the term fragmentary.

> The moral act establishes man as a person, and as a bearer of the spirit. It is the unconditional character of the moral imperative that gives ultimate seriousness both to culture and to religion. Without it culture would deteriorate into an aesthetic or utilitarian enterprise, and religion into an emotional distortion of mysticism. . . . Science and the arts, politics, education--all become empty and self-destructive if, in their creation, the moral imperative is disregarded. The imperative exhibits itself in scientific and artistic honesty to the extent of self-sacrifice; in one's commitment to humanity and justice in social relations and political actions; and in the love of one toward the other, as a consequence of experiencing the divine love. These are examples which demonstrate that, without the immanence of the moral imperative, both culture and religion disintegrate because of lack of ultimate seriousness.[1]

However, the problem is that under existential estrangement, the unity is shattered, and would be totally separated if it were not for the work of the Spiritual Presence which is ever at work to effect theonomous forms through which in all of cultural creations the infinite, the Unconditional, the value of values, the meaning of meanings can appear. The Spiritual Presence is the unambiguous unity of these functions. But its "accomplishments" under the conditions of time and space are fragmentary. And being fragmentary, its work is always anticipatory--anticipating the non-fragmentary--anticipating the Kingdom of God.

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[1] Tillich, Morality and Beyond, pp. 18-19.

In this discussion of the essential nature of life in terms of the Spiritual Presence there is indicated how all of life, as it creates and actualizes itself, is possible only because of the grace which is operative in and upon it. From this, it must be concluded, is Tillich convinced that mankind is never alone. Never is the a priori of Being or value absent completely. There is therefore a value in even the lowest of values; a truth even in error; goodness even in evil. Man, to be man, has values which are grounded in the nature of Being-Itself. They are objective and because of this they can be meaningfully discussed, "Good" refers to something objective, namely, the essential nature of things. And this essence is always "there," and "here;" "out there" in the objective world and "in here" in the subjective world of man.

This ambiguity of life imposes on all revelations of the unambiguous a certain quality which is termed "fragmentary." The absolute is never identical with that through which it is manifest. Precluded is any identification of a value with value; a good with good. But neither is it possible to separate disvalue from value; evil from good.[1] Man's values must be so understood, so interpreted as to permit the unconditional to be manifest through them. They must become *theonomos*. Even though that which theonomity reveals is fragmentary, it creates an anticipation of that which is *not* fragmentary. It creates the hope for the recapture of that which was once man in the state of dreaming innocence. It creates the hope for the end which is the beginning. It actualizes the desire for the state in which God is all and in all.

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[1] Although some similar statement is made by Tavard in his criticisms of Tillich's analysis of law and morality, it is here relevant to the very core of the philosophy which grounds value in being. H. N. Wieman claims that such an equation of value and being actually adds to the confusion of the times. The ontological ground "sustains in existence

7. Values and Eternity

It would not be possible to complete an exposition of the major aspects of the nature of value in Tillich's thought without making some reference to his concept of essentialization. Basically, this concept concerns both creation, history, and that which is "beyond" both. The examination of Tillich's ontology has suggested that value is being, the a priori of all life in all of its dimensions. Unqualified accreditation is given the biblical declaration that creation--life--is good. Human history is likewise regarded as nothing other than the actualizations of the essential goodness of being. But every actualization is am-

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the very worst as much as the best. The process of degradation to the last demonic level participates in the power of being as much as the creativity toward the highest." *Man's Ultimate Commitment* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1958), p. 128. This criticism is also contained in his book, *The Source of Human Good* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), pp. 33 ff.

biguous. Freedom is such that it can deny being, the Unconditional. When it does, being destroys those expressions which deny it. The wrath of God, understood as the love of God which leaves to its own destruction that which resists love, is operative. Yet while claiming that actualization in freedom always involves something of this tendency to de-structure the structure of being, it is impossible, given the polarity of freedom-destiny, that this destructiveness can ever be complete. That things "are" or "exist" at all is a testimony to grace--to the essential goodness of being.

History is finally the victory of the Absolute, the Unconditional. It is always an actualization of value, which can likewise be interpreted as a victory of Being-Itself. History is always relatively good, since in the multidimensional unity of life, it is but a completion of creation. Consequently, it is "only the valuation of the creation as good [that] makes an eschatology of fulfilment possible; and only the idea of fulfilment makes the creation meaningful."[1]

Several parts of this dissertation have alluded to the thesis that history is the continuation of creation. Depending on being, all creation has by necessity to actualize some value, some essential goodness. Interpreting new creations as products of man's freedom, one reaches the conclusion that man's creations can be interpreted in no other way than as embodiments of the Unconditional. Considered either from the point of view of formal or final "cause," the new which is created is "essentially related to meanings or values."[1] As stated earlier, history is the realm of the actualization of values, or, in deference to Tillich's concern regarding the word value, the actualization of meaning.

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[1] Tillich, III, 299. In Biblical Religion Tillich repeats this by claiming that the doctrine of creation "emphasizes the dependence on God of everything created and, consequently, the essential goodness of creation." Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 35.

Tillich addresses himself to several questions concerning history and the interpretations of historical phenomena. The first issue of importance concerns the degree to which history can be regarded as progress. In other words, we might ask if there is progress in the production or realization of values. In keeping with the basic motif of his thought, the answer is a yes and a no.

> In every creative act progress is implied, namely, a step (gressus) beyond the given. In this sense the whole movement of history is progressive. It progresses to the particularly new and tries to reach the ultimately new. This applies to all sides of the cultural function of the human spirit, to the functions of theoria as well as to the functions of praxis, and it applies to morality and religion in so far as cultural content and cultural forms are implied in them.[2]

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[1] Tillich, III, 303.

[2] Ibid., p. 333. The use of the words, "ultimately new" must be clarified. It is for Tillich a direction, not a destination. In one sense there is nothing ultimately new in this system. The new is always created out of freedom in polarity with destiny.

In contrast, it must be stressed that in the functions of the spirit as functions, there is no progress. The moral act is ever the same though we might readily admit that the content of the moral act has undergone considerable refinement, from primitive to modern ethics. Education has indeed helped to make more secure the moral habits of man. In a sense, the same obtains also in the realm of culture, although for Tillich the classical expression of man's encounter with reality, whether through arts, philosophy or in the personal-communal realms, is always the same and progress can be measured only as a variation of attempts to reach the classical expression. So also with religion, as with the other functions, there is here only progress to the degree that culture progresses in richness and breadth.

The freedom to produce or to create the new is limited by the pole of destiny. This polarity is the foundation of Tillich's optimism that there is a necessary guarantee that disintegration, destruction, or profanization cannot conquer the temporal and eternal aims of the historical process. "The demonic forces are not destroyed, but they cannot prevent the aim of history, which is reunion with the divine ground of being and meaning."[1] Being will not fail in its drive to be reunited with itself. There is value actualization in everything that is. Further, it is asserted that what potential being becomes actualized is preserved in the

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 373.

Divine Life. Such statements embody Tillich's doctrine of essentialization.

In history as the creation or actualization of values, the same analysis obtains. History, is also a "mixture" of the essential (the Kingdom of God) and existential. As pointed out in the analysis of the spirit, there is always an element of new being in every creation of the new. There is always an actualization of the Kingdom of God. As it is true in man, so in history, the essential is in history. It was mentioned above that history is creative of the qualitatively new--and its thrust and quest is toward the ultimately new,

> which, however, it can never attain within itself because the ultimate transcends every temporal moment. The fulfilment of history lies in the permanently present end of history, which is the transcendent side of the Kingdom of God: the Eternal Life.[1]

It is the concept of eternal life that completes the theory of essentialization.

Tillich claims that it is the ever-present end of history--the telos of history--which somehow

> elevates the positive content of history into eternity

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[1] Ibid., p. 396. Tillich gives little attention to the description of human fulfillment except in terms of fulfillment of potentialities. "By blessedness I do not mean going to Heaven or hell, or something like that. That is not the point. I mean the fulfillment of the highest human potentialities, including the relationship to God as a basis. . . . The decisive thing here is the desire, the inner relationship to the ultimate that baptizes you, or takes you into the spiritual community, which is universal. And through that, in any terms, we can experience fulfillment." Tillich, Ultimate Concern, by D. Mackenzie Brown, pp. 218-219.

> at the same time that it excludes . . . the negative element with which it is entangled within existence. The positive becomes manifest as unambiguously positive and the negative becomes manifest as unambiguously negative in the elevation of history to eternity. Eternal Life, then, includes the positive content of history, liberated from its negative distortions and fulfilled in its potentialities. History in this statement is primarily human history. But since there is a historical dimension in all realms of life, they are all included in the statement, though to different degrees. Life universal moves toward an end and is elevated into eternal life, its ultimate and ever present end.[1]

It is in these basic concepts relating to essentialization that Tillich attempts to analyze the relationship of time to eternity, given his monistic Weltanschauung based on a concept of being which is analyzed in the motifs of idealism. Does the process of life, of actualization, change Unconditional Being? What is the relationship of eternity to time? The difficulty in answering such questions is that one must first of all recognize what Tillich means by these terms. Time is primarily a category of finitude. In fact, it is the central category.[2] As a category, it reveals its double relation to being and nonbeing, its positive and negative elements. For Tillich this means that time is characterized by "permanence" and "transitoriness." But more significant is the fact that it "ex-ists" or stands out of the Ground of Being. One must accept this "essential" unity of time with that which transcends time or he cannot accept the analysis at all. Because both of the above-mentioned elements are present in time, it is impossible to derive the meaning of time by analyzing it.[1]

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[1] Tillich, III, 397-398.

[2] Tillich, I, 193.

On the other hand, eternity "is neither timelessness nor the endlessness of time."[2] God is essentially related to time since it "is created in the ground of the divine life."[3] But it has already been made clear that the Ground of Being is beyond the separation of potentiality and actuality. Time cannot be seen "in God" except in a symbolic way. This means that special moments of time are not atomized in God. "Eternity is the transcendent unity of the dissected moments of existential time."[4] Nor is it mere simultaneity. This would deny that God is a living God.

But neither is eternity the endlessness of time, "the endless reiteration of temporality."[5] To elevate time to eternity would be tantamount to idolatry. Tillich tries to avoid both of these misinterpretations by pointing out that the relation of eternity to the modes of time is best interpreted or symbolized in our experience of the present as a remembered past and an anticipated future. Eternity then is symbolized as an eternal present. But this nunc eternum is not to be interpreted as simultaneity or the abrogation of the independence of past or future. "The eternal present is moving from past to future but without ceasing to be present."[1]

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[1] _Ibid_.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 274.

[3] _Ibid_.

[4] _Ibid_.

[5] _Ibid_., p. 275.

Does this understanding of the relationship of eternity and time suggest change in the unconditional? The answer is both yes and no. Tillich claims that everything which happens in an atom or through a genius is ultimately significant, though he offers no precise explanation of what "significant" might mean. In every actualization there is enrichment in the life of God. The "change" would then be interpreted as greater actualization of potentiality. However, potentiality also determines actuality. Because Tillich keeps freedom and destiny in irrevocable polaric tension, it must also be stated that from the side of destiny, there is no change in the sense that Being-Itself is "altered." This would be a self-contradictory assertion for Tillich. Again, we are pushed to the limits of comprehensibility and are asked to surrender again to the abyss which shrouds all further considerations and imaginations in a sea of mystery.

This "process" by which life is understood is described by Tillich in terms of essentialization, a moment in all moments of life. In other words, nothing that is created in history can ever be totally lost. Its negative and positive elements are separated, the latter being identified as fulfilled potentialities. Such becomes the content of eternal life. The eternal is not simply a designation of the future or a future state of things. It is present in both man and things, though the former alone is aware of it. Time is understood as moving "not only forward but also upward and . . . the two movements are united in a curve which moves both forward and upward."[1]

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[1] Ibid.

Eternal life, the inner aim of all creatures, is life in God, life in the eternal. The eternal is that from which and to which everything moves. This interpretation Tillich calls "eschatological pan-en-theism."[2] The "in-ness" of life in the Divine Life is threefold, reflecting the trinitarian rhythm of Being-Itself. (1) The Ground of Being is the source of everything that is. All things participate in being. (2) Everything is ontologically dependent on the Divine Life, Being-Itself. (3) To be in God, in the Eternal Life, is to have ultimate fulfillment, "the state of essentialization of all creatures."[3] The whole process of being is "the way from essence through existential estrangement to essentialization."[1] In the process, nothing good is lost. Beyond this a description cannot go without violating the divine abyss. The question as to the life of the creature in the Divine Life is left undescribed and decreed as undescribable. However, Tillich claims that immortality is valid as a symbol of man's participating in ultimate meaning and being. Man shares in the eternal life in terms of essentialization, a process which characterizes everything.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 400.

[2] Ibid., p. 421.

[3] Ibid.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., pp. 409-412.

CHAPTER III

SUMMARY, CRITICAL EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS

1. A Summary of Tillich's Concept of Value

i. Value as A Priori

The difficulty in describing Tillich's precise Ausgangspunkt for the formulation of the concept of value lies in the fact that the point of departure presupposes the assumptions which in turn involve the point of departure. Tillich claims, as the expositions of ontology and value contained in Chapter II indicate, that value is within the realm of things "spiritual," that is, in the dimension in which Being-Itself is fulfilled in meaning or value. The fact that "every understanding of spiritual things (Geisteswissenschaft) is circular,"[1] is illustrated by identifying as the root of the concepts of both naturalistic and idealistic theologians the " 'mystical a priori,' an awareness of something that transcends the cleavage between subject and object. And if in the course of 'scientific' procedure this a priori is discovered, its discovery is possible only because it was present from the very beginning."[2]

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[1] Tillich, I, 9.

[2] Ibid.

This means that at the foundation of empirical and metaphysical systems there is an a priori, which makes possible induction or deduction, an a priori which is identified as a "type of mystical experience."[1] In similar claims, Tillich insists that the cornerstone of experience and awareness is an a priori, "an immediate experience of something ultimate in value and being of which one can become intuitively aware."[2] This, it must be argued, is the point at which one must elect to walk with Tillich or he will not walk with him at all. Tillich's uniqueness is not his employment of this approach, for it is indeed an old one, but actually more the way he uses this in combining a scholastic understanding of reality and an existential understanding of man, claiming that the former is the door to the latter. Man becomes _the_ category _par excellence_, apart from which no description of ultimate reality can be obtained.

An attempt to indicate the significance of this approach for the theory of value encounters a repetition of the problem of "circularity." Being, and consequently value, is the a priori of all that "is" and all that is "known," the a priori of all "awareness." One cannot separate being from value, nor can he separate value from awareness. Consequently, Tillich's philosophy does not isolate as separate the arena of value. From this it follows that, one should not speak of a theory of value in Tillich's philosophy without qualifying the statement with the claim regarding being and value. Tillich's philosophy of being is a philosophy of value. The result is that the theory of value has to be understood along with the concept of being as the a priori of the entire system. The preceding expository chapter has attempted to exemplify this claim. From this analysis of Tillich's theory of value several important points have emerged as crucial to Tillich's value philosophy. We shall now examine them.

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[1] _Ibid_.

[2] _Ibid_.

ii. A Monistic Weltanschauung

Tillich insists on the priority of ontology to epistemology. The analysis of knowledge itself illustrates this priority. Every act of knowing has to be something, that is, have structure, and nothing can be without getting its power to be from Being-Itself. Too, knowledge is always knowledge of something. This basic polarity of knowing-known, of the subject-object, is the very structure of knowledge. This structure is simply the "given" of human experience. It represents the very polaric structure of Being-Itself.

The how and the why of this analysis takes as its point of departure a monistic Weltanschauung in which all things coinhere. The world for Tillich is a structured whole in which there is the polarity of objective reason, which is the world as known, and subjective reason, the part of the world as knower, the centered self or man. These are essentially united in Reason-Itself. Consequently, reason is regarded as the sine qua non of world and self. Reason is the structure of logos of being. Tillich claims that "where there is reason there are a self and a world in interdependence."[1] In other words, all that "is" is structured. Everything that has being has structure, the structure of subjective and objective reason.

But what is this that is "structured?" It is that which appears in the structure and to which the structure points, namely, to Being-Itself. As the ground of structure, Being-Itself precedes it. Being-Itself, variously interpreted as the Ground of Being, the Unconditioned, the Unconditional, the Ultimate, to name the more important designations, is beyond the subject-object polarity of being as its ground. Consequently, it cannot be known. It is rather that of which one is immediately and intuitively aware, the a priori of something ultimate in value and being. Unless one comprehends this ultimate monism in Tillich's thought, a monism which permits dialectical but not dualistic structures, there can be no appreciation of his theory of value.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 172.

iii. Life and Spirit

From the above summary it is justifiably concluded that awareness is a moment of great importance in Tillich's thought. It is of utmost importance to note how and where this awareness of Being-Itself (described symbolically as the power of being) is made actual. The key concepts involved in the analysis of awareness are life and spirit. Life is interpreted as the actualization of being. Everything participates in being and is therefore "alive." But obviously there is to be made a distinction between stones and history, But consistency demands that all between these two extremities also be comprehended within the concept of life.

Here Tillich introduces the concept of life in dimensions, in place of the traditional understanding of life in "levels." It will be recalled that there is a criterion by which "degrees" of value can be distinguished in this dimension-analysis, namely, the degree to which a dimension actualizes the previous or lower dimensions. That which actualizes the most dimensions is of greater value. Potentially all dimensions are in the atom. But the organic could not be an actualized dimension without the inorganic. Likewise, the psychological is "dependent" on the vegetative. It is finally in man that the most encompassing dimension is located. It is in man that the dimension of spirit is actualized, an actualization that presupposes and transcends in freedom the psychological dimension.

Spirit (Geist) is defined as the actualized unity of being (Sein) and meaning (Denken). In terms of the previous analysis, spirit is the actualized unity of the subjective and objective logos of Being-Itself. In spirit are united the going-out-from and the returning to Being-Itself. Therefore it is most significant that Tillich understands man as the bearer of the spirit in whom Being-Itself actually becomes aware of Itself. The implications of this analysis become explicit in the claim that "if there is a knowledge of God, it is God who knows himself through man."[1]

iv. Man

The full import of Tillich's anthropology revolves around the concept of personal center, which, as is indicated above, is a very crucial point in the analysis of man as the door to ontology. It is therefore central to the concept of value.

Being-Itself or the Ground of Being is more consistently referred to as the Unconditional. The Unconditional as the Ground of Being is also a moment in man's self-awareness. The "center" of man is interpreted as the ground or the a priori of the self-world structure, as the "point" which has a self and a world. In short, awareness is unconditional awareness. Awareness analytically involves the functions of self-integration, self-creation and self-transcendence. It is in the first of these three functions that the unconditional actually breaks through finiteness. Tillich claims that

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[1] Ibid.

> the only point at which the prison of finitude is open is the realm of moral experience, because in it something unconditional breaks into the whole or temporal and causal conditions. But this point which Kant reaches is nothing more than a point, an unconditional command, a mere awareness of the depth of reason.[1]

Tillich equates "center" and "point." As such it is the Ego which is prior to deliberating, deciding, choosing, etc. It is the locus in which freedom transcends the mere psychological dimension to bring into actualization the realm of the spirit, the realm of the personal-communal. While admitting that there is a moment of subjectivity in all things, and that in the psychological dimension there is a "self-hood" of sorts, Tillich claims that in man one "has" a self and the "haver" of the self is a kind of self better symbolized as center. Here is the import of the concept of being aware of one's self-awareness. Such awareness, actualized in the encounter with other persons wherein the self is thrown back on the self, produces thereby a self that is able to have both a self and a world.

Tillich's analysis linking the unconditional moral imperatives to become a person in a community of persons with self-awareness results in the claim that in self-awareness there is of necessity unconditional awareness. As already suggested, this can also be formulated as awareness of the Unconditioned. This makes it possible to characterize the center of self-awareness with the adjective "unconditional," and from there to locate the full impact of "unconditional concern" in the philosophy and theology of Tillich.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

In the analysis of the self-integration or self-constitution of life in the dimension of spirit as morality (a self-integration which cannot be avoided since it is the spiritual actualization of the individualization-participation polarity of being), the moral imperative to actualize one's self as a person in a community of persons is accorded the attributes of being apodictically necessary and certain. Self-awareness is the awareness of this unconditional moral imperative. Consequently, this moment of the unconditional, which is the a priori of ultimate meaning and value, is the self which is immediately aware of itself. It is actually prior to knowing in the only sense in which Tillich depicts knowing, namely, in the subject-object structure. This self as center is the a priori of all the functions of the spirit, namely, self-integration, self-creation and self-transcendence. As such, it is the seed which impregnates each function with the Unconditional, interpreted as the a priori of being and value. This is an extremely dialectical analysis and if it is difficult to grasp, the difficulty is indigenous to the philosophy itself.

v. Creations and Values

However the full import of the value ontology has not yet been fully explored. It is man, as indicated above, in which history is actualized. From this it follows that history must be seen as the dimension in which values are actualized or realized, as the dimension in which life in meanings is actualized. Tillich suggests that man is to be interpreted as sharing the creative work of God. Man as spirit actualizes value in his creative processes because he actualizes being.

The creation of the new presupposes two important moments in Tillich's thought, namely, freedom and spirit. The former is the sine qua non of the latter, the power to transcend the given to create the new. But lest this claim be misinterpreted, it must be noted again and again that freedom is not freedom from being, rather it is freedom for being. This is the significance of the often-referred to polarity in which freedom is ever in tension with destiny.

In keeping with the pervasive ontological structure, polarities and elements, it can be affirmed that freedom in man is the freedom of being to go out from itself, that is, to transcend itself through actualizing itself, and returning to itself. In other words, the destiny of freedom is nothing other than Being-Itself. Tillich's analysis of man's freedom in terms of creativity in the dimension of spirit carries this analysis to its logical conclusion. The creative functions of life in the spirit are under the norm of Being-Itself, so interpreted in relationship to the particular functions of man as bearer of spirit. The Unconditioned must be seen as reaching through the conditioned for Itself. That which it reaches is finally but Itself, described only in various terms which are related to the several specific functions.

It is necessary to make inquiry concerning the possibility of there being something actualized or created which would be of absolutely no value. The answer is negative. Nothing can violate the structure which is the presupposition for "being" anything. This analysis leads to Tillich's affirmation of the essential goodness, the intrinsic value of the world, of creation. Nothing "is" unless it has or participates in being and consequently value. Essentially, the world is the good actualized through the freedom of Being-Itself, consciously in self-awareness through man. The consistency of Tillich's analysis is realized in his interpretation of the various functions of the spirit and the values which they embody.

vi. The Functions of the Spirit and Related Values

All creativity is to be understood in relation to the spirit-dimension of life. Further, the ontology of the spirit, as has been outlined earlier, must be interpreted as determinative for any analysis of creativity. Tillich has been faithfully determined to interpret all creativity in terms of Form, Inhalt and Gehalt. It is in terms of the latter that he is able to locate the self-creation of life in the dimension of spirit as an embodiment or realization of the essential unity of the relative and the absolute, the particular and the universal. That toward which a thing or a creation "points" must now be interpreted as part of the creative product.

(1) Morality and Love. -- At no other moment in Tillich's thought is the unity of the absolute and the relative or the unity of the Unconditional and the conditional more obvious. In fact, Tillich analyzes this moment as the only one in which the Unconditional breaks through the bonds of finitude, measured by the categories of consciousness. It is also a point at which freedom has no possibilities, in the sense that man is destined to be free, to be man. Self-integration or self-constitution is understood as the foundation of all functions of the spirit.

Man cannot deny the unconditionality of the categorical imperative to become a person in a community of persons. The unconditional aspect of man's self-awareness bestows upon him his "citizenship in heaven," which of necessity he as a self-aware person cannot deny. He cannot refute the ultimate claim of the ultimate imperative without affirming that which he seeks to deny. Obviously, the analysis is formalistic. While establishing the unconditional nature of the moral imperative, the unconditional nature of self-awareness, it does not answer the question as to what kind of participation in a group is prescribed.

Man is helped, however, by the fact that he is born in a moral universe, that is, a universe whose laws embody the wisdom of the ages. But laws as temporalized and spatialized abstractions are at best ambiguous. As actualizations of the moral imperative laws serve both to reveal to us our essential nature (the ought dimension) and our existential estrangement from that essential nature. They bless and judge at the same time.

A further ambiguity is the fact that laws are abstractions which must be applied to concrete circumstances. The ambiguity implicit in the relationship of the formal imperative to the conditional and material particulars in morality is analyzed by Tillich with the conclusion that love in the sense of _agape_ is the mediating norm. Love fulfills the absolute in the relative. But again an ambiguity emerges. Love is "beyond" law. The paradoxical formulation of love as law (we ought to love or "Love one another") indicates the ambiguities which cannot be overcome apart from an introduction of grace, the point at which Tillich's "Protestant Principle" becomes obvious and determinative. What Tillich actually is anxious to conclude is the fact that self-awareness itself is possible only by _agape_ given by grace. Again, the Unconditional functions as the a priori beyond which man cannot analyze.

It is no accident that there is reluctance on Tillich's part to let love remain as law. What is actually achieved by this analysis is the unity of the "ought" or essential with the "is" or the existential. Actual man is (existentially) what he ought to be (essentially), and this he is because of grace. Love is ontologically understood as the very form of the process of Being-Itself seeking reunion with Itself. In the self-integration of life the ought becomes the is. And it becomes this with less ambiguity than is evidenced in all the other functions of the spirit. In other words, self-awareness is a consequence of grace whereby the essence of man is experienced in the existence of man.

By claiming that the Unconditional breaks through the bonds of finitude in the self-integration of the spirit, Tillich is able then to suggest that this function is the very condition of the other two functions of the spirit, namely, self-creation and self-transcendence.

(2) Culture and the True, the Good, and the Beautiful. -- It is to the second function of spirit that the traditional values of the good, the true and the beautiful are related. In self-creation man creates a culture. Being a self and having a world, man shares in the creative processes and brings to fulfillment being in value or meaning. This is the most important function of the spirit if one is

concerned with values in the sense in which they are traditionally interpreted.

Values cannot have reality, that is, they cannot be, unless they are grounded in being. They have being because the creation of life in the dimension of spirit is the actualization of being. As such, they are the creations of the spirit whose freedom in polarity with destiny effects a unity of power and meaning. Values participate in being because they are an actualization of being. What Tillich does by this analysis is to interpret cultural phenomena in terms of value actualizations. Consequently, Tillich is able to bring together in this moment that which other interpretations (even Troeltsch's) had not been able to relate in a necessary way.

Man's creations are classed as theoretical and practical, a bifurcation of creative forms which are finally unified in the "intention" in both toward the Unconditional. Under the paradigm of all cultural creativity analyzed as language and tools, Tillich interprets all culture in terms of *theoria* and *praxis*.

Under *theoria* are subsumed the cognitive and aesthetic creations. The quest for the really real, created by the hiding-revealing nature of reality, raises in man the desire for the true. The True becomes truth through cognitive acts in which the structure of mind grasps the structure of reality in such a way as to avoid subsequent disappointments.

Even this interpretation is dependent on Tillich's ontology. Cognition is interpreted as subjective reason driven by eros to seek reunion with objective reason. It is finally to be interpreted as Being-Itself seeking through cognition reunion with Itself. Through this function Being-Itself is to be interpreted as verum ipsum, actualized as truth in the cognitive endeavors of man through which reunion is achieved.

This analysis of the cognitive functions presupposes Tillich's concepts of ontological and technical reason, subjective and objective reason, and the basic polarity of subject-object. When one "knows" a thing he grasps something of its "essence," that which Tillich interprets as the source of its "isness" and "oughtness." It follows from this that knowledge of something always entails a knowledge of its value. This point is rather important, given Tillich's understanding of the milieu of this century as characterized at least in part by the separation of the essential and the existential. He has had to construct not only a singular world view in which these realms are necessarily one, but he has also had to demonstrate that the cognitive process is also singular. The knowing process must account for both the descriptive and normative truths. Not only is the essential knowable, it is for Tillich impossible not to know it. Error is then understood as recognizing the existential as the essential, confusing what seems to be with what really is.

Remembering that the absolute is not domesticated in history, it follows of course that all such reunions are ambiguous. Knowledge can never be certain since it presupposes the subject-object polarity. This circumstance occasions ambiguities which can only be resolved by revelation. But for Tillich, estrangement is to be understood in such a way that knowledge is already a moment of revelation in its most fundamental sense.

The grasping by subjective reason of objective reason--the overcoming of the subject-object polaric structure by way of concepts--is paralleled in aesthetic creations in terms of images. Such are the creations of all forms of art. For Tillich it is art that is the most adequate symbolism of the creative and dynamic surge of Being-Itself to express Itself. Tillich acknowledges in many places his experience with artistic creations which best actualize the form-depth aspects of Being-Itself.

Beauty is reinterpreted in terms of "authentic expressiveness" which serves as the norm or value actualized in all art or aesthetic creations. Again, the ambiguities of all such creations must be interpreted as resulting from the separation of subject and object, of the "expresser" and that which is expressed. But the drive, which is the pulse of aesthetic endeavors, is nothing other than Being-Itself seeking reunion with Itself. Consequently, beauty as the image or form of Being-Itself is actualized in all creations. It is Form.

In the practical area of man's self-creation under the dimension of spirit it is bonum ipsum which is the absolute actualized in all creations. Again one encounters Tillich's consistency of interpretation. The bonum ipsum is interpreted as a manifestation of esse ipsum. The Good-Itself is of broader relevancy than can be isolated to the praxis of self-creation. In a sense it pertains to all creation since it is interpreted as the actualization of potentiality. Consequently, Tillich suggests two interpretations of the bonum ipsum which can better capture its meaning in relation to the personal-communal realm of life.

Humanity is the bonum of personal creation, the fulfillment of man's potentialities qua man. Though again there is an ambiguity here which is the result of the polarity of the polar structure of being, it is this very ambiguity by which Tillich seeks to avoid the failures and shortcomings of humanism. Parallel to humanity in the personal realm is justice in the communal realm. Justice is the norm or value which embodies the good aimed at by groups and societies. It is also the case that there are ambiguities operative here to assure consistency in the claim concerning the history-eluding character of the absolute.

(3) Religion and the Holy. -- The third function of life in the dimension of spirit is designated as religion. Here, the Holy is interpreted as the quality of Being-Itself operative in and expressed by all religions of man. Because

all functions of the spirit are essentially one, the holy is regarded as the quality of that which concerns man ultimately, such concern being expressed in the symbols of meaning which constitute the content of culture.

The ambiguities attendant upon all religion as the self-transcendence of life in the dimension of spirit lie in the fact that self-transcendence must be actualized in finities but they must also be transcended. Basically the ambiguity is representative of the unavoidable tension between the secular and the so-called holy. Although the absolute is also here unavoidable, it can also never be fully grasped in any given moment. What is even more important, however, is the claim that the Holy is but the quality of Being-Itself, the destiny and quality of a freedom whose expression is self-transcendence.

vii. Summary Concepts

From these remarks it is clear that Tillich's concept of value is primarily structured in terms of an ontology of spirit. It is _Geist_ which unites _Sein_ and _Denken_ in terms of a creativity which is the necessary expression of freedom--the _sine qua non_ of actualized being. Recalling that Tillich is intent upon improving Troeltsch's manner by which the absolute and culture are related, it is easier to grasp the import of Tillich's analysis. Each thing that is, as well as each thing that man does or creates, is an embodiment of the a priori of being and value. In other words, the moment of the Unconditional is in everything which man, whose "center" is interpreted as unconditional, creates. The Unconditional is seen as incarnated in each expression of the self-transcendence of being, in terms of the symbols of cultural creations.

It is further obvious that the values which manifest the Unconditional in the respective functions of the spirit are none other than Being-Itself in various manifestations. The values of Love, the Good, Truth, Beauty and the Holy are all manifestations of Being-Itself. This being the case, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the theory of value confirms Tillich's deep and inalterable commitments to idealism.

Tillich's indebtedness to such thinkers as Schelling and Hegel is self-confessed. What he could not accept, however, was any kind of absolute idealism which so identified the absolute and relative realms in such a way that the absolute became domesticated in history. The absolute is dynamic power. This cannot be logicized in any absolute idea which is for Hegel the ultimate synthesis. Tillich, however, does not wish to deny a synthesis between the absolute and the relative. But it is a synthesis described not in terms of a rational idealism but rather in a kind of dynamic or metarational idealism wherein meaning or value is the moment of synthesis. Value completes being. The absolute or Ground of Being is the power of being which is dynamic, creative, form-bursting and form-creating, ever completing itself in terms of actualizations which are achievements or fulfillments interpreted in terms of meaning or value.

And yet it must further be pointed out that though the abyss of power in Being-Itself is not to be synthesized in terms of logic, it is nevertheless not to be concluded that it is illogical. Rather, Tillich prefers to designate that absolute in meaning and power in terms which are metalogical. Dynamics must be interpreted in polarity with form, with *logos*. Consequently, whatever new is created, whatever new actualizations are effected, they cannot be interpreted except in terms of *logos*, the rational structure of mind and nature.

To the degree that Tillich does synthesize or identify the Unconditional and the conditional in terms of *Geist*, *meaning*, or *value*, he faces in but different terms many of the problems which faces Hegelianism. On the basis of this analysis, one can detect the structure of the dialectical interpretation of life in terms of which the Ground of Being (absolute) reaches for Itself through man, and is enriched by the process.

Tillich's commitment to a philosophy of being which he interprets in terms of a dialectical, metarational idealism has made it possible for him to accomplish the main goals which he set for himself. (1) The worlds of value and existence are identical. The Weltanschauung which is the basis of this identity is obviously monistic in intention. Granted that it is not a monism made static in terms of unity, but rather a monism which is dynamic and dialectical, it is still monistic. (2) The Neo-Kantians are considered by Tillich as being correct in their understanding of value in terms of a prioristic analysis. Their error is located in their designating this a priori as but one among other a prioris. Tillich succeeds in locating value as the a priori of all a prioris, as the all-present and all-pervasive moment in all being and knowing. (3) His determination to discover being as the fundamentum in re of all things, including values, is successful. Tillich is thus able to guarantee objectivity and absoluteness in an area of life which was being inundated by subjectivity and relativity.

Tillich's main difference with the idealism which taught him so much is expressed in his interpretation of the error of Hegel and other idealists. The Ground of all things serves also as the abyss of all things. The finities of time and space can never exhaust this absolute in any one place or moment. Consequently life is interpreted as at best but ambiguous. Life both reveals and excludes the Unconditional.

However, the Ground of Being is ever present, though ambiguously, making necessary the designations of all "achievements" of the essential in life as fragmentary. But this necessity is two-sided. It is both judgment and grace, the "No!" *and* the "Yes!" While admitting that all actualized being is fragmentary, that is, partly essential and partly a denial of the essential, and that it can actually never be more than this, it is also the case that actualized being can never be any less than this.

Each dimension of life is described in terms of its essential nature. Life in the dimension of spirit is described unambiguously as the Divine Presence or the Divine Spirit. This is characterized as the essential unity of the three functions of the spirit. Essentially, the Divine Spirit is ever creating, through faith and love, New Being, the incarnation of which is Jesus as the Christ. It is ever creating new community, a designation for the unambiguously just society, of which the church is a manifestation, though indeed a fragmentary one. The unambiguous description of history is in terms of the Kingdom of God. It is also operative, effecting something of a realization of the Kingdom of God in history as the essence of history. By these designations and interpretations, Tillich concludes that all that is must be understood as a result of operative grace. God never leaves mankind alone.

To the question as to the nature of the destiny of actualized being, Tillich answers in ways which are most difficult to comprehend. With the actualization of being there are created the possibilities of self-realization, estrangement and reconciliation. In ontological terms, the process is one which "is the way from essence through existence to essentialization."[1] Existence enriches essence in terms of essentialization.

On this basis Tillich concludes that everything every individual does is of ultimate significance. It enriches the essential. From this Tillich concludes that the positive of every achievement is never lost. Rather it is essentialized. But it also follows that every actualized potential is always partly "lost," that is, judged and excluded from the Eternal Life of Being-Itself. All that is not essentialized is surrendered to its own self-destruction.

The nature of creaturely life in the Divine Life cannot be described. The symbols of immortality and resurrection are inadequate because they do not encompass the participation element of the individualization-participation polarity. Logic would demand that nothing ever be interpreted as purely individual in the personal realm. Man is always personal-social. Tillich might be interpreted as unbothered by the individual destiny of the person because essentially there is no purely individual.

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[1] Tillich, III, 422.

2. Critical Evaluations

The main moments and broadest dimensions of Tillich's concept of value having been summarized, it is now possible to evaluate this aspect of his philosophy. This critical evaluation will attempt to focus on the strengths and weaknesses of the theory of value as this dissertation has discovered and discussed it. It only needs to be stated as a reminder that the formal criterion which Tillich advocates in his criticism of Barth will govern the remarks made here. In other words, Tillich will be evaluated by his own standards. As indicated in Chapter I, Part 3, the criteria for the evaluations are as follows. (1) It must be determined whether Tillich's theory of values overcomes the deficiencies and inadequacies which he finds in the theories rejected. (2) There must be an examination of the consistency of the theory of value with the system as a whole. (3) What in fact escapes Tillich when judged by his own standards? (4) Given Tillich's self-confessed purpose to provide a system in which the problem of meaning or value is addressed in correlation with twentieth-century man, there must be some assessment of the degree to which Tillich indeed stands in the twentieth century--a century which he characterizes as precluding any idealistic identification or synthesis of the absolute and the relative.

i. Tillich's Weltanschauung and the Modern Era

The writings of Tillich are replete with references to the "present" or "modern" crisis. The impetus of his method of correlation lies in the determination to interpret theology as an answer to the modern man's questions. His autobiographical reflections and the concerns he addresses reveal an undeniable sensitivity to the modern situation which is considered to have begun with the era following the First World War, a war which is said to have marked the close of the nineteenth century. The crisis which is referred to so often is described in many ways but always in terms of the same theme. Formally interpreted, the synthesis of idealism was shattered. The war, its causes, and its effects destroyed the easy liberal synthesis of the absolute and the relative. These circumstances combined to indicate that the Ground of all Being is finally an abysmal mystery.

From this evidence Tillich concluded that the Absolute could not be contained in history. It likewise followed that if the Absolute could not be historicized, history could not be absolutized. This fact was the foundation for the interpretation of the practical and theoretical consequences which seemed to follow. The cultural crisis was the result of political and economic forces which threatened, like Chronos, to devour the last remnant of the Absolute, the Unconditional, the Ultimate Value of values. The meaninglessness and the valuelessness of life were regarded as the consequences of a relativity which resulted from the loss of the dimension of absolute and unconditional being.

Theoretically the situation was no more encouraging. Scientific positivism threatened to become as demonic in the theoretical realm as an uncritical capitalism or nationalism was in the practical realm. In both the theoretical and practical realms, existence and value, or the conditional and the Unconditional, were separated. The modern era began with the alternatives of a demonic autonomy or a demonic heteronomy. Because the consequences of both were regarded by Tillich as destructive, the import of his whole philosophy is in the attempt to find an alternative.

Several aspects of Tillich's interpretation of the birth of the modern age are noteworthy. He is correct in identifying the trends of history and culture as potentially demonic and destructive. He is perceptive and accurate in his interpretations of the milieu of the early twentieth century. The references to his boundary experience and his use of this to describe the modern situation quite accurately, even if poetically, give expression to a basic motif that has been discussed in various ways by thinkers of this century. Expressed in many ways as it was and is, the crisis is certainly represented in the Tillichian concern for the separation of value and existence, or religion and culture. Lacking in necessity, supernaturally transcendent or isolated in one a priori, an absolute hardly has significant relation to the realm of the finite. Relativity or idolatry are natural and necessary alternatives.

The basic approach which Tillich adopts in an attempt to work out this alternative is in terms of a Weltanschauung whose monistic motif postulates that meaning or value will be found only in a whole. There will be no answer if there is no system. Consequently Tillich's alternative is an attempt to "naturize" supernaturalism and to "superize" naturalism. In other words, he advocates a new interpretation of reality. Such an interpretation is to be based on the fact that (1) man is the key to reality and (2) an understanding of man reveals the kind of structures, polarities, and functions which make justifiable and verifiable such a view. In man is to be found the key to the answer to the problems of this era.

But it must be asked to what degree "being on the boundary" is a metaphor which characterizes the place where the problem of the modern age is viewed or as a place which is actually the answer to the problem. Tillich talks of the separation of the absolute from the relative; the separation of the realm of value from the realm of existence. He contends that positivism, relativism, existentialism and various forms of naturalism are the necessary outcomes of this separation. An yet Tillich's basic thrust is to interpret separation in terms of estrangement on the basis of his adherence to a philosophical principle of identity. "On the boundary" presupposes estrangement but not separation. In other words, it could be argued that the beginning of the twentieth century, characterized by Tillich as the eruption of the depth and abyss of being in such a way as to preclude absolute idealism's synthesis of the absolute and the relative, also precludes Tillich's synthesis in terms of the principle of identity whereby he interprets the relation between the two realms as one of estrangement, or essential identity, but not separation. To the degree that such philosophical traditions as existentialism and positivism characterize the main currents of twentieth-century thought, and to the degree that these currents of thought are regarded as the result of the separation of the two realms, one must conclude that Tillich's synthesis does not really reflect the depth of the crisis to which he so constantly refers. Consequently, it is not at all obvious that he can reinterpret the problems in terms of estrangement and yet remain related to the twentieth century.

Stated in yet a different way, Tillich's ability to be on the boundary between the realms of value and existence, between the natural and the supernatural, is precisely an achievement which the crisis of the twentieth century precluded. Tillich's awareness of the crisis is the moment which has made him a modern thinker who has attracted a large audience. His solution to the problem of meaning or the value of life is in terms of a principle of identity and a kind of synthesis which translate separation into terms of estrangement is "pre-crisis." A case can be made for the fact that for many, the crisis of our day is that there is nothing left to be synthesized. Some would argue that all there is for us is "existence," the conditional, and the relative. For some, the crisis is in terms of the separation of the realms of the absolute and the relative with no possible hope of regaining what has been lost. It seems quite obvious that Tillich's lasting appeal and his lack of appeal are couched in this precise dilemma. To stand where Tillich stood and behold what Tillich beheld are a position and a vision which some would regard as the blessings of a paradise no longer available.

If Tillich, in answer to this charge, insists that man is the key to the universe and that an understanding of man is without question the basis of this analysis, then he is to be confronted with another criticism. He argues that no moment of time and no place in space affords the occasion for the absolute standpoint (the fallacy of Hegel and Schelling). But does not man so interpreted become this precluded absolute standpoint? In any event, estrangement must be seen as a type of answer (rather than the problem) or it must be interpreted as the conclusion of an absolute standpoint (supposedly precluded by the modern crisis).

If it is granted that any answers Tillich might give to the criticism are equally as problem-laden as the claims which justify this analysis of the way Tillich understands the problems, then it would follow that Tillich's entire method is put into question. Undeniably, Tillich has established a correlation. The structure of the method stands. But the criticism suggested above implies that it is not the questions of modern man and the answers of biblical revelation which are correlated. Tillich's correlation can be better interpreted as the correlation of the nineteenth-century idealism and the twentieth-century loss of idealism, and this in terms of the former. When Tillich goes to answer the problems he only succeeds in bringing through the back door what he regards as necessarily evicted through the front door.

Tillich's method of correlation is based on the essential unity of essence and existence. It is Tillich's modus operandi by which he relates existential questions and the truth of the Christian faith. It seems quite obvious, however, that this approach is possible only because for Tillich all of reality is to be interpreted in terms of categories, principles, structure, and spirit--all of which depend on the particular ontology which he embraces. Rather than a key that unlocks a door, the method emerges more as an example of the fact that the door was never locked. Consequently, both the existential questions and the biblical answers are shaped and determined by an ontology and a methodology which reflect an appreciation for and commitment to an idealism quite removed from much of the contemporary arena.

The protests against the ontologizing of the biblical witness, (such as those raised by Niebuhr), are in part based on the view that history, freedom, creation, and individuals are not simply exemplifications of an ontological structure or mere moments in the triadic process of being, but rather are really real in their own right. It would seem that a monistic Weltanschauung has within it moments which remain incompatible with the biblical witness.

However, the protests have not come singularly from those who find the biblical witness incompatible with a nineteenth-century ontology. The dissertation has pointed out the question of the degree to which Tillich is really an existentialist. His essentialism determines his existentialism. It is strangely ironic that those who stand on the "answer side" and those who stand on the "question side" become "correlated" in their common rejection of Tillich's idealistic methodology and ontology without which his method cannot stand.

At any rate, there is now needed a new appraisal of Tillich's method of correlation. Undoubtedly he has done us a great service in pointing out the necessity for correlation. But in spite of his efforts, the "what and the how" of correlation are every bit as problematic today as they were at the beginning of the twentieth century.

ii. Alternate Theories of Value

It is yet not to be denied that Tillich is able from his own position to detect serious weakness in the interpretations of value as suggested by neo-Kantianism, Troeltsch, Ritschl, positivism, pragmatism and supernaturalism. He insists that value is not an isolated a priori of the Neo-Kantians, whether in terms of a value category or in terms of value reduced to religion (which in turn is regarded as an a priori). Only as an a priori of a prioris, only as a necessary precondition of all thought and reality, can value be understood. Tillich overcomes the formalistic limitation in his identifying the a priori of being and value as the necessary moment in self-awareness which is the foundation for self-creation.

Again it is Tillich's basic monism which is the foundation for his rejection of any kind of supernaturalism. He places himself as diametrically opposed to any kind of an interpretation which reflects a dualism. Supernaturalism's fallacy lies in its division of the world of existence and value. This approach guarantees the preservation of value in a world view, but there is no basis for a necessary relationship between the two realms.

Obviously there is affinity in Tillich for a view which is more monistic, such as naturalism. But naturalism is judged as tending to fail to discover its own structure and depth. It tends to result either in relativism or in absolutism. An adequate theory of value will have to recognize that the absolute cannot be abstracted from the relative (or value from existence). Too, an empirically derived theory of value, pragmatism for example, is finally left with the question of the value of the whole, the _bonum_ of all _bona_. Tillich's Weltanschauung adds to each part and the whole of reality the moment of _Gehalt_ or import. The absolute meaning and value, that is, the Unconditional, is a moment in all conditioned entities--in all creation.

On this basis it is correct to conclude that Tillich offers a theory of value which indeed does meet the objections he finds in various alternate views. But his success is to be found more in his analysis of the problems than in the alternative he offers. A defense can be made for the claim that many of the alternatives Tillich spurns are more the results than the causes of the twentieth-century intellectual milieu. If this is actually the case, Tillich must be judged as having failed to assess properly the alternate views which he rejects. "Relative absolutes," and "probable certainties" and "partial wholes" may well have more relevancy and meaning in them than what Tillich seems to be able to allow.

It also needs to be pointed out that any critique of opposing views is as strong as the alternative it proposes is acceptable. It seems, however, that Tillich's Weltanschauung of "belief-ful realism" or "ecstatic naturalism" is every bit as difficult to grasp as the supernaturalism which he rejects. An examination of what is meant by these descriptive designations reveals several underlying assumptions which Tillich takes from idealism.

(1) As indicated in the opening section of Chapter II, Tillich rejects any philosophy which reduces reality to nature _or_ mind. His task is to avoid meaning-destroying dualism and yet to recognize as "real" both nature and mind. His solution is found in the idealistic "principle of identity." This is clearly exemplified in the analysis of epistemology (Chapter II, Section 3), in which mind and that which the mind grasps are to be understood in terms of subjective and objective reason. Given the classical concept of reason in terms of _logos_, _Denken_ becomes the form of everything which "is," which has _Sein_.

(2) Tillich then accepts another of idealism's tenets. The Ultimate Ground of which _Sein_ and _Denken_ are manifestations, is interpreted as a living reality. Being-Itself is "alive," with life being interpreted in terms of a dialectic in which the "yes" and the "no" or "essence" and "existence" are in dialectical tension (in terms of the polaric structure of being) but also in dialectical unity. The dialectical nature of life is then used as the motif by which the elements and structure of being are the a prioris in

terms of which life is to be interpreted. Consequently, nature is "more than nature" from the outset of Tillich's analysis. Naturalism per se comes under the condemnation of reductionism or positivism.

(3) Tillich's commitment to a monistic Weltanschauung is sustained by his analysis of life as the actualization of being. The cosmos becomes a multi-dimensional unity of life. The lowest to the highest dimension of this actualization must be interpreted in terms of life conceived dialectically. It is in terms of *Geist*, however, that the unity of *Sein* and *Denken* becomes consciously actualized. The Ultimate Ground is the *alpha* of the dialectic out of which emerge *Sein* and *Denken* whose essential unity becomes actual in terms of *Geist*, the *omega* of the dialectic, which in turn becomes the *alpha* of the self-transcendence of being toward itself.

(4) Because man is the bearer of spirit, he is able to grasp the structure of being within himself. In terms of what he understands about himself, all of reality is thus to be understood. Because freedom is the *sine qua non* of the spirit, and because self-transcendence is the expression of spirit, Tillich is able to see reality as one, big, living whole in and through which being reaches for itself. The element of freedom and transcendence precludes a positivistic naturalism or an autonomous realism. In terms of the analysis of culture, all reality must be seen in terms of

the dimension of Gehalt.

It is obvious that Tillich's reference to "ecstatic naturalism" or "belief-ful realism" is to be understood only if one recognizes Tillich's ultimate commitment to idealistic assumptions. There is an unyielding disposition to see all the created realm in terms of its essential unity with Being-Itself. It is even affirmed that "the divine transcendence is identical with the freedom of the created to turn away from the essential unity with the creative ground of its being."[1] It seems again difficult to avoid the conclusion that Tillich's "ecstatic naturalism" can be ultimately reduced to a kind of absolute idealism. But absolute idealism presupposes a synthesis of the Unconditional and the conditional, the Absolute and the relative. And it is just this synthesis which is supposed to be excluded by the discovery of the abyss or depths of life.

To the degree that this analysis is correct, and given the fact that Tillich's alternative to the theories of value which he rejects is dependent on this Weltanschauung closely resembling a type of idealism, then it must follow that his alternative is as transcendent to the modern mind as any supernaturalistic idea of God or value which he so vehemently condemns. However, it must hastily be admitted that if an initial leap to either a naturalism, supernaturalism or ecstatic naturalism (with all the concomitant methodologies and issues of each) is finally determined as absolutely necessary, that is, that there is finally no other way to gain a "point of view," then Tillich's alternative is undeniably fruitful. Debatable is the point as to whether or not modern man is consciously ready and able to concede that such is necessary.

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[1] Tillich, II, 8.

iii. Value and Ontology

It is obvious that Tillich's refusal to concede to modern philosophy's lack of appreciation for traditional metaphysics makes his system somewhat unique among the philosophies of our day. Being is regarded as the *sine qua non*, the prius of a prioris. As such it serves as the *fundamentum in re* of all finite "things," of all dimensions of life (interpreted as the actualization of being). The dissertation has dealt at length with the most important phase of this philosophy of value, namely, an ontology of spirit. Here is to be found the evidence which confirms Tillich's commitment to idealism.

Tillich accepts and criticizes idealism as it was developed by his philosophical and theological mentors. The question must be asked as to whether Tillich's criticisms of idealism are sufficient to modify the aspect of idealism which he spurns. In his own terms he carefully indicates that the easy synthesis of idealism is no longer possible in the modern era, that is, the synthesis of the absolute and relative--of the Kingdom of God and history. And yet Tillich's ontology of value suggests that he in fact presupposes that very synthesis which such movements as existentialism and positivism regarded as impossible. In other words, Tillich must finally be criticized in part for his tendency to use what he suggests must be rejected. At no point is this claim more evident than in the manner in which spirit and value are related.

Tillich's main concept of value is intended to fulfill what he regards as necessary conditions for an adequate concept of value. (1) Values must be grounded. There must be an "anchor" which keeps values from drifting in a sea of relativism. The ontology provides this. (2) Values must be objective, not mere reflections or projections of personal and consequently arbitrary preferences. By insisting that all things participate in being, he is able to avoid the subjectivity of such as the emotive theory of value. (3) In order for there to be meaningful statements about value, in order for there to be meaningful value prediction, values must refer to something. They must denote. Tillich's insistence that values are found in the essential aspect of life, and that such aspect is knowable, provides the ingredients for meaningful discourse regarding values. These achievements, though largely formal, are of significance to the kinds of concerns which characterize much of the contemporary discussions regarding value and value statements.

This approach to and interpretation regarding value being such, it is obvious that Tillich at this point expounds conservative philosophical tradition which has interpreted values as real, as "given," and as objective. The designation of Tillich as conservative is an open challenge to the many interpretations which interpret him as "a radical" lost in the modern milieu. Such a designation throws further doubt on his "existentialism" and even on his daring attempt to state a case for "beyond" morality. A careful appraisal of the foundations upon which Tillich builds his system suggests that history might well have to evaluate him as one of the main conservatives of the first half of the twentieth century. It is not accidental that his conservatism should emerge from his theory of value. It is this which confirms his commitment to many of nineteenth-century idealism's basic tenets.

iv. The Ontology of Life

Tillich is meticulously consistent in his ontological schematization of being and life. The primary polar elements of being are listed as (a) individualization-participation; (b) dynamics-form; (c) freedom-destiny. In terms of life in the spirit, the first polarity becomes self-integration or morality; the second is interpreted as self-creation or culture; the third is designated as self-transcendence or religion. Sein and Denken are interpreted as the basic polar structure, grounded in Being-Itself as "source" and actualized in unity as Geist. On this basis Tillich is able to conclude that history is to be interpreted ontologically as the arena in which Being-Itself is the actualization and essentialization of Itself.

From this analysis several conclusions are tenable. First of all, Tillich is able to avoid any ultimate dualism such as is exemplified in the Weltanschauung of Plato. Tillich rejects Plato for Aristotle in his "world-view." And he also avoids any static monism. Identity as a principle is so analyzed as to imply not a unity but a polaric identity to which is added the infinite abyss or ground in which all things ultimately participate. Tillich seeks to avoid a closed universe by advocating a dynamic one; a closed system by arguing for an open one. His degree of success is in his concept of the Ground of Being as a form-bursting, dynamic power.

In religious terms, there can be no ultimate separation of the creator and the created. As stated earlier, estrangement does not have the ontological consequences of separation. The identity is maintained in terms of the former. Several critics have charged Tillich with identifying creation and actualization or the fall and estrangement.

Tillich answers this charge in ways that confirm the idealism which determines and is determined by the theory of value. (1) Creation is not temporal--it is a symbol which portrays the dependence of all things on the Ground of Being. (2) The fall, if it is associated with actualization, must be seen as a means to the greatest good, namely, the actualization of potentiality. As the exposition in Chapter II points out, the actual-potential polarity must be understood in terms of the polarities of freedom-destiny. There is freedom or potentiality in Unconditional Being, but only the freedom to fulfill or realize destiny. From one side of the polarity, there is no potentiality or freedom. There is only destiny. But such an interpretation does violence to Tillich's basic concept of freedom as an ontological element in polarity with destiny. Too, in more strict language, there can be no ultimate separation of these two polarities in the Ground of Being which, as the source or ground of life, is prior to such distinctions. Tillich surrenders to mystery the nature of further clarification. Creation cannot then be interpreted as it is by Tennant, as a "planting out." Rather, it is an actualization of being, an actualization that is interpreted as life. And here is the determinative key. Life in all dimensions is the "life of being." It can be interpreted in no other way.

v. Man and His Place in Life

The great moment in the cosmic scheme is when in man this ontological process of essence-existence-essentialization becomes actualized as spirit. Here also emerges the greatest threat to the identity principle, the moment in which for many philosophies and theologies the cosmic crisis is structured. Here the freedom of being is actualized with the result that the otherness in being becomes self-conscious. The centered individual is the extreme point from the universal. It would seem logical to expect that at this point the consistency of the system would yield. Freedom suggests a kind of self-determination which is a real threat to any first and final causes. It implies independence, It does indeed suggest a "planting out." It poses a real element of dualism. But it is precisely at this point that the theory of value confirms that Tillich does not permit this. Monism triumphs.

Man is not allowed to become a cosmic contender of singular and independent standing. It is questionable even if he is a cosmic partner. He is more a cosmic servant. The sine qua non of man is identified as his center. But this center is finally to be understood as the moment in which the unconditional achieves actual self-awareness on the basis of which are actualized being's self-creation and self-transcendence. As the discussion on man in Chapter II indicates and as the previous summary section of this chapter repeats, personal life is the highest achievement of being (as far as we know). However, it is being at its moment of greatest reality because it is being at its greatest or highest point of individuality.

Tillich criticizes absolute idealism and naturalism as denying to man ultimate significance. They reduce man to a means through which something passes. It is quite probable that a judgment of similar nature must be spoken to Tillich. Granted, the individual has achieved ultimate significance in the system, it is nevertheless not an ultimate significance for the individual self that is allowed. The ultimate significance is assured because of the fact that in and through man Being reaches itself and returns to itself, enriched by the process. Individuality is not a state of final achievement. It is rather the moment for a return to universality.

Tillich's concept of essentialization represents his endeavor to expound the relationship of time to eternity. Though only in an indirect way, here Tillich analyzes the question of whether there is change in the Unconditional. It is again in terms of the polarity of freedom and destiny that such problems are analyzed. Time is related to eternity, change is related to permanence in the same motif as is the relationship of freedom and destiny. In the Ground of Being there are no such separations. However, symbolically speaking from the side of freedom, one can assert that there is change in the sense of actualization of potentiality. There is also the "time element" in Ultimate Being. From the side of destiny, one cannot speak of time or change in Being-Itself. What Tillich wants to do is to preclude speaking literally from either side. Rather we are to speak from the middle--even if this causes us to surrender the meaning of our language to the mystery of the divine abyss.

Tillich's self-acknowledged unwillingness to discuss thoroughly the life of the individual after death, his scorn for the traditional interpretation of the symbols of immortality and eternal life, and his final surrender to mystery the nature of creaturely life in the Divine Life, confirm beyond great doubt that he is determined to assure to the universal the ultimate victory over the individual.

But does this not do violence to the unconditional moment which Tillich suggests is realized in the Ego-Thou encounter? Is man required to accept as unconditional the command to participate via acceptance in the life of others while allowing the divine ground and abyss of all being to participate in the "other" (the Thou) by using the "other," that is, man as bearer of the spirit? If so, and to the degree that it is so, Tillich's theory of value, and consequently his interpretation of culture and religion are not substantiated by the ontology which is the key to his whole thought. The consistency he cherishes threatens to elude him at this most critical point.

The ontological analysis which places freedom in polarity with destiny is Tillich's model for an understanding of the spirit. Freedom is the sine qua non of the spirit interpreted as the unity of power and meaning. And it is man who is regarded as the bearer of the spirit. Now the question suggested by the introduction into the cosmic scheme of freedom is to be asked again: Does man's existence as a "free" person destroy the foundational principle of identity? The answer is negative, for man is finally free only to reach for Being-Itself.

vi. Functions and Norms of Life

Tillich often refers to the triadic pulsation of being. It integrates, creates and transcends itself. It is itself, goes out from itself and returns to itself. On the basis of Tillich's doctrine of man it is necessary to conclude that man is the moment in this process where being's going out and returning to itself is located. This is the significance of the concept of "center" which is the a priori of all decision and thinking. In this precise moment is the Absolute or the Unconditional aware of itself in man as bearer of the spirit. With self-awareness, as the third section of Chapter II shows and as the earlier part of this chapter reiterates, the "otherness" of being is born. What Tillich does by his theory of value is to indicate that this particular moment in being's process is also the occasion for the return to itself.

The "otherness" of being still lives on being as its source. The ontology of love drives this moment of the process of being to yet a fuller moment--to itself. Self-integration or morality is the formal dimension of this moment. Self-transcendence or religion is the drive or pulse of this process--the moment of the grand Gehalt. Culture is the symbolic embodiment or the content of this process.

The being that is to be reached is the destiny which is in tension with freedom. This is the full significance of Tillich's claim that to be free in the spirit is to be under valid norms. There is only one direction in which freedom can go, namely, toward Being-Itself in a process whose abysmal source precludes any arrestment of the process. This point is a most important distinction between Tillich and such thinkers as Hegel and Schelling. The Absolute is eternally on the move--in everything and through everything. Consequently, there is no absolute place (Schelling) from which to survey the Eternal nor is there an absolute system (Hegel) which can fully describe it.

It is culture, the content of history, which symbolizes the self-creation and self-transcendence of being. Culture is the Inhalt of being's process. Culture is also the realm in which the question of value is raised, the moment in which is asked the question of the meaning of all that man does. What Tillich now must do is to show that culture is not a realm of created phenomena to which value is attributed or predicated. This would destroy the system. Rather, culture is a system of values. The Weltanschauung permits discoveries but not additions. It must and it does remain monistic. It is guaranteed to remain such by Tillich's interpretation of the functions of the spirit in which the reach for the conditional is analytically understood as a moment within the function.

vii. The Unity of Value and Existence

The dissertation has indicated that the norms or values controlling all functions are designations of Being-Itself: Love, Truth, Beauty (expressiveness), the Good, and the Holy. There is nothing and there is no one which can escape these absolutes. They constitute life. They are the essence of life. They cannot be separated from life. This is obviously a strange conclusion for a man who interprets the modern crisis as the separation of the world of value from the world of existence. Actually, Tillich's most serious difficulty is in getting them separated. Again here is the confirmation that Tillich's systematic consistency is based on a position which the beginning of the modern era regarded as impossible.

Tillich's solution to this obvious difficulty is stated in such terms as demonization, ambiguity, and fragmentariness. But since participation in being, the ultimate in power and value, is unavoidable, Tillich is not really able to interpret such aspects of reality in a way that provides a basis for a clear distinction between good and evil. At best, Tillich is able to understand life and culture not in terms of differences but rather in terms of degrees. Everything then must be seen in terms of degrees of Love, degrees of Truth, degrees of Goodness, degrees of Beauty, and degrees of Holiness.

Such a position, based on Tillich's assumptions, emerges as problematic in the following areas:

(1) Evil is to be interpreted in terms of sin or estrangement. Tillich does not allow the converse interpretation. The problem of evil is basically the problem of sin. But sin is not really a problem. The fall is regarded as a means to the telos of all the creative process, namely, the actualization of the potential. There would be no actualized value in Tillich's world were it not for what many regard as the moment in which all value-actualization is most seriously threatened. Consequently, ambiguity and fragmentariness are necessary consequences of a process that is essentially good and of supreme value.

(2) Every achievement of man, every moment of history as the actualization of being, is a manifestation of some achievement of value. Because of the ontological relationship between essence and existence, these actualizations are judged as ambiguous. However, as

they can never be totally or absolutely evil, neither can they be totally or absolutely good. The "Yes!" and the "No!" of the Protestant Principle's interpretation of the Unconditional remain operative. Consequently, one must conclude that in the concept of ambiguity is Tillich's means of hiding countless problems. It is a concept which reduces reality to a big blur. This leads to a further incongruity for a philosophy which intended to bring value back to the world of existence. Distinctions between good and evil are blurred. Starting with good as the lowest achievement possible, accepting the fact that the absolute cannot be contained in history, and recognizing that the best is always subject to a better, one has to "evaluate" with precious little alternative and with even less definity. If one wished to use more traditional value concepts, he would have to conclude that good is a "bad" that could be better or that good is a "bad" that never became better. Tillich's theory of value has considerable formal appeal. When it deals with the concrete situations and the manner of evaluating, its existential inadequacy is quite obvious.

(3) In terms of Tillich's ontology of love, there is never an absence of love. There is always a drive toward reunion. Love is what makes the world go beyond. The ultimate of love or God is maintained over

against the traditional concept of wrath, this being interpreted as an act of love which operates in that which resists love to effect its own self-destruction. But total resistance to love is impossible. Consequently, so is total destruction precluded. Spelled out in terms of Tillich's analysis of morality, no act can ever succeed in ultimately destroying either a self or another person. But if there is no consequence of ultimate risk, what then emerges as the ultimate criteria for judging or evaluating an act as moral or immoral? Tillich places much emphasis on the self-integration function of life which becomes morality in the dimension of the spirit. The foundation for this experience is the unconditional command to become a person in a community of persons through "participation" in terms of love or acceptance. But on the basis of the ontology of love which precludes ultimate separation from the unconditional, cannot the moral experience be interpreted as founded not on the ought but on the is? In other words, every person and every relationship "are" in part what they "ought to be," or, conversely, every person and every relationship "ought to be" what they actually "are." It therefore must be asked whether this blurring of the "is" and the "ought" undermines the very moment of awareness of the Unconditional on which Tillich builds his ethical theory and consequently the moment in terms of which the Unconditional is "incarnate" in the other functions of the spirit.

(4) All cognitive acts aim at and achieve some reunion or truth. To be in total error is an impossibility. Neither can one ever be totally correct. Errors are truthful misapprehensions--a failure to distinguish sufficiently between appearance and reality. But even appearances are partially "true." Consequently, what is truth from one perspective is error from another--and vice versa. Given this analysis, one must ask what criterion is available for distinguishing truth and error. Must we conclude that such distinctions are finally invalid? And yet is not a value theory that claims truth as a norm or value obligated to indicate how one is to distinguish truth and that which is not truth? If Tillich wishes to argue that truth is first of all related to awareness and not first of all to knowledge, is it not then his duty to make clear the nature of our knowledge of this awareness and/or the relationship of awareness to knowledge? Awareness may well be immediate and undifferentiated. But awareness of truth ought to be correlated with awareness of error. But Tillich cannot permit this, given the ontology on which awareness depends. Again, this blurring of truth and error puts

into question the "knowability" of the very value on which the cognitive functions depend for their validity.

(5) Interpreting beauty in terms of authentic expressiveness, Tillich argues that to be anything is to participate in or to have structure. Expressiveness being the preferred interpretation of beauty, one must evaluate here under the same ambiguity as is evidenced in the other areas of life in the dimension of the spirit. What is deficient in beauty can be judged as beautiful and what is beautiful can be regarded as lacking in beauty. Referring again to the ambiguities cited above, one must ask if this analysis of beauty does not bring to light what is hidden in all the other interpretations of norms and values, namely, the necessity to make a decision between two equally unacceptable alternatives. Either we must run the risk of absolutizing the relative or we must relativize the absolute. These alternatives can be illustrated in the matter of Tillich's understanding of beauty or authentic expressiveness. The solution is obviously to hold to a formal absolute of beauty and a material relativity in regard to expressions of beauty. But then the issue becomes one of the relationship between the formal and the material or an interpretation which claims participation in beauty of all creative expressions.

Tillich cannot permit a formal-material dualism. Obviously, one then recognizes the necessity of judging as relatively beautiful all works of art. But if this is the case, has the value theory really succeeded in interpreting the norm of this function of the spirit in a way that makes evaluations possible?

(6) There is finally no ultimate difference between that which is holy and that which is secular. The holy is the realm of the secular which is discovered and/or acknowledged to reveal its source or depth. The secular is but the holy waiting for this dimension to be found in it. On this basis, how can we make final valuations concerning the holy and the profane? The blurring of the distinctions between the holy and that which is not holy threatens the function of self-transcendence with great ambiguity. Tillich insists that the holy is the norm under which religion functions. As such, the holy is the name given by religion to all the values governing the other functions of the spirit. Separated from the other functions under the conditions of existential estrangement, all religions point in unique ways to the holy. By this analysis Tillich has been able to open the doors of the temple thereby admitting to the holy of holies the whole world. The consequence is

the loss of criteria to determine what is holy and what is not holy. Obviously this is not a great concern for Tillich, since most unholy is that which claims to be absolute. Consequently, the uniqueness of the Christian faith is symbolized in the cross wherein Tillich sees the necessary denial of the claim of anything finite to be infinite. The holy then is finally to be understood as a direction and not as a destination. But if this is so, how is one to determine what directions are holy? Or is Tillich forced to insist that there is finally only one direction? Again, does Tillich's value theory here deny the distinction between the "is" and the "ought?" It would seem that we are faced with an all-or-nothing alternative in regard to evaluations related to the holy. In either case there is a blurring of the very distinctions which Tillich seeks to clarify by his concept of value.

These summary conclusions warrant the raising of the question as to whether the theory of values, offered on the basis of an ontology which grounds everything in being, is finally a theory of value which precludes decisive evaluations. This point introduces yet another new topic, namely, the knowability of values.

To know is to achieve a unity, though ambiguous, between the knower and the known, such achievement being designated as truth. The essential unity of subjective and objective reason is actualized in all cognitive acts. Borrowing some of the most pervasive philosophical traditions of the West, Tillich concludes that knowledge is always of essences. Here the world of the absolute and relative, the normative and descriptive, value and existence are one. Given the commitment to the essential goodness of creation, Tillich is able to secure in this a priori the way in which knowledge of values can be obtained. The deeper truth and perhaps deeper problem which Tillich tends to overlook is rather the fact that essences being the basis of both the isness and oughtness of a thing, one cannot but "know" value. Knowledge of what one's self is must also be interpreted as knowledge of what one ought to be.

viii. Value and Verification

But how do we have certainty that our knowledge or our valuations are correct? First of all, Tillich denies certainty to knowledge. Only awareness of that which is unconditional in power and value is certain because it is prior to the subject-object polarity which is at once the condition for knowledge and the occasion for all ambiguity. Courage is intrinsic to the act of making a specific value judgment. To determine what one ought to be or ought to do in any given moment has all the risk intrinsic to applying a law to a concrete situation. The courage to be is correlated with the courage to value.

However, we are not left without a guide. There is suggested a method of verification. Tillich argues that values are verified by the life process itself. As indicated in the section of the dissertation treating epistemology, this standard of verification is strikingly pragmatic. The very process of being as actualized in man and his history reveals the essential and thereby also confirms our evaluations regarding life.

Yet Tillich rejects pragmatic value theory. It leads to (a) subjectivity, (b) relativity, and (c) self-refutation. It is obvious that two alternatives are open to Tillich at this point. (1) The method of verification which he advocates can stand as an inexplainable inconsistency. But if it is allowed to stand as valid, why should not we conclude that it is just as valid to construct a theory of value on pragmatic grounds as it is to construct a theory of value on ontological grounds? Tillich may be able to avoid this by insisting that the process of Being-Itself, that is, the Whole, verifies the parts or moments of the process. Doubtless, this would be the Tillichian escape.

But this raises another issue. The "whole" is not the subject of knowledge. It is that of which one is "aware" in its unconditional and essential power and goodness. This would seem to suggest that the question of verification is answered in terms of that which is to be verified. This may be a demonstration of the necessary circularity intrinsic to things spiritual. If it is, however, it should not be held up as a method of verification. We are faced with the alternatives of either a method of verification which does violence to the system or with no method of verification.

ix. Uncritical Assumptions

A further issue in epistemology concerns Tillich's a priori of awareness and its relationship to knowledge. This matter is also related to the above concern regarding verification. The modern crisis is interpreted as having lost certainty, absolute and necessary certainty. Relativity in all functions of the spirit is stated as having resulted from such a loss. Meaninglessness and emptiness and loss of a sense of value are named as the progeny of such relativity. However, Tillich's whole approach to the issue is based upon an uncritical appraisal of what is meant by certainty. He assumes, on the basis of his paradigm of truth, that certainty is necessary and immediate. Knowledge can never attain this status because it is always mediated. It is built upon the structure of subject and object, the cause of all ambiguities.

This structuring of the problem leads Tillich to the description of the alternatives open to philosophy of religion as ontological and cosmological. This a priori acceptance of the ideas of certainty, awareness, and knowledge again serves to substantiate the conclusion regarding

Tillich's relationship to the modern era. He obviously remains unalterably committed to a concept of certainty and absoluteness of which the twentieth century knows little. If the circumstances of our day finally preclude this kind of certainty, then Tillich's employment of it causes one to wonder if he has actually interpreted fully all the trends of the modern day. His failure to encounter the empirical traditions of the nineteenth and twentieth century must be interpreted as an oversight which costs Tillich his fullest relevancy to our day.

Inevitable is the conclusion that Tillich's modified nineteenth-century idealism and formalism preclude from his view a whole range of twentieth-century alternatives. Tillich might have been more relevant and finally more influential had he considered such possibilities as "probable certainties," "partial wholes," and "relative absolutes."

This weakness further illumines what has been pointed out in this dissertation and in other works, namely, Tillich's failure to consider seriously the empirical philosophical tradition which has had such great influence in much contemporary philosophy. In terms of the issues of epistemology, for example, many serious attempts have been made to recognize and accredit as "certain" the probabilities by which we live. In such an alternative as empirical comprehensive coherence, there is a recognition of the incompleteness of the "whole" which is nevertheless schematized. The same analysis obtains in the area of interpreting absolutes in other than formalistic terms. In short, it could further be suggested that the life process he so skillfully schematizes and which he wishes to employ as a verification of valuations actually verifies more conclusively these very alternatives which he fails to consider seriously.

3. Conclusions

i. The Significance of the Concept of Value in the Thought of Paul Tillich

The dissertation has demonstrated that Tillich's thought is structured and determined by a definite ontology of value. Value and being are interpreted as the ground, as the a priori of all thought and reality. The *bonum ipsum* and the *verum ipsum* are to be understood as manifestations of *esse ipsum*. Value is not prior to Being. Rather, it fulfills being. Value is the actualization of being.

Tillich attempts to interpret value in a way that is to avoid the shortcomings of naturalism, supernaturalism, formalism and uncritical idealism. The exposition of value has served to illumine the deep commitments and assumptions which give structure to the entire philosophical scheme.

It must now be concluded that Tillich's theory of value, as the dissertation has attempted to discover and expose it, supplies evidence for the judgment that his philosophy is modeled after the pattern of the idealism which he was taught.

He modifies it so as to preserve for the process of being an eternal "ongoingness." However, he never forsakes basic idealistic principles, namely, the principle of identity; the interpretation of Ultimate Reality as a living whole; the idealistic distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal (existential and noumenal) worlds; the analysis of life in terms of a dialectical process whose ultimate category is *Geist*; and the interpretation of both nature and *Geist* as manifestations of Being-Itself. Tillich's analysis of *Geist* as the unity of *Sein* and *Denken* makes necessary the interpretation of freedom, man, history, morality, culture, and religion solely in terms of the ontological interpretation of life as the actualization of being. Granted that Tillich rejects any form of absolute idealism's claim to make absolute the synthesis between the relative and absolute realms in terms of the Absolute Idea, he nevertheless makes the synthesis between the two realms in terms of value or meaning. As indicated in the dissertation, the Unconditional is the Ground of Being, it is Absolute Meaning, Ultimate Value. It is dynamic power, form-bursting and always transcending itself. Though Tillich rejects Hegel's analysis wherein all of this source and power of being is swallowed up in *logos*, though Tillich sees something which he would call "metalogical" as the ultimate ground of all being, he *never* denies the fact that whatever this Ground "creates," however it "actualizes," it cannot avoid *logos*.

It is the form and structure of mind and nature. It is the sine qua non of all that is and of all that will become. Tillich has avoided rational idealism's "completion" in a system or process. But he has embraced idealism's structure. As indicated earlier, Tillich's is a dialectical idealism, a metarational idealism.

These considerations are further substantiated by the fact that Tillich will not permit an essential separation between the realms of the conditional and the Unconditional. As indicated in Part 2 of Chapter II, separation must be interpreted in terms of estrangement, a term which is used to denote essential identity. There is no separation of the absolute and the relative, of value and existence. There is estrangement. By using this analysis, Tillich is able to structure his system in such a way that always the essential determines the existential. Tillich's philosophy is finally essential not existential. All reality must be interpreted in the terms and structures of his essentialism, the name he advocates be now used instead of idealism.

This priority of the essential to the existential is the moment which has been used to provide an interpretation of history (with Schelling) as the process by which the divine, working through man's freedom, overcomes estrangement. But the difficulty here is that Tillich interprets this transcendence of being as identical with the freedom of the creature. Given Tillich's commitment to a monistic Weltanschauung and the lack of "serious otherness" in God (see Chapter II, Part 2, Section 1), one finds some grounds for the claim that Tillich's position is strikingly parallel to an Hegelian idealism in which the divine comes to self-consciousness and self-transcendence through man. This claim is further substantiated by the analysis of value as the fulfillment or "completion" of being. At any rate, there is great similarity in the structure of the approaches used by Tillich and Hegel.

Tillich is able to unite the world of value and life by his interpretation of the latter as an actualization of being and consequently of value. As a result of this Ausgangspunkt, the Absolute, the Unconditional, Value-Itself, Meaning-Itself are not only the cause (in the sense of ground or source) of all existence but also the absolute aim of all things. This latter claim is accorded formal status by Tillich's adding the dimension of Gehalt (import) to the other "categories" of interpretation, namely, Form and Inhalt. This third dimension is the Absolute or Value-Itself as it is embodied in all relativities, by which value is necessarily realized in all existence.

Actualization of being in the dimension of life called the spirit is analyzed in terms of functions. Each function of the spirit is finally understood in such a way as to manifest the Absolute or Unconditional or Being-Itself reaching for Itself. Consequently the realm of finities (of history and existence) must be understood as in the middle and consequently as a means by which Being-Itself actualizes Itself and through the actualizations seeks to return to Itself. The dissertation has shown that each norm or value which determines each function of the spirit in terms of morality, culture, and religion is finally but a manifestation of Being-Itself.

ii. Tillich's Theory of Value in Relation to the Alternatives He Rejects

The dissertation has indicated the objections which Tillich finds in various interpretations of value. Tillich's theory seeks to avoid both the relativism and the demonic absolutism which he considers to be the consequences of interpretations of value based upon an autonomous naturalism. It also seeks to avoid the incompleteness of pragmatism. His equation of value and being and the related assumption concerning life as an actualization of being combine to provide objectivity and knowability to the realm of value. This position locates Tillich in a conservative tradition of philosophy. As such, Tillich's position places him in diametric opposition to such theories of value which not only deny values objectivity but knowability as well.

Tillich's opposition to a supernaturalism which keeps values and God as something above or apart from the world and consequently unrelated to the world in any necessary way is based on an understanding of reality as essentially one, or a whole. By locating values in the essence of things and by further indicating life to be a mixture of the essential and existential elements, Tillich is able to overcome the weaknesses in the theories of value which support or express any kind of dualism. His monism demands that essence and existence or value and existence be necessarily related. The dissertation has raised the question whether Tillich's Weltanschauung is any more "available" or any less "transcendent" than the supernaturalism which he rejects.

Tillich both accepts and rejects formalistic interpretations of value. He agrees that value is a priori but that it is rather the a priori of all a prioris. There can be no side-by-sideness of value with other realms if value is to be kept essentially, necessarily, and commandingly related to existence. He further rejects those attempts which reduce value to religion and make the latter an a priori. Formalism is also regarded as unable to account for or relate content to form. It further fails to take into account the dimension of import or Gehalt. Tillich's Weltanschauung is one in which the Form, Inhalt, and Gehalt are the necessary elements in all reality.

Tillich's critique of alternate views is judged as perceptive and valid. The critique is deficient on the basis that it presupposes and offers as an alternative that which is considered the impetus for the alternatives it rejects or precludes. In other words, Tillich assumes a world view which the crisis of the early part of this century prohibits.

iii. The Theory of Value and Consistency

The dissertation has established that Tillich's philosophy is an ontology of value and meaning without which there would be no meanings or values. It is further demonstrated that this consistency is based on a schematization of the process of being which is interpreted as essence, existentialization, and essentialization. This trinitarian description of the process of being includes as one of its moments the actualization (existentialization) into an "otherness" through which in turn it seeks to obtain reunion with itself. The actualization of being is also the designation of life. One such dimension of life is spirit (of which man is the bearer) which is interpreted so as to be the embodiment of Being-Itself through the functions of spirit whose norms are manifestations of Being-Itself in terms of Love, Truth, Beauty, the Good, and the Holy.

Although the conclusion is reached that Tillich's system is formally consistent, two points of material inconsistency emerge. These involve the verification of value and the interpretation of actualization as a means.

(1) *Verification of Values*. -- If Tillich insists that the life-process itself verifies valuations, then he

is to be criticized for employing a pragmatism which he evaluates as inadequate and inconsistent. If, however, it is intended that the life process itself, as a whole, verify the values and norms as they are grasped and understood by man, then he is subject to the charge of providing no means of verification at all. This is an inevitable conclusion because of his concept of awareness as the only means by which the whole is to be understood. In other words, Tillich is offering up as a method of verification that which is to be verified. Consequently it must be concluded that the verification he proposes is either inconsistent with his earlier renunciation of pragmatism or it is no verification at all.

(2) *Actualization as a Means*. -- Tillich's theory of value, as indeed his whole ontological scheme, is such that man stands as its central and consequently crucial moment. In the personal-social realm of life in the dimension of the spirit is the moment in which ought and is, absolute and relative, or value and existence are consciously actualized. Here they coincide. In the moment of self-integration or morality, and only in this moment, the Unconditional breaks through the finite realm. The Unconditional "is." It is embodied or incarnate in man's awareness of the necessity to become a person within a community of persons.

The expression of this command is the unconditional acknowledgement of the unconditional sanctity of the other person or persons. Love, which is the constitutive and the normative moment in this aspect of life, demands that the participation be in terms of acceptance, in terms of love. To do other than this is to destroy the personhood of those in encounter--both the I and the Thou.

Consequently, there can be no reduction of another person or group to that of a means (the basis of Tillich's prophetic concern in regard to the social evils of capitalism and nationalism). Few would challenge Tillich's insights at this point. It is only when one realizes that Tillich's idealism tends to reduce the whole personal-social realm to a means whereby the Ground of Being through history (man) enriches itself and not first or directly the "other" of its structure that the whole ontology of value as Tillich himself depicts it is severely threatened. The "Unconditional" is threatened with an exception by the very process of being which is interpreted as the structure of the unconditional. This inconsistency threatens the very foundation of the whole theory of value and consequently the whole system.

iv. That which Eludes Tillich when Judged by His Own Standards

Tillich has been able to bring together the worlds of value and existence on the basis of a monistic Weltanschauung. Consequently, the formal consistency of the system makes it difficult to understand the experienced separation of value and existence. The grounding of all actualization in the a priori of Being-Itself and Value-Itself, blurs the distinctions between good and evil, truth and error, love and hate, beauty and ugliness, the holy and the unholy. What is usually experienced as matters of kind become for Tillich matters of degree. Consequently, Tillich provides an ontology of value that must be judged as precluding definitive valuations. There are only degrees of good, love, truth, beauty and the holy. Evil can be interpreted as a good that has not become better while good can be regarded as an evil that regards itself as the best.

It must also be concluded that Tillich's employment of the "pre-crisis," idealistic concepts of certainty, experience, immediacy and like concepts has resulted in his inability to take seriously the achievements and alternatives in the empirical tradition of philosophy. He is therefore unable to offer a critical appraisal of the possibilities of "relative absolutes," "partial whole," or "probable certainty." These alternatives have developed out of serious attempts to face the problems which concern Tillich, but from the perspective of twentieth-century empiricism.

v. Tillich's Relation to the Modern Era

The dissertation has established that Tillich has a prophetic sensitivity to and awareness of a significant number of the problems which modern man has inherited. It cannot be denied but that the crisis he beheld at the end of the First World War was indeed a crisis for much of Western culture. Tillich's determination to establish a necessary relationship between the world of value and the world of existence is a genuine reflection of the crisis which he uses to characterize the birth of the twentieth century.

But it must be concluded that beyond this the relevancy of Tillich to contemporary man is greatly reduced. It has been demonstrated that his awareness of the problem of the separation of value and existence is not reflected in his answer to the problem. The Weltanschauung which is the basis of Tillich's value theory and consequently of his "answer" to the modern crisis is modeled after the one which he and his mentors regarded as no longer available to modern man. This is not to deny Tillich's detection of failures in idealism. He seeks to correct these by denying Schelling his absolute standpoint and by keeping Hegel's dialectic from ever becoming complete. But he does not renounce the assumptions of idealism. His philosophy is based on the principle of identity which translates separation into estrangement, distinctions of kind into ambiguities of degrees. He effects a synthesis of the Unconditional and the conditional.

The dissertation has concluded that Tillich's purpose to speak the answers of religion in terms of modern man is only partially realized. His understanding of the basic form of the difficulties in the modern era is monumental. But even granting this, it must yet follow that his philosophy fails precisely where he sought most to succeed, namely, in his answers. This conclusion suggests the need for a careful reappraisal of Tillich's basic method by which philosophy and theology are supposedly correlated. If he has succeeded (as it seems that he has) in demonstrating the necessity for this method in terms of the modern era, then even greater is the necessity that the "what and how" of correlation be re-examined, Tillich's efforts in this area notwithstanding.

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ABSTRACT

The dissertation attempts to discover, expound, and evaluate critically Paul Tillich's understanding of value. The concept of value is interpreted as a most central moment in the thought of Paul Tillich. An exposition of value sheds light on the deep philosophical commitments and assumptions which give shape to his entire systematized thought. The criteria for evaluating the value theory are found in Tillich himself. (1) Does the theory of value meet the objections discovered in the alternate view which he rejects? (2) Is it consistent? (3) What eludes Tillich when judged by his own standards? (4) Is the theory of value contemporary?

Tillich's understanding of the problem of value is inherited from such of his mentors as Troeltsch and Ritschl. Value interpreted in terms of naturalism, supernaturalism, or formalism is judged as inadequate. Proposed is a new and monistic Weltanschauung in which the realms of value and existence are in a necessary relationship, in essential unity. This is possible only if one founds and structures the Weltanschauung in terms of being.

An examination of Tillich's ontology, in terms of which are interpreted epistemology, man, and the functions of the

spirit, discovers absolute or unconditional norms or values considered to be embodied in each moment and phenomenon of history. These are Love, Truth, Beauty (Authentic Expressiveness), the Good (Humanity and Justice), and the Holy.

Tillich is careful to structure all reality and functions in terms of his ontology. Nothing is or happens without actualizing being in terms of its polarity, structures and elements. In this way he is able to offer an understanding of value as not only participating in being but also "expressing" and fulfilling being. On this foundation Tillich makes possible a synthesis of value and existence to such a degree that it is difficult for him to account for their differences.

Man is the locus in the cosmic scheme in which Being-Itself fulfills Itself as spirit and begins, through the functions of the spirit, to return to Itself. The notion of man's "center" serves as the point which is both the sine qua non of man as bearer of the spirit in freedom and the point at which the Ground of Being transcends Itself. Man's center is the a priori of awareness of that which is ultimate in being and value. This awareness is the a priori of all functions. Only by locating value as an a priori awareness can Tillich claim that value has met the criteria of absoluteness, certainty, unconditionality, and immediacy.

The conclusions of the dissertation are the following.

(1) Tillich's theory of values meets the objections he identifies as intrinsic to alternate views. (2) It is formally consistent with his entire system of philosophy. This consistency substantiates the claim that Tillich's commitment is finally to a dynamic idealism. This commitment results in a blurring of the distinctions between good and evil, truth and error. It also reduces to a matter of degree the difference between "ought" and "is." In short, Tillich's concept of value precludes precise valuations. At two points material inconsistency becomes evident, namely, in the method of verification and in the violation of the unconditional by the reduction of the actualized world to that of a means for an essentialized world. (3) Tillich's uncritical commitment to an idealistic-formalistic understanding of certainty, immediacy, and wholeness precludes a consideration of the possible significance of relative absolutes, partial wholes and probable certainties. (4) Tillich's awareness of modern problems is sensitive. However, his answers are in terms of a Weltanschauung of the nineteenth century, not of the twentieth century. This factor suggests the need for a new appraisal of Tillich's method of correlation.



AUTOBIOGRAPHY

Oscar E. Remick was born in Ellsworth, Maine on August 24, 1932, the third of four children born to Horace W. Remick and the late Blanche Rich Remick. His early education was received in the public schools of Ellsworth.

Mr. Remick's higher education began in 1950 at Eastern Baptist College in St. David's, Pennsylvania where in 1954 he received his B.A. Degree. From 1954 until 1957 he continued his education at two Philadelphia schools, the Eastern Baptist Theological Seminary and the University of Pennsylvania from which he received respectively his B.D. and his M.A. in philosophy. On May 28, 1957, he was ordained at the Drexel Hill Baptist Church in Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania.

One year of study at Andover Newton Theological School preceded his receiving a Fulbright Grant which enabled him to study theology and philosophy in Heidelberg, Germany during 1958 and 1959. Upon returning to the United States in 1959, he pursued his education at Columbia University and Union Theological Seminary where he served also as a Tutor-Assistant in 1960-1961. He returned to formal study at Boston University Graduate School in 1963.

In 1961 he accepted the pastorate of the United Baptist Church in Topsham, Maine. While serving this church he also taught in the Philosophy and Religion department at Bates College in Lewiston, Maine from 1962 until 1963. In September of that year he assumed the duties of Pastor at the First Congregational Church (United Church of Christ) in Paxton, Massachusetts. In January, 1966, Mr. Remick was named Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Assumption College, a Roman Catholic institution in Worcester, Massachusetts, becoming thereby the first Protestant minister to be named to such a position in this area.

Mr. Remick was married to Miss Emma Lucille Lorance of Detroit, Michigan in December of 1959. They have three sons, Mark Stephen, John Andrew and Paul Thomas.